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Jeffrey Parker

Jeffrey Parker

Chief Executive Officer at PARKERVISION
CEO
Executive
Board

About Jeffrey Parker

Jeffrey L. Parker, age 68, is Chairman and CEO of ParkerVision, a role he has held since founding the company in August 1989; he previously served as President from April 1993 to June 1998 and is a named inventor on 31 U.S. patents, underscoring deep technical credibility in RF innovation . During 2024, ParkerVision posted a net loss of $14.5 million and disclosed substantial doubt about going concern, highlighting execution and financing risk under Parker’s leadership framework . Pay-versus-performance shows volatile TSR: a $100 investment (year-end 2021 base) was $25.00 in 2022, $17.39 in 2023, and $95.38 in 2024, while “compensation actually paid” to the PEO (Parker) tracked $9.037M (2021), $(2.389)M (2022), and $0.634M (2024), reflecting equity valuation effects and discretionary bonus dynamics .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
ParkerVision, Inc.Chairman & CEO1989–PresentFounder-CEO; led RF IP creation, licensing and enforcement strategy .
ParkerVision, Inc.President1993–1998Built early operating leadership capacity across R&D and commercialization .
Parker Electronics, Inc.Executive Vice President1983–1989R&D/manufacturing JV with Carrier; scaled HVAC-related technology operations .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
None disclosedNo public-company board roles disclosed for Parker .

Fixed Compensation

Metric2023 (FY)2024 (FY)
Base Salary ($)260,000 260,000
Target Bonus %Not disclosed Not disclosed
Actual Cash Bonus ($)111,000 350,000 (approved Jan-2025 for 2024 performance)
All Other ($)24,000 (auto allowance) 24,000 (auto allowance)
Total ($)455,020 634,000
Notes200k shares granted Jan-2023 as part of prior performance bonus .Base increased Apr-2025 to $400,000 (post-period) .

In April 2025, the compensation committee raised Parker’s base salary from $260,000 to $400,000, noting levels remained below the 50th percentile of a peer group developed by Alliant Human Capital .

Performance Compensation

Incentive TypeMetric/StructureWeightingTargetActual/PayoutVesting/Term
Annual Bonus (2024)Discretionary, tied to strategic initiatives (litigation leadership; financial stability); partially offsets prior 20% salary cuts since 2018Not disclosed Not disclosed $350,000 cash (paid Jan-2025) Cash (paid 2025)
Stock Awards (2023)Common shares tied to performance recognition (immediate vest)Not disclosed 200,000 shares granted Jan-2023 Immediate
Stock Options (Modification, 2025)Option expiry extension from Jan 11, 2026 to Jan 11, 2031 (no price change; fully vested)One-time charge ≈$1.9M (company-wide options for CEO/CFO); contributed to ~$2.5M H1’25 non-cash comp expense New expiry Jan 11, 2031

No NEO equity awards were granted in 2024; committee engaged Alliant in Dec-2024 for broader program review .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetails
Total Beneficial Ownership11,170,583 shares (8.54% of outstanding as of Aug 4, 2025) .
ComponentsIncludes 10,660,000 shares issuable upon options exercisable within 60 days; 393,324 shares held directly; 117,259 shares JTWROS with spouse .
Shares Outstanding (Record)120,116,916 (as of Aug 4, 2025) .
Hedging/PledgingCompany policy prohibits short sales, hedging, and pledging; pre-clearance and blackout compliance required; 10b5-1 plans allowed with cooling-off periods .
Ownership GuidelinesNot disclosed for executives/directors .

Outstanding options (as of Dec 31, 2024):

GrantExercisableExercise PriceOriginal ExpiryStatus/Notes
Aug 7, 20192,660,000 $0.17 Aug 7, 2026 Vested over 8 quarterly periods (Sep 1, 2019–Jun 1, 2021) .
Jan 11, 20218,000,000 $0.54 Jan 11, 2026 → extended to Jan 11, 2031 Vested over 8 quarterly periods (Mar 31, 2021–Dec 31, 2022) .

Insider selling pressure lens:

  • As of Nov 14, 2025, PRKR priced at $0.21 in a registered direct sale to a director; Parker’s $0.54 options are out-of-the-money and $0.17 options are modestly in-the-money, reducing near-term exercise-driven selling pressure relative to at-the-money grants .

Employment Terms

  • Agreements: No employment agreements for executives; compensation committee retains discretion over pay elements .
  • Non-compete/Non-solicit: Company-wide non-compete arrangements apply post-termination (employment/consulting with competitors; employee poaching; customer solicitations); specific durations/geographies not disclosed .
  • Severance: No cash severance multiples disclosed; standard equity award agreements provide acceleration—50% accelerated vesting upon death/disability; 100% upon change in control without Board authorization .
  • Clawback/Tax gross-ups: No clawback program or gross-up provisions disclosed for executives in the filings reviewed .
  • Insider trading policy: Pre-clearance, quarterly/other blackout periods, bans on shorting/hedging/pledging; 10b5-1 plan governance with cooling-off periods; CFO as Compliance Officer .

Board Governance and Service

  • Roles: Parker serves as Class I Director, Chairman, and CEO; Board believes combined roles best fit given size/complexity; no Lead Independent Director; independent directors meet in executive session regularly .
  • Independence: Parker is not independent; all other directors are independent under Nasdaq rules (though stock trades on OTCQB) .
  • Committees: 2024 audit committee (Rosenbaum–Chair; Litvack; Titterton) and compensation committee (Titterton–Chair; Litvack; Rosenbaum) fully independent; Litvack resigned Apr-2025; Board reduced to four members .
  • Meetings: Board met 10 times in 2024; all directors attended ≥75% of Board/committee meetings; two directors attended 2024 annual meeting .
  • Director compensation: Non-employee directors receive equity-only compensation with annual grant-date values generally ≤$80k; 2024 grants were options (275k each at $0.20, expiring 2029); 2025 awards offered RSUs (275k) or options (300k at $0.29) with 50/50 vesting (grant/Dec 31, 2025) .

