James Parr
RING ENERGYAbout James Parr
James J. Parr is Executive Vice President, Chief Exploration Officer at Ring Energy (REI), appointed in November 2024; he is 64 and a Texas Certified Professional Geologist (#5600) . He holds a B.S. in Geological Sciences (Honors) from the University of Aston and pursued doctoral studies in Earth Sciences at the University of Cambridge, with executive programs at Thunderbird (ASU), Wharton (UPenn), and SMU Cox . Company performance context for 2024: Net Income $67.5MM, Adjusted EBITDA $233.3MM, Adjusted Free Cash Flow $43.6MM, net cash from operations $194.4MM, production 19,648 BOE/d (+8% YoY), LOE $10.89/BOE, 43 wells drilled, and $40MM debt reduction . Pay-versus-performance TSR shows the value of a fixed $100 investment at $51.52 in 2024 versus $141.49 for the peer group, with CROCE of 15.9% in 2024 (context for PSU metrics) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Woodside Energy | Vice President, Global New Ventures | Jun 2022–Nov 2024 | Led global exploration and business development; supported upstream M&A |
| BHP Petroleum | Head of Growth, Petroleum | 2021 | Led petroleum growth initiatives pre-merger with Woodside |
| Anadarko Petroleum | Director, International Exploration | 2018–2019 (to OXY acquisition) | Directed international exploration until company’s acquisition by OXY |
| APA (Apache) Corporation | VP, International New Ventures & Gulf of Mexico | 2011–2018 | Led international new ventures and GOM strategy |
| Cabot Oil & Gas | Director, Exploration & Business Development | 2004–2011 | Drove exploration and BD after earlier roles at Anadarko, ARCO, BP |
External Roles
No public company directorships or committee roles disclosed in the proxy for Parr .
Fixed Compensation
Not disclosed for Parr in the latest proxy (he is an executive officer but not a Named Executive Officer (NEO) in 2024) .
Performance Compensation
AIP metrics and outcomes (company-wide plan that applies across executives; Parr’s individual target % was not disclosed):
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Performance Factor | Funding Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Boe Production (Sales) | 50% | 5,950,336 | 6,611,484 | 7,933,781 | 7,191,054 | 144% | 72% |
| IRR (%) | 25% | 24% | 47% | 71% | 60% | 155% | 39% |
| Net Lifting Costs ($/BOE) | 25% | $12.05 | $10.95 | $8.76 | $10.89 | 103% | 25% |
| Total AIP Funding | 100% | — | — | — | — | — | 136% |
| HSE Objectives Modifier | 100% | N/A | 100% | 200% | 100% | — | Applied (total remained 136%) |
LTIP structure and metrics:
| Component | Weighting | Metric Details | Payout Range | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | ~60% of LTIP | 50% TSR (absolute and relative) + 50% CROCE | 0–200% of target | Cliff-vest after 3-year performance period |
| RSUs | ~40% of LTIP | Service-based | N/A | Ratable vesting, 3 equal tranches over 3 years |
TSR PSU payout matrix:
| Relative TSR Percentile | Absolute TSR <0% | 0% | 10% | ≥25% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| <25th percentile | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| ≥25th percentile | 25% | 50% | 75% | 100% |
| ≥50th percentile | 50% | 75% | 100% | 125% |
| ≥75th percentile | 75% | 100% | 125% | 150% |
| ≥90th percentile | 100% | 125% | 175% | 200% |
CROCE PSU payout matrix:
| Final CROCE Performance % | Below Threshold ≤0% | Threshold 5% | Target 10% | Stretch 15% | Maximum 20% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CROCE PSU Payout | 0% | 50% | 100% | 150% | 200% |
Compensation philosophy emphasizes at-risk pay and performance linkage; CEO target mix shown for illustration (40% PSUs, 26% RSUs, 17% target annual bonus, 17% base salary) and policies include clawback and capped payouts .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Insider trading policy prohibits hedging, pledging, and margin transactions in Company securities (reduces misalignment and forced sales risk) .
- Stock ownership guidelines for management (CEO 5x base salary; NEOs 3x base salary; three-year compliance window; two-thirds of net shares from vesting must be held until guideline met) .
- Beneficial ownership was disclosed for directors and NEOs as of April 4, 2025; James Parr was not listed among NEOs or directors, and his individual holdings were not disclosed .
| Position | Required Ownership (Multiple of Base Salary) |
|---|---|
| CEO | 5x |
| Named Executive Officers | 3x |
Employment Terms
- Change-in-Control and Severance Benefit Plan (CIC Plan) adopted March 6, 2024; participants as of Dec 31, 2024 include McKinney (Tier 1) and Dyes, Feiner, Thomas, Young (Tier 2). Parr is not listed among participants in the proxy’s disclosures .
- Double-trigger vesting policy: equity accelerates upon qualifying termination within the 6 months before to 24 months after a change in control; otherwise normal vesting applies .
Summary of CIC economics:
| Tier | Timing | Salary Multiple | Target Bonus Multiple | Pro-rated AIP | Equity Vesting | COBRA Reimbursement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 (CEO) | Outside CIC protection period | 200% salary | 200% bonus | 100% pro-rated AIP | Accelerate vesting | 24 months |
| Tier 1 (CEO) | Within CIC protection period | 300% salary | 300% bonus | 100% pro-rated AIP | Accelerate vesting | 24 months |
| Tier 2 (Other NEOs) | Outside CIC protection period | 100% salary | 100% bonus | 100% pro-rated AIP | Accelerate vesting | 18 months |
| Tier 2 (Other NEOs) | Within CIC protection period | 200% salary | 200% bonus | 100% pro-rated AIP | Accelerate vesting | 18 months |
| Death/Disability | N/A | — | — | — | Accelerate vesting | 12 months |
Other contract terms: Prior individual employment agreements were terminated and replaced by the CIC Plan on March 6, 2024; restrictive covenants (non-compete, confidential information, non-solicit) existed under prior agreements, but CIC Plan governs severance now .
Investment Implications
- Data scarcity for Parr-specific compensation: As a recently appointed executive officer (Nov 2024) and not a 2024 NEO, base salary, target bonus, and equity grant sizes were not disclosed; monitor future proxies and Form 4s for ownership accumulation and grant details (key for alignment and potential selling pressure) .
- Strong alignment policies (no hedging/pledging; stock ownership guidelines; clawback) reduce governance risk and forced-sale risk; watch holding requirements as equity vests .
- Retention and severance protections: Parr was not listed in the CIC Plan as of Dec 31, 2024; inclusion status going forward will affect retention risk and change-in-control economics; monitor for updated participation disclosures .
- Performance signal: AIP metrics emphasize production, IRR, and lifting costs with 2024 funding at 136% of target; LTIP PSUs tied to TSR and CROCE with 0–200% payout range and 3-year vesting—execution on these metrics should drive realized pay and signal management confidence .
- Company backdrop: 2024 results show solid free cash flow and deleveraging; TSR underperformed peers in 2024 while CROCE remained healthy—watch PSU outcomes and capital allocation discipline in exploration under Parr’s remit to gauge value creation .