Tara A. Plimpton
REGIONS FINANCIALAbout Tara A. Plimpton
Tara A. Plimpton (age 56) is Chief Legal Officer and Corporate Secretary of Regions Financial (RF). She joined RF in April 2020 after a 17-year career at General Electric culminating as Vice President and General Counsel for GE Global Operations overseeing a 450+ person global team; earlier, she was a managing partner at a law firm. She holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Nevada and a J.D. from Georgetown University. Company performance context during her RF tenure includes cumulative TSR growth of 71.4% from 2019–2024, 2024 net income of $1,893 million, and 2024 Adjusted ROATCE (LTIP basis) of 15.31% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| General Electric | Vice President & General Counsel, GE Global Operations | Through 2020; 17-year GE career | Led 450+ global professionals across compliance, trade, IP, labor, and transactional support; extensive global legal operations and governance experience |
| Private Law Firm | Managing Partner | Not disclosed | Provided legal counsel to corporate clients in manufacturing, agricultural, and tourism sectors |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Way (Atlanta) | Board Member | 2012–2018 | Non-profit governance experience |
| Georgetown University | Corporate Counsel Advisory Board | Not disclosed | Legal leadership network |
| CARE Women’s Network | Advisory Committee | Not disclosed | ESG and community engagement |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Detail |
|---|---|
| Base salary | Not individually disclosed for Ms. Plimpton in RF’s 2025 proxy (she is not a Named Executive Officer) . |
| Target/actual bonus | Not individually disclosed for Ms. Plimpton; executive officers participate in the annual cash incentive plan described below . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive (ACI) structure (applies to executive officers):
| Element | Detail |
|---|---|
| Weighting | 70% corporate performance; 30% individual performance |
| Corporate metrics | 50% Adjusted Net Income Available to Common Shareholders; 50% Adjusted Efficiency Ratio (absolute vs budget) |
| Modifiers/thresholds | Customer Service modifier ±10%; Capital & Liquidity safety-and-soundness thresholds can reduce payout up to 40% |
| Payout range | 0%–200% of target based on combined results |
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) design (2024–2026 performance cycle; applies enterprise-wide):
| Grant type | Weight | Metric(s) & measurement | Performance range | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time-based RSUs | 33.33% | Stock price drives value | N/A | 3-year cliff; 2024 grants vest April 1, 2027 |
| Performance Stock Units (PSUs) | 33.33% | 50% ROATCE; 50% cumulative EPS Growth; each measured 25% absolute (vs plan) and 25% relative (vs peer banks) | 0%–150% of target based on matrix | |
| Performance Cash Units (PCUs) | 33.33% | 50% cumulative EPS Growth; same absolute/relative split and matrix as above | 0%–150% of target | |
| Peer construct | Relative performance vs 13 peers (14 incl. RF); at least 7th place ranking required for above-target payouts | |||
| Risk guardrails | Capital & liquidity thresholds can reduce payouts up to 40% |
Notes on vesting schedules and grant conventions:
- 2024 RSUs for NEOs cliff vest at the end of a 3-year period ending April 1, 2027; PSU/PCU payouts depend on 2024–2026 performance; RSU/PSU units valued at $20.56 grant-date price in 2024 examples .
