Leonard Post
uniQureAbout Leonard Post
Leonard Post, Ph.D., age 72 (as of March 31, 2025), is an independent non-executive director of uniQure N.V. and serves as Chair of the Research & Development Committee; his current non-executive director term runs through the 2026 annual meeting under uniQure’s staggered board structure . He is a virologist by training with a B.S. in Chemistry (University of Michigan) and a Ph.D. in Biochemistry (University of Wisconsin), and has over 35 years of biopharma leadership across R&D and scientific chief roles .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Committees/Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| BioMarin (Nasdaq: BMRN) | Chief Scientific Officer; prior roles | Feb 2010 – Jun 2016 | Oversaw initiation of BioMarin’s first gene therapy project for hemophilia A |
| Vivace Therapeutics | Chief Scientific Officer | 2016 – Jan 2024 | Oncology; small molecules targeting the Hippo pathway |
| Virtuoso Therapeutics | Chief Scientific Officer | 2018 – Jan 2024 | Oncology; bispecific antibodies |
| LEAD Therapeutics | Chief Scientific Officer | Not disclosed | Senior scientific leadership |
| Onyx Pharmaceuticals | SVP, Research & Development | Not disclosed | Research leadership |
| Parke-Davis Pharmaceuticals | VP, Discovery Research | Not disclosed | Discovery leadership |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| CG Oncology (Nasdaq: CGON) | Director | Since 2018 | Public company board service in oncology |
| Canaan Partners | Advisor | Current | Venture advisory role |
Board Governance
- Independence: The board determined Post is independent under Nasdaq/SEC rules; he is one of seven independent non-executive directors on the board .
- Committee assignments: Chair, Research & Development Committee (members: Post, Gut, Springhorn); met 7 times in 2024, with each member attending at least 75% .
- Board attendance: The board met 9 times in 2024; all directors attended the 2024 annual meeting and each attended at least 75% of board and committee meetings .
- Executive sessions: Independent directors meet regularly without management .
- Governance context: Dutch law emphasizes stakeholder interests; uniQure’s articles include staggered non-executive terms, heightened thresholds for dismissal, and board proposal requirements for certain matters, which can deter rapid board changes and influence investor activism dynamics .
- Ownership concentration: As of Sep 30, 2025, directors/executives/major holders collectively beneficially own ~40.7% of share capital, implying potential influence over shareholder matters if acting together .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Structure | 2024 Amount (Post) |
|---|---|---|
| Annual retainer (non-exec) | $45,000 paid semi-annually | $45,000 |
| Committee chair – R&D | $15,000 annual retainer (members $7,500) | $15,000 |
| Meeting fees | Not disclosed | — |
| Reimbursements | Reasonable travel/other expenses reimbursed | Not quantified |
Total 2024 cash fees earned: $60,000 .
Performance Compensation
| Element | Grant Mix/Value | Vesting | 2024 Value (Post) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Options | 50% of annual equity grant; grant-date fair value | One-year vesting | $36,918 |
| RSUs | 50% of annual equity grant; grant-date fair value | One-year vesting | $36,926 |
- Board equity context: Due to >70% share price decline from Dec 30, 2022 ($22.67) to Dec 29, 2023 ($6.77), the Compensation Committee reduced 2024 board equity grant values below the peer group 25th percentile to mitigate dilution .
- Performance metrics tied to director compensation: None disclosed; director equity is time-based (RSUs/options) with one-year vesting .
Other Directorships & Interlocks
| Company | Role | Committee Roles | Potential Interlock/Conflict |
|---|---|---|---|
| CG Oncology (CGON) | Director | Not disclosed | Oncology focus; no disclosed related-party transactions with uniQure in 2024 |
- Related party transactions: None with board members or >5% holders during 2024 .
- Compensation committee interlocks: None disclosed for 2024 .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Virology and biochemical training; prior scientific leadership roles (CSO, SVP R&D, VP Discovery) across leading biopharma organizations .
- Gene therapy experience (initiated BioMarin’s first hemophilia A gene therapy project), oncology modality breadth (small molecules, bispecific antibodies) .
- Current advisory role in venture capital (Canaan Partners), adding external innovation perspective .
Equity Ownership
| Measure | Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 67,621 shares | <1% of 54,729,000 outstanding as of Mar 31, 2025 |
| Options exercisable ≤60 days | 51,622 | Counted for beneficial ownership and % calculations |
| Outstanding ordinary shares | 15,999 | Direct holdings |
| RSUs outstanding (unvested) | 8,080 | As of Dec 31, 2024 |
| Options outstanding (incl. unexercisable) | 67,462 | As of Dec 31, 2024 |
| Pledged/hedged shares | Prohibited by policy; no pledge exceptions requested by directors/NEOs in 2024 |
Additional alignment signals:
- 10b5-1 plans: Q3 2025 disclosure lists adoptions by two insiders, not Post; company states no other directors/officers adopted/modified/terminated such plans in Q3 2025 .
- Lock-up: Post signed a 60-day lock-up in connection with the September 2025 upsized offering, alongside other executive officers and non-executive directors .
Governance Assessment
Key findings:
- Committee leadership and engagement: Post chairs the R&D Committee, which met 7 times in 2024; board and committee attendance ≥75%, supporting active oversight of scientific programs .
- Independence and structure: Confirmed independent, with Dutch governance features (staggered terms, dismissal thresholds) that promote continuity but can reduce flexibility for rapid board changes; relevant for activism risk assessment .
- Pay-for-performance alignment (director level): Equity grants are time-based (options/RSUs) with one-year vesting; notable committee decision to reduce board equity grant values below 25th percentile amid share price declines, a shareholder-friendly signal on dilution discipline .
- Ownership and alignment: Modest direct holdings (<1%); policy prohibits pledging/margin accounts with no exceptions requested, reducing misalignment risk; lock-up participation adds confidence in alignment around capital markets events .
RED FLAGS:
- Section 16(a) timeliness: One Form 4 for Post (June 13, 2024 annual equity grant) was filed one day late due to technical challenges; minor process lapse but disclosed .
- Activism/entrenchment risk: Dutch law and articles can make board replacement more difficult; combined with concentrated ownership (~40.7%) among insiders/major holders, activist campaigns could face structural headwinds .
Overall, Post’s deep R&D leadership and chair role on the R&D Committee strengthen oversight of uniQure’s pipeline. Compensation practices and lock-up participation support alignment; governance safeguards under Dutch law require investors to weigh continuity benefits against reduced flexibility for rapid board changes .