Jim Forrester Jr.
About Jim Forrester Jr.
Senior Vice President, Finance at United Parks & Resorts Inc. (PRKS); previously served as Interim Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer from September 23, 2024 until November 11, 2024, then returned to SVP Finance . The 2024 company performance context: Total revenues $1,725.3M, Net income $227.5M, Diluted EPS $3.79, Adjusted EBITDA $700.2M, Attendance 21.6M, Total revenue per capita $80.07 . Say‑on‑pay support in 2024 was 99.1%, indicating strong shareholder endorsement of the pay program .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Parks & Resorts Inc. | Interim Chief Financial Officer & Treasurer | Sep 23, 2024 – Nov 11, 2024 | Led finance and accounting; facilitated CFO transition |
| United Parks & Resorts Inc. | Senior Vice President, Finance | Current | Ongoing leadership of finance function |
External Roles
Not disclosed in the 2025 DEF 14A for Jim Forrester Jr. .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Ending Base Salary ($) | $285,000 | $285,000 |
| Salary Earned ($) | $275,868 | $285,000 |
| Perquisites and Other ($) | $7,120 | $7,756 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Structure and Outcomes (2024)
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Target bonus (% of salary) | 80% → $228,000 target |
| Bonus components | Cash (50%) and PSUs (50%) |
| Metrics & weights | Adjusted EBITDA (35%), Dept Cost (20%), Dept Capex (20%), Guest Satisfaction (15%), Discretionary & Individual (10%) |
| Cost objectives adjustment | −25% reduction applied for not meeting cost targets |
| Final payout percent of target | 27.2% |
| Actual payment | Cash $31,031; Stock $29,123; Total $60,154 |
2024 Annual Bonus – Metric Detail
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout % | Weighted Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (pre-bonus) | 35.0% | $902.0M | $700.2M | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Department Cost Basis | 20.0% | — | — | Met | 20.0% |
| Department Capital Expenditures | 20.0% | — | — | 31.5% | 6.3% |
| Guest Satisfaction | 15.0% | — | — | 0.0% (below threshold) | 0.0% |
| Discretionary & Individual | 10.0% | — | — | 100% | 10.0% |
| Subtotal before cost adj. | — | — | — | — | 36.3% |
| Cost Objectives adjustment | — | — | — | — | −25.0% |
| Final payout as % of target | — | — | — | — | 27.2% |
Long‑Term Incentives (2024 LTIP)
| Component | Target Value | Design | Vesting | Performance Metrics |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 LTIP total | $427,500 (150% of $285k salary) | 25% options; 75% PSUs | Options vest in 3 annual installments; PSUs over FY2024–FY2026 | PSUs: 2026 Adjusted EBITDA (75%), 2025 growth Adjusted EBITDA (12.5%), 2025 non‑EBITDA growth goals (12.5%) |
Special Equity Awards (March 5, 2024)
| Award | Grant Date | Number/Value | Vesting Schedule |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Options | 03/05/2024 | $250,000 value → option grants; e.g., 3,304 options @ $52.96, 1,416 options @ $52.96, 602 options @ $53.18 | Equal annual installments over 4 years |
| RSUs | 03/05/2024 | $250,000 value → 4,720 RSUs | Equal annual installments over 4 years |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (4/15/2025) | 8,768 shares |
| Options exercisable within 60 days (as of 4/15/2025) | 5,588 shares |
| Time‑vesting RSUs held (as of 4/15/2025) | 6,033 RSUs |
| PSUs held (as of 4/15/2025) | 15,174 PSUs |
| Stock ownership guidelines | NEOs: 3x base salary; must retain 50% of net after‑tax shares until compliant |
| Compliance status | As of April 15, 2024, all employed NEOs were in compliance |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging limited and requires approval |
Outstanding Awards and Upcoming Vesting (selected)
| Award Type | Terms | Key Future Vesting Dates/Amounts |
|---|---|---|
| Options (various strikes) | Multiple grants incl. $64.94, $56.92, $53.18, $54.67, $52.96 | E.g., $64.94: 770 vested 3/2/2025; 770 vests 3/2/2026; 770 vests 3/2/2027. $56.92: 626 vests 5/11/2025; 626 vests 5/11/2026. $53.18: 669 vests 5/15/2025; 670 vests 5/15/2026; 670 vests 5/15/2027. $54.67: 94 vests 8/8/2025 . |
| RSUs (time‑vesting) | 4,720 RSUs from 3/5/2024 grant; 807 RSUs from 5/9/2024 grant | 1,180 RSUs vest each on 3/5/2026, 3/5/2027, 3/5/2028; 269 RSUs vest 5/9/2025; remaining vest 5/9/2026 . |
