Amy Campbell
About Amy Campbell
REV Group’s Chief Financial Officer since April 15, 2024; age 48, tenure ~1.6 years through Nov 2025 . CPA; B.S. in Accounting from Illinois Wesleyan; leadership programs at Kellogg and Duke; Certified Internal Auditor and Six Sigma Blackbelt . 2024 pay-for-performance context: Company TSR up 122% year-over-year to $417.61, net income up 469% to $257.6M, and Adjusted EBITDA up 40% to $162.8M, driving a corporate MIP payout factor of 115% for FY2024 . Campbell publicly engaged investors on backlog quality and margin profile; REV cited ~$4.5B backlog with 2–2.5 years duration, predominantly in Specialty Vehicles .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| ASC Engineered Solutions | Chief Financial Officer | Jul 2021–Apr 2024 | Led finance for engineered piping solutions; private sponsor-backed industrials |
| BrandSafway (Commercial & Industrial Division) | Division CFO | Jun 2019–Jul 2021 | Oversaw divisional finance in industrial services; capex-heavy projects discipline |
| Caterpillar, Inc. | CFO, Global Aftermarket Services Division | Mar 2019–Jun 2019 | Profitability stewardship in high-margin aftermarket |
| Caterpillar, Inc. | VP, Investor Relations | Jan 2016–Feb 2019 | Capital markets communication; valuation narrative |
| Caterpillar, Inc. | Chief Audit Executive | Nov 2013–Jan 2016 | Control environment, risk management leadership |
| Caterpillar, Inc. | Multiple divisional CFO roles | Dec 2010–Nov 2013 | P&L accountability; operating finance |
| Caterpillar, Inc. | Various finance and accounting roles | Dec 1997–Jun 2019 | Broad finance exposure across operations, IT, product dev., corporate |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kellogg School of Management | Women’s Senior Leadership program | N/A | Executive education |
| Duke University | Digging Deep Executive Leadership program | N/A | Executive education |
| Certifications | CPA, CIA, Six Sigma Blackbelt | N/A | Technical credentials |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Annual base salary | $500,000 | Set in offer letter |
| Sign-on bonus | $150,000 | Paid within 45 days; repay if departure within 1 year |
| Target annual bonus (MIP) | 75% of base salary | Max 200%; FY2024 prorated |
| FY2024 actual bonus (Non-equity incentive) | $223,918 | Reflects 115% corporate payout factor and proration |
| Perquisites | None disclosed for NEOs | No tax gross-ups |
| 401(k) match | Plan provides up to 4% match; CFO amounts not listed | All employees eligible |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Factor | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | — | $155M FY2024 | 105% of target | Corporate MIP factor 115% (discretionary adj.) | Cash, paid FY2025 |
| Average Net Working Capital (% of sales) | — | 10.9% FY2024 | 95% of target | Included in 115% factor | Cash, paid FY2025 |
| CFO MIP (prorated) | — | 75% of $500k | Prorated for Apr 15 start | $223,918 actual | Paid per MIP policy |
Additional equity performance design changes (Dec 2024 onward):
- Shift to RSUs with 3-year ratable vesting; introduce PSUs for senior leadership with ROIC metric and TSR modifier; CEO ≥50% PSUs .
- Transitional PSU vesting cadence: Dec 2024 grant vests Dec 2025/26/27; Dec 2025 grant vests Dec 2027/28; Dec 2026 grant 3-year cliff to Dec 2029 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 29,130 shares; <1% of outstanding (52,054,444 shares as of Jan 8, 2025) |
| Unvested RSAs | 23,532 shares; granted 4/15/2024 |
| RSA vesting schedule | 5,883 shares on each Dec 31, 2024/2025/2026/2027 |
| Stock options | None granted in FY2024 to NEOs |
| Ownership guidelines | CFOs (execs reporting to CEO) must hold ≥3x salary; 5-year compliance window; executives on track/achieved |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited; no margin or collateral pledging allowed |
| Vested vs unvested breakdown | Outstanding unvested RSAs disclosed above; company presents beneficial ownership inclusive of certain unvested units per SEC definition |
Merger award treatment (Terex-REV Group merger agreement signed Oct 29, 2025):
- REV restricted share awards convert to Terex restricted share awards based on 0.9809 exchange ratio plus restricted cash of $8.71 per share; same terms generally continue .
