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M. Keith Waddell

M. Keith Waddell

President and Chief Executive Officer at ROBERT HALFROBERT HALF
CEO
Executive
Board

About M. Keith Waddell

M. Keith Waddell (age 68) is President and Chief Executive Officer of Robert Half Inc., Vice Chairman of the Board since 1999, and a director since 1999; he previously served as CFO (1988–2019), Treasurer (1987–2004), and joined the company in 1986 as its third employee . Under his leadership in 2024, revenue was $5.80B and net income $252M amid macro headwinds; ROIC was 17% and the company returned $2.10B to shareholders over five years while ending 2024 with $538M cash and no debt . Say‑on‑pay support was 93.5% in 2024, and 93% of CEO target compensation is performance‑based, with 100% of equity in performance shares tied to three‑year relative ROIC and TSR .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Robert Half Inc.CEO; President; Vice Chairman; DirectorCEO since Dec 15, 2019; President since 2004; Vice Chairman since 1999; Director since 1999Led growth through cycles; long‑tenured finance/operator with deep industry, IT controls, and financial expertise
Robert Half Inc.Chief Financial Officer1988–2019Key leader during substantial growth; helped create Protiviti (launched 2002) which reached ~$1.95B revenue in 2024
Robert Half Inc.Treasurer1987–2004Financial stewardship and capital allocation during expansion

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
Public company boardsNone disclosed beyond RHI“Public Boards: 1” for Waddell (RHI)

Fixed Compensation

YearBase salary ($)All other compensation ($)Notes
2024500,000 281,637 (SERP contribution) Base unchanged vs 2023
2023500,000 383,774 (SERP)
2022500,000 533,086 (SERP)
  • No perquisites were approved for executive officers in 2024; no excise tax gross‑ups .
  • SERP allocates 15% of salary+bonus annually; Waddell’s 2024 registrant contribution was $281,637; aggregate SERP balance at 12/31/24 was $17,120,683 with $1,006,183 in 2024 earnings; fully vested .

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Bonus – Structure and 2024 Outcomes

MetricWeight2024 target2024 actualPayout vs target
Revenue20% $6.19B $5.80B 93.6%
Net income80% $351M $252M 71.8%
Combined factor76.1%
YearTarget bonus ($)Actual bonus ($)Payout (%)
20241,811,347 1,377,582 76.1% (company payout factor)
  • Formulaic plan (no leverage): payout scales one‑for‑one to performance; no payout if net income < 0; max the lesser of 200% of target or $9M .

Long‑Term Incentives (Performance Shares)

Design (2024 grants):

  • 100% performance shares; three‑year cliff vest on service plus two performance conditions: three‑year relative ROIC vs ~130‑company industry peer group (65th percentile target, 90th percentile max, 40th percentile threshold/forfeit) and three‑year relative TSR as ±25% modifier; continued employment through March 19, 2027 required .
  • No stock options; company ceased granting options to executive officers in 2005 .

Key grant/realization data:

Grant/awardGrant dateTarget shares (#)Max shares (#)Vesting/measurementResult
2024 PSU grant (CEO)Mar 19, 202457,687 108,163 ROIC/TSR over 1/1/24–12/31/26; cliff vest 3/19/27 In progress
2022 PSU grant (CEO)Mar 23, 202238,924 ROIC/TSR over 1/1/22–12/31/24; vested 3/23/25 Earned at 112.5% (total 43,789)
2021 PSU grant (CEO)Vested 3/19/24106,978 shares vested; value realized $8,406,331 (@$78.58)

Vesting cadence and potential supply:

  • 2021 PSU vested March 19, 2024; 2022 PSU vested March 23, 2025; 2023 PSU expected March 20, 2026; 2024 PSU expected March 19, 2027 (subject to performance and service) .
  • No options outstanding or exercises (RHI has no outstanding options) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership1,424,722 shares; 1.4% of outstanding (as of 3/31/25)
Composition/footnotesIncludes 202,630 shares acquired via company plans (disposition restricted) and 1,222,092 shares held jointly with spouse
Unvested/Unearned equity at 12/31/24Unvested 2022 PSU (performance certified) 43,789; maximum unearned PSUs (2023/2024 cycles) 220,857
OptionsNone outstanding; company ceased option grants to execs in 2005
Hedging/pledgingProhibited for directors, officers, employees (no hedging/pledging)
Ownership guidelinesCEO must hold stock = 6x salary; Waddell’s minimum was 32,227 shares; all NEOs exceed requirements