| PSUs (2023 & 2024 LTIP) | Performance‑vesting; below threshold as of 12/31/2024 | Earn‑out depends on 2025–2026 targets; threshold counts disclosed (2023 LTIP 2,286; 2024 LTIP 1,507) . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Detail |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | None; covered by Key Employee Severance Plan |
| Severance (no CIC) | 12 months base salary; pro‑rata annual cash bonus (up to target) based on actual performance; $15,000 health insurance lump sum (requires release; includes 1‑year non‑compete, 2‑year non‑solicit, non‑disparagement, confidentiality) |
| Change‑in‑control (double trigger) | Accelerated vesting of unvested time‑based awards; specified treatment for performance units; estimated total value $844,129 (including $513,098 equity) under double‑trigger illustrative scenario as of 12/31/2024 |
| Change‑in‑control (good reason) | Equity value $469,270 accelerates; severance payable per plan |
| Clawback | Company clawback policy and NYSE‑compliant supplemental clawback adopted Nov 13, 2023; awards subject to recoupment for restatements, misconduct, errors; detrimental activity can cause forfeiture |
| Deferred comp & pension | None; no nonqualified deferred compensation plans and no pension benefits |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Strong pay‑for‑performance linkage: 2024 annual bonus paid ~27% of target due to missing Adjusted EBITDA and revenue thresholds; cost discipline and discretionary factors supported partial payout .
- Equity‑heavy incentives: 2024 LTIP 75% PSUs and 25% options; special RSU/option grants support retention after interim CFO service .
- No option repricing and robust governance: plan prohibits repricing without shareholder approval; double‑trigger vesting on CIC; clawbacks and ownership guidelines in place .
- Peer benchmarking uses diversified leisure/restaurant/hospitality group to calibrate pay; peer list updated for 2024 .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging prohibited; pledging restricted—alignment preserved .
- No excise tax gross‑ups on CIC; no repricing of underwater options .
- Related‑party oversight robust; Hill Path agreements include protections (special committee, disinterested vote) though control concentration is an ongoing governance consideration .
Say‑On‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
| Year | Say‑on‑Pay Approval | Engagement Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 99.1% | Outreach to top holders (~90% of shares); discussions with investors representing >60% of shares |
Performance & Track Record
- Interim CFO performance recognized: Compensation Committee credited his leadership of finance during the interim period and transition, contributing to discretionary bonus element .
- Company performance context: Revenues $1,725.3M; Adjusted EBITDA $700.2M; diluted EPS $3.79 in 2024 . Pay vs Performance disclosure shows CAP trends versus TSR, Net Income, Adjusted EBITDA (company‑level) .
Compensation Peer Group (2024)
AMC Entertainment, Cheesecake Factory, Cinemark, Dave & Buster’s, Hilton Grand Vacations, Madison Square Garden Sports, Marriott Vacations, Norwegian Cruise Lines, Six Flags Entertainment, Texas Roadhouse, Travel + Leisure, Vail Resorts .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Low 2024 bonus outcome vs ambitious EBITDA targets evidences performance sensitivity; equity mix (PSUs/options) reinforces multi‑year alignment and creates upside only if EBITDA and stock appreciate .
- Near‑term selling pressure: Multiple scheduled RSU vests in 2025–2028 (e.g., May 9 and March 5 cycles) could add modest supply; however, ownership guidelines require retention of 50% of net after‑tax shares until 3x salary threshold, tempering sell‑through risk .
- Retention risk: Special grants (Mar 2024) and standard severance (12 months + pro‑rata bonus) reduce near‑term attrition risk; double‑trigger CIC protection is standard market practice without tax gross‑ups .
- Governance: Strong shareholder support and clawbacks are positives; continued oversight is warranted given Hill Path’s large stake, though protective provisions are in place (special committee, disinterested approvals) .