- REV RSUs convert to Terex RSUs (performance conditions removed) per award exchange ratio plus restricted cash for accrued dividend equivalents; terms generally continue .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment | At will; terminable by either party at any time |
| Severance policy (involuntary separation) | Lump-sum equal to base salary; CFO: $500,000 (as of 10/31/2024) |
| Change-in-control (CIC) | Double-trigger; 2x (salary + target MIP), plus up to $30,000 outplacement and up to 18 months medical/dental continuation; CFO CIC cash: $1,750,000 (as of 10/31/2024) |
| Equity acceleration on CIC | No single-trigger acceleration; specific RSA/RSU agreements govern; Zamansky case noted; NEOs generally not auto-accelerated |
| Restrictive covenants | Non-compete 18 months; non-solicit employees/customers 18 months; confidentiality and trade secret covenants |
| Clawback policies | Financial restatement clawback per SEC/NYSE; misconduct clawback for reputational harm or restatements |
| Deferred comp | Plan available; NEOs not participating currently |
Compensation Committee Analysis
- Independent comp consultant Mercer engaged May 2024; peer benchmarking used (e.g., Alamo Group, Federal Signal, Winnebago, Wabash, Greenbrier; Shyft removed, Greenbrier added in FY2024) .
- Program best practices: no single-trigger CIC; no tax gross-ups; anti-hedging/pledging; clawbacks; one-year minimum vesting; limited perqs .
- FY2024 Say-on-Pay approval ~98% for 2023 compensation, supporting program alignment .
Performance & Track Record
| Measure | FY2024 Outcome |
|---|---|
| Total Shareholder Return (cumulative since FY2020 baseline) | $417.61 (up 122% y/y) |
| Net Income | $257.6M (up 469% y/y) |
| Adjusted EBITDA | $162.8M (up 40% y/y) |
| Backlog (commentary) | ~$4.5B total; ~2–2.5 years duration; ~$4.2B Specialty Vehicles; ~$300M Recreational Vehicles |
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Anti-hedging/anti-pledging policy mitigates misalignment risk .
- No tax gross-ups; no option repricing without shareholder approval .
- No single-trigger vesting on CIC; double-trigger required .
- Related party transactions: sponsor reimbursements ended with sale-down; governance clean-up of former sponsor provisions proposed .
- Forms 3/4 referenced generally; specific Form 4 transactions for Campbell not surfaced in retrieved docs .
Compensation Peer Group (FY2024)
| Peers |
|---|
| Alamo Group; Astec Industries; Blue Bird; Federal Signal; Greenbrier; Hyster-Yale; LCI Industries; Miller Industries; Manitowoc; Titan International; Wabash National; Winnebago |
Fixed vs Equity Mix (FY2024 for CFO)
| Salary | Sign-on | Stock Awards (Grant-Date Fair Value) | Non-Equity Incentive | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $273,224 | $150,000 | $520,057 | $223,918 | $1,167,199 |
Investment Implications
- Alignment improving: Transition to RSUs + PSUs (ROIC + TSR modifier) increases performance-contingent pay and reduces guaranteed outcomes; 3-year vesting enhances retention while balancing liquidity cadence .
- Retention risk contained: Double-trigger CIC economics ($1.75M) and 18-month non-compete/non-solicit, plus meaningful unvested RSAs/anticipated PSUs, lower near-term flight risk .
- Insider selling pressure: Annual RSA tranches (5,883 shares each Dec 31, 2024–2027) may create periodic supply; anti-hedging/pledging reduces leverage-induced selling; future PSUs temper vest-driven supply via performance gating .
- Merger mechanics: Conversion of REV equity to Terex awards plus restricted cash preserves vesting terms; removal of performance-vesting on converted RSUs could modestly increase certainty of future settlements, monitoring required post-close .
- Pay-for-performance: Corporate MIP tied to Adj. EBITDA and NWC drove 115% payout amid strong TSR and earnings; continuation of ROIC/TSR PSU framework should sustain investor-aligned incentives .