Dual-role implication: Concentrated authority (CEO + Chair; no LID) raises independence/oversight considerations, partly mitigated by fully independent committees and regular executive sessions .

Related Party Transactions (governance signals)

  • Legal services to SKGF (director Robert G. Sterne’s firm): ~$39k (2024) and ~$52k (2023); repayments on 2016 note to SKGF ~$150k (2024) and ~$163k (2023); ~$.3M outstanding at Dec 31, 2024 .
  • Director financing: Convertible notes purchased by directors (Rosenbaum, Titterton, Litvack) with various conversions/repayments/amendments in 2023–2025; Titterton converted remaining $200k note in May 2025 .
  • Review controls: Audit committee reviews/approves related-party transactions; policies require director/officer disclosures .

Performance & Track Record Highlights

  • Litigation milestones: CAFC remanded Qualcomm case to district court in Sept-2024; subsequent claim construction in Orlando led PRKR to seek Rule 54(b) judgment to appeal; two Texas trials scheduled for Q1 2026 (Realtek Jan; MediaTek Mar); certain cases stayed pending PTAB decisions; PTAB denied two Realtek IPR petitions Jun-2025 .
  • Financial profile: 2024 net loss ($14.5M), cash $4.9M at year-end; going concern explanatory paragraph; ongoing reliance on litigation proceeds and financing (including contingent funding arrangements) .
  • Capital actions: Nov 17, 2025 registered direct sale of $1.0M common stock to independent director at $0.21; Shelf declared effective May 28, 2025 .
  • Stock volatility: Price ranged $0.07–$1.18 (Jan 2023–Mar 2025); OTCQB listing with associated liquidity constraints .

Compensation Structure Analysis (alignment and risk)

  • Mix shift and discretion: 2024 CEO pay emphasized cash via a sizable discretionary bonus ($350k) rather than formulaic metrics; no 2024 equity grants to NEOs .
  • Option modification: Extending fully vested NEO options by five years (no strike change) created a one-time non-cash charge (~$1.9M) and can be perceived as a retention mechanism without direct performance tie; company disclosed broader H1’25 non-cash comp of ~$2.5M from modifications .
  • Peer benchmarking: Alliant engaged Dec-2024; April-2025 base increases positioned below 50th percentile of peer group—could indicate room for future equity/cash increases if outcomes materialize .
  • Pay versus performance: TSR whipsawed (2022–2024) while CAP to CEO in 2024 equaled reported SCT total, reflecting lack of new equity grants and discretionary cash orientation; 2022 CAP negative driven by equity valuation changes .

Compensation Peer Group and Say-on-Pay

  • Peer group: Alliant Human Capital retained to evaluate executive and director pay (Dec-2024); specific peer constituents not disclosed .
  • Say-on-Pay & Frequency: 2025 proxy included Say-on-Pay and Say-on-Frequency; Board recommends biennial frequency; last frequency vote (2019) supported two-year cadence .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Parker’s 8.54% beneficial stake (primarily options) and prohibitions on hedging/pledging support alignment, though absence of formal ownership guidelines is a gap; extension of option expiries reduces near-term selling pressure, with most options currently out-of-the-money at recent $0.21 pricing .
  • Incentive design: Heavy reliance on discretionary cash bonuses and option-term modifications, with limited disclosed performance metrics or multi-year PSU constructs, dilutes pay-for-performance rigor until litigation/monetization milestones become measurable .
  • Retention/continuity: No employment agreements, but non-competes and extended option life serve as retention tools; key-man risk is explicit (company maintains $1.5M key-man life policy on Parker) .
  • Governance: CEO/Chair dual-role and no LID increase oversight risk, partly offset by independent committees and regular executive sessions; related-party legal payments are governed by audit committee review .
  • Binary outcomes: Strategy remains litigation-centric (Qualcomm remand, Texas trials), implying outcome-driven value realization; going concern emphasis and need for ongoing financing are persistent risks that may influence compensation decisions and insider selling windows .

Appendix: Key Tables

Pay-versus-performance (Company disclosure excerpt)

YearPEO SCT Total ($)PEO Compensation Actually Paid ($)Value of $100 Investment (TSR)Net Income (Loss) ($000)
2022284,000 (2,389,000) 25.00 (9,813)
2023455,020 455,020 17.39 9,515
2024634,000 634,000 95.38 (14,472)

Beneficial ownership (as of Aug 4, 2025)

HolderShares Beneficially Owned% of Class
Jeffrey L. Parker11,170,583 (incl. 10,660,000 options exercisable within 60 days) 8.54%
Shares Outstanding120,116,916

Board structure and committees (2024)

CommitteeMembersChairNotes
AuditRosenbaum; Litvack; Titterton Rosenbaum All members independent; financial experts .
CompensationTitterton; Litvack; Rosenbaum Titterton Oversees NEO comp; retained Alliant (Dec-2024) .
LeadershipCEO/Chair combined (Parker); No LID Independent directors meet in executive session regularly .

Notes on disclosures:

  • No executive employment contracts; equity acceleration on death/disability (50%) and change in control (100%) .
  • Insider trading policy bans hedging/pledging; pre-clearance and blackout regimes; 10b5-1 plans permitted under strict governance .
  • Director equity program capped at $80k for Board service (plus $20k for committees), with 2024/2025 grants detailed above .