- Company-wide, there were no outstanding stock options held by any Directors or executive officers as of the 2025 proxy record date, reducing option exercise-driven selling pressure .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Topic | Detail |
|---|---|
| Stock ownership guidelines | Executive officers subject to robust ownership guidelines with required retention of at least 50% of after-tax shares until compliant; CEO 6x base salary; other NEOs 3x; executive officer tiers vary by role (tier multiple for Ms. Plimpton not disclosed) . |
| Anti-hedging/pledging | Strict prohibitions on hedging, short sales, margining, borrowing against, or pledging Regions securities; all Directors and executive officers in full compliance; no pledged shares . |
| Options outstanding | None outstanding for any Directors or executive officers as of record date . |
| Beneficial ownership | Ms. Plimpton’s current beneficial ownership was not individually disclosed in the 2025 proxy tables (which list Directors and NEOs). On initial Form 3 filing (Apr. 14, 2020), she reported no securities beneficially owned . |
Employment Terms
| Item | Company policy | Applicability/notes |
|---|---|---|
| Employment agreements | RF generally does not enter into employment agreements with executive officers . | No individual employment agreement for Ms. Plimpton is disclosed . |
| Executive Severance Plan (ESP) | For eligible executives (including NEOs), involuntary termination without cause: accrued comp/benefits + 18 months base salary + pro-rated bonus based on 3-year avg; prohibits tax gross-ups . | Eligibility for Ms. Plimpton not specifically disclosed; ESP is the standardized framework for exec severance . |
| Change-in-control (CiC) | During 6 months pre- or 2 years post-CiC: accrued comp/benefits + multiple of (base salary + 3-year avg bonus) + pro-rated bonus; multiples vary (e.g., CEO 3x; certain NEOs 2x); benefit continuation; grandfathered agreements may differ . | Ms. Plimpton is not listed among NEOs with specific CiC multiples; no individual CiC agreement disclosed for her . |
| Clawbacks | Not specifically quoted here; RF discloses clawback and other governance policies in CD&A; ESP prohibits tax gross-ups . | — |
Performance & Track Record (Company context during tenure)
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Shareholder Return (Value of $100) | 98 | 137 | 140 | 132 | 168 |
| Net Income ($ millions) | 1,094 | 2,521 | 2,245 | 2,074 | 1,893 |
| Adjusted ROATCE (LTIP, %) | 17.04% | 17.92% | 21.09% | 18.01% | 15.31% |
Additional compensation-program–performance alignment:
- RF identifies Adjusted ROATCE and EPS Growth as the most important long-term metrics linking NEO pay to performance, with visual relationships disclosed between CAP, TSR, net income, and Adjusted ROATCE; cumulative TSR rose 71.4% (2019–2024) vs 68.6% for S&P 500 Banks peer index .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
| Year | Outcome |
|---|---|
| 2023 | Advisory vote on executive compensation passed: For 639,137,632; Against 62,417,286; Abstain 4,495,896; Broker Non-Votes 113,182,230 . |
Risk Indicators & Governance Signals
- No pledged shares by any Directors or executive officers; anti-hedging/anti-pledging policy in place and enforced .
- No stock options outstanding for any Directors or executive officers as of the record date, limiting option-exercise–driven selling pressure .
- Section 16 compliance: all required reports timely filed in 2024 except one Director (José Suquet) due to broker-managed accounts; no issues noted for Ms. Plimpton .
- Severance/CiC program prohibits tax gross-ups; grandfathered CiC agreements can differ (e.g., legacy treatment shown for a retiring NEO), indicating improved but evolving governance posture .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Equity-heavy, multi-year design: Two-thirds of LTIP is performance-based (PSUs/PCUs) tied 50/50 to ROATCE and EPS Growth, with absolute and relative components—indicative of strong alignment to profitability and shareholder returns .
- Absolute targets reset for 2024 ACI amid rate/regulatory volatility, with explicit customer service modifier and safety-and-soundness thresholds—suggesting balanced incentives with downside risk controls .
- No options outstanding and strict anti-pledging reduce risk of forced selling; RSUs cliff-vesting in 3 years elevate retention incentives and defer realizable pay .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Ms. Plimpton’s incentives are governed by RF’s enterprise structure emphasizing ROATCE and EPS Growth with rigorous relative benchmarking and risk guardrails, supporting pay-for-performance alignment and prudent risk culture .
- Selling pressure: No outstanding options and a no-pledging policy reduce liquidation risks; RSU cliff vesting extends retention and may stagger potential future sales around vest dates (e.g., April 1, 2027 for 2024 grant cycle) .
- Retention/Severance: While her individual severance/CiC terms aren’t disclosed, the standardized ESP framework (and prohibition on gross-ups) indicates controlled exit economics and limited shareholder-unfriendly features versus legacy agreements .
- Execution risk: Legal/governance leadership with deep GE experience and clean Section 16 record underpin oversight quality; company TSR recovery in 2024 with still-normalizing profitability (lower 2024 net income and Adjusted ROATCE vs 2023) suggests focus on sustainable earnings amid rate dynamics .