Chris Finazzo
Chief Commercial Officer at PRKS
Executive
About Chris Finazzo
Christopher (Chris) Finazzo, 43, is Chief Commercial Officer of United Parks & Resorts Inc. (PRKS) and has served in this role since January 1, 2022; he previously consulted for the company from August–December 2021. He holds a bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Connecticut . Company performance in fiscal 2024: total revenues $1,725.3M (-0.1% YoY), net income $227.5M (-2.9%), diluted EPS $3.79 (+4.4%), and Adjusted EBITDA $700.2M (-1.9%); the company reported a record total revenue per capita and noted five-year stock performance in line with relevant U.S. equity markets . The CODM uses Operating Segment Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP definition provided) for performance evaluation and as a basis for certain incentive compensation, aligning executive pay with adjusted operating profitability .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burger King Corporation (BKC) | President, BKC Americas | Dec 2017–Jul 2021 | Led Americas operations and commercial strategy . |
| Burger King Corporation (BKC) | Head of Marketing, North America | Jan 2017–Dec 2017 | Directed North America marketing . |
| Burger King Corporation (BKC) | Head of Development | Jan 2016–Jan 2017 | Oversaw development initiatives . |
| Macy’s | Strategy team | Pre-2014 | Corporate strategy experience . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| Carrols Restaurant Group, Inc. | Director | Feb 2020–Jul 2021 |
| Burger King Foundation Inc. | Director | 2018–Jul 2021 |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Detail |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $400,000 |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 100% (Target $400,000) |
| Bonus Design | 50% cash / 50% PSUs granted at start of year; PSUs settle in stock post-performance |
| 2024 Actual Bonus Payout | 4.2% of target after cost objective reduction (−25%) |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Bonus – Finazzo Custom Department Plan
| Metric | Threshold ($M) | Target ($M) | Actual 2024 ($M) | Weight | Payout for Metric | Notes/Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (pre-bonus) | 812.0 | 902.0 | 700.2 | 45% | 0.0% | No max payout; threshold pays 50% if met . |
| Total Revenues | 1,820.7 | 2,023.0 | 1,725.3 | 15% | 0.0% | No max payout . |
| Department Cost Basis | — | — | — | 15% | 0.0% (not met) | Company cost targets missed; −25% bonus reduction . |
| Guest Satisfaction | — | — | — | 15% | 0.0% (not met) | No park/quarter met threshold . |
| Department Capital Expenditures | — | — | — | 10% | 5.6% weighted payout | Committee evaluated performance . |
| Cost Objectives Adjustment | — | — | — | — | −25.0% to award | Applied to final award . |
| Final Payout as % of Target | — | — | — | — | 4.2% | After cost adjustment . |
2024 Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – Grant Structure and Targets
| Element | Target Value | Weight | Vesting/Performance |
|---|---|---|---|
| LTIP Target (Finazzo) | $800,000 | 100% | 2024–2026 plan |
| Stock Options | $200,000 (25%) | 25% | Time-vest over 3 years; option count based on assumption stock price doubles vs grant date for grant sizing (Black-Scholes used for accounting) . |
| Performance-Vesting RSUs (PSUs) | $600,000 (75%) | 75% | 75% weighting: predefined Adjusted EBITDA by FY2026; 12.5%: Adjusted EBITDA tied to growth initiatives by FY2025; 12.5%: other non-Adjusted EBITDA growth objectives by FY2025 . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership and Equity Holdings (as of Aug 11, 2025)
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Shares Beneficially Owned | 79,006 |
| Ownership % of Shares Outstanding | ~0.14% (computed: 79,006 ÷ 55,024,612) |
| Options Exercisable within 60 Days | 47,049 |
| Unvested RSUs | 87,819 |
| Unvested PSUs | 21,823 |
| RSUs Converting within 60 Days (as of Aug 11, 2025) | 12,291 |
Equity Vesting Schedules (selected upcoming)
