Jeremy Kinch
Primoris ServicesAbout Jeremy Kinch
Jeremy Kinch, age 51, is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Primoris, appointed March 2025 after serving as Chief Operations Support Officer (Jan–Mar 2025), President of Energy (Jan 2021–Jan 2025), President of Industrial/Fabrication/Maintenance (Jun–Dec 2020), and President of Primoris Canada (Jun 2018–May 2020). He holds a B.S. in Geological Engineering from Queen’s University and has 25+ years of infrastructure construction experience, including prior service as President and COO of Willbros Canada before Primoris acquired Willbros in 2018 . Company performance under his leadership scope has been strong: record 2024 revenue of $6.4B (+11% YoY), net income $188.1M, cash from operations >$500M, backlog $11.9B, and TRIR of 0.50; Energy segment revenue grew 21% in 2024, driven by >$600M growth in renewables .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Primoris Services Corporation | Chief Operating Officer | Mar 2025–Present | Enterprise operations leadership during CEO transition; responsibility for power delivery, renewables, communications, and industrial infrastructure execution . |
| Primoris Services Corporation | Chief Operations Support Officer | Jan–Mar 2025 | Oversaw IT, real estate, fleet, project services, and HSE to drive efficiency and execution . |
| Primoris Services Corporation | President, Energy | Jan 2021–Jan 2025 | Led Energy business through renewables growth; Energy segment revenue up 21% in 2024 . |
| Primoris Services Corporation | President, Industrial/Fabrication/Maintenance | Jun–Dec 2020 | Industrial services portfolio leadership in fabrication and maintenance . |
| Primoris Services Corporation | President, Primoris Canada | Jun 2018–May 2020 | Managed Canadian operations post-Willbros acquisition . |
| Willbros Canada (subsidiary of Willbros Group, Inc.) | President & COO | Pre-2018 (until acquisition) | Led Canadian operations across pipelines and industrial infrastructure; transitioned into Primoris after acquisition . |
External Roles
No external public company directorships disclosed in company filings reviewed for Jeremy Kinch .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Terms | Effective Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (COO) | $600,000 | Mar 21, 2025 | |
| Base Salary (Chief Operations Support Officer) | $560,000 | Jan 7, 2025 | |
| Target Annual Bonus (AIP) | 100% of base salary | 2025 (COO & COSO) | |
| LTIP Award (2025) | $1,000,000 (equity/equity-based under 2023 Equity Incentive Plan) | 2025 | |
| Location | Houston, Texas | 2025 | |
| Reporting | President & CEO | 2025 |
Performance Compensation
| Program | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Achievement/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIP (2024 design reference) | Net Income | 60% | $142.1M | $177.4M | 200.0% of component | Cash; annual payout . |
| AIP (2024 design reference) | New Business Generated | 20% | $6,509.1M | $7,712.3M | 192.4% of component | Cash; annual payout . |
| AIP (2024 design reference) | Cash Management (days) | 10% | 70.0 days | 52.0 days | 200.0% of component | Cash; annual payout . |
| AIP (2024 design reference) | Safety (TRIR) | 10% | 0.54 | 0.48 | 155.6% of component | Cash; annual payout . |
| LTIP (2024+ design reference) | Cumulative Net Income | 70% of PSU | $242.7M | $304.6M | 200.0% of PSU component | PSUs cliff vest after year 3 (2024+) . |
| LTIP (2024+ design reference) | Operating Margin % | 30% of PSU | 4.80% | 4.95% | 115.6% of PSU component | PSUs cliff vest after year 3 (2024+) . |
| LTIP (general) | RSUs | — | — | — | Time-based | RSUs vest 25%/25%/50% over 3 years . |
Notes:
- AIP and LTIP plan structures apply to executive officers broadly; Jeremy’s 2025 LTIP award amount is specified, with grant details subject to Equity Plan approvals .
