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William S. Susman

Trustee at Power
Board

About William S. Susman

Independent trustee of Power REIT with 25+ years in investment banking across transportation and consumer sectors; currently leads Cascadia Capital’s consumer, retail and e‑commerce practice after selling Threadstone Capital to Cascadia in January 2024 . Age 61 as of March 29, 2025 ; trustee of Power REIT since December 2011 and of P&WV since May 2011 . Considered independent under NYSE American standards; chairs Compensation, Nominating, and Special Committee – Related Party Transactions; member of Audit Committee . Education: B.S. in Business Administration (University of Michigan) and Master’s from Northwestern’s Kellogg School of Management .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleTenureCommittees/Impact
Cascadia CapitalLeads consumer, retail & e‑commerce investment banking practiceSince Jan 2024–present Brings transaction and sector expertise to PW’s compensation and governance oversight
Threadstone Advisors/Threadstone CapitalFounder; sold to Cascadia2011–Jan 2024 Boutique IB leadership; governance perspective from founder/operator
FinancoPresident2004–2011 Consumer/retail M&A advisory leadership
Merrill LynchHead, Transportation & Consumer GroupNot disclosed Advised major railroads; finance expertise applicable to PW/P&WV
Salomon BrothersTransportation group (career start)Not disclosed Early capital markets grounding

External Roles

OrganizationRoleTenureNotes
Preferred Fragrances (private)DirectorNot disclosed Private company board; consumer sector exposure
Jonathan Adler Enterprises (private)DirectorNot disclosed Private company board; retail/brand exposure
Public company boardsNone disclosed in proxy

Board Governance

  • Independence: Determined independent under NYSE American; Board has 3 independent trustees (Susman, Haynes, D’Aguilar), CEO/Chair Lesser not independent .
  • Committee assignments: Compensation Committee Chair (since Dec 2011); Nominating Committee Chair (since Aug 2012); Special Committee – Related Party Transactions Chair (since Mar 2022); Audit Committee member (since Feb 2024) .
  • Annual meeting attendance: Three of four trustees attended the 2024 annual meeting .
Committee (2024)ChairSusman’s RoleMeetings HeldWritten Consents
AuditD. D’Aguilar Member Not quantified; met to approve filings 2
CompensationW. S. Susman Chair 0 0
NominatingW. S. Susman Chair 0
Special Committee – Related Party TransactionsW. S. Susman Chair 0

The Special Committee comprises independent trustees and is mandated to pre‑approve related party transactions; it did not meet in 2024 .

Fixed Compensation

YearCash Retainer ($)Stock Awards ($)Option Awards ($/Shares)Meeting Fees ($)Other ($)Total ($)
2024$0 $0 $0 / – $0 $0 $0

No restricted stock or options were granted to independent trustees in 2024; no reimbursements were made in 2024 .

Performance Compensation

MetricFY2024
Restricted stock awards granted (#)0
Stock options granted (#)0
Performance metrics tied to director payNone disclosed

Compensation Clawback Policy adopted via Compensation Committee charter amendment (2023), applies to performance-based compensation, primarily for executives .

Other Directorships & Interlocks

TypeCompanyRolePotential Interlock
PrivatePreferred FragrancesDirectorNone disclosed with PW counterparties
PrivateJonathan Adler EnterprisesDirectorNone disclosed with PW counterparties
PublicNone disclosed

Related party transactions at PW primarily involve entities affiliated with CEO David Lesser (HBP, IntelliGen, MILC); these are reviewed by independent trustees and the Special Committee chaired by Susman .

Expertise & Qualifications

  • Transportation/rail finance expertise from Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers; relevant to P&WV oversight .
  • Consumer/retail advisory leadership (Financo, Threadstone, Cascadia), useful for compensation benchmarking and strategic oversight .
  • Education: University of Michigan B.S.; Northwestern Kellogg master’s .
  • Determined “financially literate”; Audit Committee comprised solely of independent trustees .

Equity Ownership

MetricMar 31, 2025Jul 28, 2025
Beneficial ownership (common shares)16,861 17,417
Ownership % of outstanding<1% <1%
Options exercisable/vesting within 60 days9,444 @ $13.44 10,000 @ $13.44
Options Outstanding (reference dates)Dec 31, 2024Mar 31, 2025Jul 28, 2025
Option shares outstanding10,000 9,444 vest/vestable within 60 days 10,000
Exercise price$13.44 $13.44 $13.44
PW share price reference$1.33 (Dec 31, 2024)

As of Dec 31, 2024, the reference share price was $1.33; director options at $13.44 were significantly out‑of‑the‑money .

Governance Assessment

  • Strengths: Long‑tenured independent trustee with extensive finance experience; chairs Compensation, Nominating, and Special Committees, signaling board reliance on his governance leadership . Membership on Audit Committee adds oversight breadth .
  • Alignment: Holds common shares and long‑dated options, but options priced at $13.44 are deeply out‑of‑the‑money given $1.33 year‑end 2024 share price, limiting near‑term incentive alignment via options .
  • Process controls: Special Committee chaired by Susman reviews related party transactions; independent trustees approved legacy arrangements involving CEO‑affiliated entities (MILC/HBP/IntelliGen) as fair and reasonable .
  • RED FLAGS:
    • Limited committee activity in 2024: Compensation and Nominating Committees did not meet; Special Committee did not meet; Audit Committee relied on written consents twice (potential engagement risk in a year with multiple related party issues) .
    • CEO concentration and related party exposure: Multiple transactions tied to CEO‑affiliated entities; leases in default/terminated and payments to MILC affiliates highlight persistent conflict management needs .
    • Director pay of $0 in 2024: No cash/equity retainer for independent trustees could impair director recruitment/retention and may reduce direct pay‑for‑performance alignment at the board level .

Overall: Susman’s independence and committee leadership are positive for governance, particularly around conflict review. However, minimal committee meetings and extensive related‑party complexity elevate governance risk; option‑based alignment is currently ineffective given strike levels relative to share price .