Karl W. Studer
President – Electric Power at PWR
Executive
About Karl W. Studer
Karl W. Studer (age 43) serves as President – Electric Power at Quanta Services (PWR) and became a named executive officer in May 2024; he previously was Regional Vice President (2018–2022) and co‑founded Probst Electric Inc. and Summit Line Construction, both acquired by Quanta in 2013; he is a certified journeyman lineman and a graduate of Northwest Lineman College in Meridian, Idaho . Under his tenure in the executive ranks, Quanta delivered record 2024 results: revenues $23.67B (+13% YoY), net income attributable to common stock ~$904.8M (+21% YoY), and operating cash flow $2.08B (+32% YoY), while completing a 2022–2024 PSU cycle at 189.9% and achieving average quarterly relative TSR between the 50th–75th percentile of the peer index .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quanta Services | President – Electric Power | 2022–present | Executive leadership over electric power solutions; supports strategy tied to ROIC, capital efficiency, and safety metrics used in incentive plans . |
| Quanta Services | Regional Vice President | 2018–2022 | Oversight of operations and significant projects within Electric Power solutions . |
| Probst Electric Inc. (acquired by Quanta) | Co‑founder; later senior leadership roles at Quanta operating company | Acquired in 2013; roles subsequent to acquisition | Helped integrate and lead operating company, contributing to scalable execution capacity in electric specialty construction . |
| Summit Line Construction, Inc. (acquired by Quanta) | Co‑founder; later senior leadership roles at Quanta operating company | Acquired in 2013; roles subsequent to acquisition | Strengthened Quanta’s craft-skilled workforce and project delivery in transmission line construction . |
External Roles
- None disclosed for Studer (public boards or outside directorships) .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $800,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 110% |
| Target Bonus ($) | $880,000 |
| Actual AIP Payout ($) | $692,560 (78.7% achievement) |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Plan Components
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Achievement % | Payout Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIP Adjusted EBITDA | 60% | $2,195.9M | $2,163.8M | 88.4% | Drives cash payout proportional to achievement . |
| AIP Adjusted EBITDA Margin | 20% | 9.50% | 9.64% | 128.3% | Reinforces profitable growth vs. revenue-only focus . |
| Safety Performance Improvement | 20% | +10.0% | Below threshold | 0% | No payout; underscores safety discipline . |
| Overall Achievement | — | — | — | 78.7% | AIP payout = Target Bonus × 78.7% . |
2024 Long‑Term Incentive Plan Structure (Grant date: 3/4/2024)
| Instrument | Weight of LTIP | Units Granted | Vesting | Performance Metrics |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 70% of LTIP | 7,670 | Cliff‑vest after 3‑year period ending 12/31/2026; earned 0–200% based on performance | 65% ROIC improvement plus average quarterly relative TSR vs. S&P 500 Industrials; 15% capital efficiency; 10% auto insurance claims rate; 10% composite driver safety . |
| RSUs | 30% of LTIP | 3,287 | Equal annual installments over 3 years (expected around 3/4/2025, 3/4/2026, 3/4/2027) subject to continued service | Time‑based (no performance conditions), promotes retention . |
2024 Summary Compensation (NEO SCT disclosure)
| Component | 2024 Amount |
|---|---|
| Salary | $800,000 |
| Stock Awards – PSUs (grant date FV) | $2,019,664 |
| Stock Awards – RSUs (grant date FV) | $799,859 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive Plan (AIP) | $692,560 |
| All Other Compensation | $194,271 |
| Total | $4,506,354 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (as of 4/3/2025) | 15,503 shares; less than 1% of outstanding . |
| Unvested RSUs (as of 12/31/2024) | 1,069 ($337,857); 3,223 ($1,018,629); 3,052 ($964,585); 3,287 ($1,038,856) – market value based on $316.05/share . |
| Unearned/Unvested PSUs (as of 12/31/2024) | 21,372 ($6,754,621); 15,340 ($4,848,207) – target amounts, 0–200% earnout possible . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Divisional President guideline = 3× base salary; method uses 12‑month avg price to compute required shares . |
| Compliance with Guidelines | All executive officers (including Studer) in compliance as of 12/31/2024 and exceeded prescribed ownership levels . |
| Pledging/Hedging | Anti‑pledging and anti‑hedging policies in effect for directors and executive officers . |
| Plan Protections | Double‑trigger vesting for equity awards granted after Aug 2023 in change‑in‑control events (if consideration not solely cash); minimum 1‑year vesting; no repricing; no dividend payments on unvested awards . |
Note: Attempt to retrieve recent Form 4 insider transactions via the insider‑trades skill returned an authorization error during this session; monitoring Form 4s is recommended to assess near‑term selling pressure.
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Agreement Term | Initial one‑year term; auto‑renews for successive one‑year terms unless either party gives non‑renewal notice ≥6 months before expiration . |
| Severance – Qualifying Termination (No CIC) | Lump sum equal to 18 months of base salary; pro‑rated AIP based on actual performance; subsidized health benefits up to 18 months; up to $20,000 outplacement; equity treatment based on service tenure (accelerated vesting for time‑based awards, performance awards remain eligible for 12–24 months or longer depending tenure) . |
| Equity Acceleration – Death/Disability | Full accelerated vesting of outstanding awards; performance awards treated per award terms (actual/forecasted performance) . |
| Change‑in‑Control Treatment | Awards after Aug 2023 require double‑trigger (termination without cause or for good reason within 24 months following CIC) for acceleration when consideration is not solely cash . |
| Good Reason Definition | Includes ≥10% reductions to salary/bonus opportunity, material benefit reductions, material diminution of role, failure to grant post‑CIC equity at ≥90% of prior 3‑yr average, non‑renewal notice, relocation >35 miles, material breach, etc., subject to notice/cure . |
| Non‑Compete/Non‑Solicit | Restrictions during employment and for 1–2 years post‑termination depending on circumstances; confidentiality and non‑disparagement covenants apply . |
| Excise Tax Gross‑Ups | None; “best‑net” cutback if applicable . |
Estimated Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024; $316.05/share)
| Scenario | Severance ($) | Welfare ($) | Equity Benefit ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause / Good Reason (No CIC) | 1,912,560 | 37,452 | 9,161,341 | 11,111,353 |
| CIC without termination (pre‑Aug 2023 awards) | — | — | 5,698,382 | 5,698,382 |
| Termination without cause / Good Reason within 24 months of CIC | 5,100,000 | 65,359 | 9,161,341 | 14,326,700 |
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance linkage is robust: 70% of Studer’s LTIP is PSUs tied to ROIC improvement, relative TSR, capital efficiency, and safety, with 0–200% earnout; AIP includes profitability and safety, and safety underperformance zeroed out 20% of the 2024 AIP, signaling discipline .
- Retention risk moderate: auto‑renewing employment agreement, 18‑month salary severance without CIC, and double‑trigger post‑Aug‑2023 equity accelerate provide balance; sizeable unvested RSUs/PSUs and ownership guideline compliance reinforce retention .
- Alignment strong and governance favorable: meaningful ownership, anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging policies, no excise tax gross‑ups, minimum vesting, and no repricing reduce red‑flag risk; say‑on‑pay support was >93% in 2024 .
- Monitoring: Track Form 4 filings for any RSU tax‑withholding sales or discretionary selling; watch safety and ROIC metrics across the 2024–2026 PSU cycle for payout trajectory and potential leadership performance signals .