| Award Type | Quantity/Strike | Vest Dates/Details |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 75,528 | 15,105 vest upon award acceptance; 15,106 vest Mar 5, 2026; 15,105 vest Mar 5, 2027; 15,106 vest Mar 5, 2028; 15,106 vest Mar 5, 2029 . |
| RSUs | 12,291 | Vest Aug 12, 2025 . |
| RSUs | 7,846 | Vested Feb 28, 2025 . |
| PSUs (2024 annual bonus) | 179 | Vested Apr 29, 2025 . |
| Options | 6,405 @ $69.39 | Vested Feb 28, 2025 . |
| Options | 3,775/3,777 tranches @ $52.96 | Vested Mar 5, 2025; future vesting: Mar 5, 2026–2029 . |
| Options | 676 @ $64.71 | Vested Mar 15, 2025 . |
| Options | 2,342 @ $56.92 | Vest in equal installments May 11, 2025 and May 11, 2026 . |
| Options | 1,253/1,254 @ $53.18 | Vest May 15, 2025–May 15, 2027 . |
| Options | 6,146 @ $54.24 | Vest Aug 12, 2025 . |
| Options | 8,950 @ $56.01 | Vest Sep 12, 2025 . |
Ownership Policies and Restrictions
- Executive ownership guidelines: CEO 6x salary; other executive officers 3x salary; 50% post-net settlement retention requirement .
- Policy prohibits hedging or pledging of company stock; clawback policy applies to incentive compensation; no option repricing without shareholder approval; no excise tax gross-ups upon change in control .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Role Start Date | Chief Commercial Officer since Jan 1, 2022; consultant Aug–Dec 2021 . |
| Severance Plan (termination without cause for specified business reasons) | 12 months base salary; pro‑rata annual cash bonus based on actual performance, capped at target; lump-sum $15,000 for health insurance; requires signed release with 1‑year non‑compete, 2‑year non‑solicit, non‑disparagement, confidentiality, and cooperation obligations . |
| Change-in-Control Treatment | Double-trigger: immediate vesting of unvested options and time-vesting units upon termination without cause or for “good reason” within 12 months of CIC; performance-vesting units vest in a specified number based on anticipated performance at CIC anniversary (see program rules) . |
Potential Payments at Termination (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Scenario | Cash Severance | Health Continuation | Equity Acceleration | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination under Severance Plan | $408,380 | $15,000 | — | $423,380 |
| Death/Disability | $8,380 | — | $1,323,260 | $1,331,640 |
| Change-in-Control (double trigger) | $408,380 | $15,000 | $5,473,456 | $5,896,836 |
| Change-in-Control (good reason) | — | — | $5,461,319 | $5,461,319 |
Say‑on‑Pay & Peer Group
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval: 99.1% support (excluding abstentions and broker non‑votes) .
- Compensation peer group (2024): AMC Entertainment, The Cheesecake Factory, Cinemark, Dave & Buster’s, Hilton Grand Vacations, Madison Square Garden Sports, Marriott Vacations, Norwegian Cruise Line, Six Flags Entertainment (post-merger), Texas Roadhouse, Travel + Leisure, Vail Resorts .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Annual bonus and LTIP are heavily tied to Adjusted EBITDA and growth objectives, with no maximum payout on certain financial metrics; 2024 actual bonus payout was 4.2% of target due to underperformance versus revenue and EBITDA goals and a company‑wide cost shortfall, underscoring genuine downside risk for variable pay .
- Retention risk: Significant multi‑year RSU and option vesting schedules from 2025–2029, plus severance protections (12 months base and pro‑rata bonus) and double‑trigger CIC equity acceleration, support retention but could create event-driven turnover incentives around corporate transactions .
- Trading signals: Multiple scheduled vest dates and option exercises in 2025 (Aug 12, Sep 12, and other monthly dates) may contribute to supply from potential sales if insider windows are open; company policy prohibits hedging/pledging and imposes 50% post‑settlement retention which moderates selling pressure .
- Alignment and governance: Robust clawback, ownership guidelines, and no excise tax gross‑ups strengthen shareholder alignment; CODM’s reliance on Operating Segment Adjusted EBITDA for incentives ties compensation to operational profitability drivers .