- Clawback policy adopted Nov 2, 2023 for Section 16 officers covers incentive-based compensation upon a required accounting restatement .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Item | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | CEO: 5x base salary; Other executive officers: 3x base salary | |
| Compliance Timeline | 5 years from adoption or from hiring/promotion; annual compliance check as of April 29 | |
| Anti-Hedging | Prohibits hedging/short-selling; no speculative transactions | |
| Equity Vehicles | PSUs (performance: cumulative net income and operating margin) and RSUs (time-based) |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Employment Agreement (Amended & Restated) | Effective Jan 7, 2025; supersedes Feb 14, 2024 agreement | |
| Offer Letter (COO) | Mar 21, 2025; base salary $600,000; target bonus 100%; 2025 LTIP $1,000,000 | |
| Severance (no CIC, term w/o cause or resignation w/ Good Reason) | Lump sum = 100% base; pro‑rata bonus for year; up to 12 months COBRA premiums; equity vesting per award agreements | |
| Change-in-Control Protection Period | 2 years after CIC; CIC defined per Section 409A control tests | |
| CIC Severance (term w/o cause or resignation w/ Good Reason during CIC protection period) | Lump sum = 2.0 × (base + target bonus); pro‑rata bonus; up to 24 months COBRA premiums; equity vesting per award agreements | |
| Non-Compete | Restricted during specified periods; scope includes CA, TX, MN, FL, CO, NC, and listed Louisiana parishes | |
| Non-Solicit | Prohibits soliciting employees and certain customers; no diversion using confidential information | |
| Confidentiality | Broad definition; DTSA carve-outs; return of materials on termination | |
| Arbitration | Binding arbitration (JAMS/AAA); waiver of jury trial; employer pays arbitrator fees | |
| Location and Reporting | Houston, TX; reports to President & CEO |
Company Financial Performance (context for tenure)
| Metric | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD) | $3,497,632,000 | $4,420,599,000 | $5,715,309,000 | $6,366,838,000 |
| EBITDA ($USD) | $292,109,000* | $274,465,000* | $365,799,000* | $415,416,000* |
Values retrieved from S&P Global.*
Additional operational highlights for 2024: annual revenue up 11% to $6.4B, net income $188.1M (EPS $3.31), cash from operations >$500M, backlog $11.9B, TRIR 0.50 .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Strong pay-for-performance alignment: 2025 AIP target bonus at 100% of base and LTIP award of $1,000,000, with LTIP concentrated in PSUs tied to cumulative net income and operating margin and RSUs time vesting .
- Shift to formulaic annual cash AIP and separate LTIP since 2023; PSUs cliff vest after year three beginning in 2024 (discourages short-term focus and supports retention) .
- Clawback policy implemented in 2023 per Dodd-Frank enhances accountability; anti-hedging policy prohibits hedging/short-selling, reinforcing ownership alignment .
- No strict benchmarking to a specific percentile of the peer group; independent consultant (Meridian) engaged in 2024 with no conflicts (reduces pay inflation risk) .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Change-in-control protection uses a double-trigger structure (termination during CIC protection period required) with 2.0× (base + target bonus) multiple; standard but meaningful payout magnitude .
- Non-compete across multiple states and extensive LA parishes plus arbitration and confidentiality terms reduce retention risk for Primoris but raise mobility constraints for the executive, potentially moderating external poaching .
- No related party transactions involving Jeremy Kinch disclosed; 8‑K confirms absence of material transactions >$120,000 and of selection arrangements .
Say-on-Pay & Governance Context
- 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approval: 92.3% support, indicating shareholder endorsement of compensation approach .
- Compensation Committee independence and use of Meridian Compensation Partners in 2024; anti-hedging policy and ownership guidelines in place .
Investment Implications
- High at-risk pay mix (100% target bonus, $1M LTIP) tied to profitability (net income, operating margin), cash management, and safety suggests compensation should scale with execution quality and cash generation—supportive of shareholder alignment .
- Double-trigger CIC severance (2.0× base+bonus) and robust non-compete/non-solicit terms reduce near-term executive turnover risk; however, CIC payouts represent potential dilution/expense in a sale scenario .
- Ownership guidelines (3× salary for executives), anti-hedging, and clawback policy add governance strength and lower misalignment risk; continued monitoring of any Form 4 activity is warranted to assess selling pressure (no pledging policy explicitly disclosed) .
- Energy segment momentum (21% revenue growth in 2024) and record backlog provide operational tailwinds under Kinch’s oversight; execution consistency remains the key lever for incentive realization and TSR .