Employment Terms

ProvisionKey terms for Waddell
Severance (no CIC)Lump sum = 2 years base salary if terminated without cause or certain good‑reason conditions; pro‑rata bonus; benefits for 2 years
Change‑in‑controlIf termination within 1 year post‑CIC: salary multiple 2 years (2.99 years if served as director); bonus = 2x prior‑year bonus (2.99x if served as director); benefits for 2 years (2.99 years if served as director)
Vesting on terminationTime‑based vest waived for restricted shares upon qualifying termination; performance conditions remain; SERP fully vests on CIC
Part‑time post‑retirement4‑year part‑time consulting; pay = 8% of highest 5 of prior 10 years average cash comp; equity continues vesting per schedule; includes non‑compete and non‑solicit during part‑time period; eligibility at later of age 55 or 20 years service (NEOs currently eligible)
ClawbackPolicy amended to align with SEC Rule 10D‑1/NYSE listing rule; applies to incentive pay

Estimated potential payments (assuming event on 12/31/24; RHI $70.46 close):

Payment/BenefitRetirement ($)Involuntary termination ($)Death/Disability ($)Change in control ($)
Value of outstanding equity18,646,957 18,646,957 18,646,957 18,646,957
Lump sum salary1,495,000 1,495,000
Lump sum bonus4,118,970
Consulting fee935,040 935,040
Medical benefits400,257 400,257 209,997 400,257
Life insurance28,856 28,856

Board Governance and Director Service

  • Board service: Director since 1999; Vice Chairman since 1999; CEO since 2019; serves on the Executive Committee; not independent .
  • Leadership structure: Chairman and CEO roles separated (Chairman H.M. Messmer Jr.); Board has a Lead Independent Director (F.A. Richman) with defined duties including CEO evaluation and agenda setting; all key committees are fully independent .
  • Committees/attendance: Board met 5 times in 2024; average director attendance exceeded 98%; independent directors meet in executive session at least quarterly .

Say‑on‑Pay and Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 say‑on‑pay approval: 93.5%; committee cites ongoing shareholder engagement and maintained performance‑heavy design (lowered 2024 bonus targets 26.9% vs 2023; equity 100% PSUs) .

Compensation Committee and Peer Framework

  • Committee members (2024): Robert J. Pace (Chair), Dirk A. Kempthorne, Frederick A. Richman; no interlocks; independent consultant FW Cook retained; committee reviews market data but does not tie pay to fixed market percentiles .
  • Performance peer set for PSUs: ~130 companies (GICS 2020 – Commercial & Professional Services) with ROIC target at 65th percentile and TSR modifier around median .

Related Party, Risk and Governance Policies

  • Hedging/pledging prohibited; 1‑year minimum vest; no dividends on unearned shares; no option repricing; severance capped at ≤2.99× salary+bonus; no excise tax gross‑ups .
  • Related party transactions disclosed (unrelated to Waddell): $50,000 donation to National Urban League (Morial) and $84,000 marketing software/services from HundredX (Pace); both below NYSE thresholds and independence maintained .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Strong pay‑for‑performance design with 93% of CEO target pay performance‑based and 100% of equity in PSUs; clawback and anti‑hedging/pledging policies reinforce alignment; CEO owns 1.4% of shares outstanding and far exceeds ownership guidelines, supporting “skin in the game” .
  • Vesting and potential supply: Large PSU vestings occurred in 2024 (106,978 shares) and 2025 (2022 cycle total 43,789), with additional 2023/2024 cycles scheduled for 2026/2027 subject to performance; monitor Form 4s near these dates for selling pressure, though policy and part‑time arrangements may stagger liquidity .
  • Retention/transition risk: Severance and CIC protection (including 2.99× multiples given director status) plus a four‑year post‑retirement consulting arrangement reduce resignation risk and provide succession glidepath; however, the modified CIC triggers for directors (voluntary termination within one year post‑CIC) are more shareholder‑friendly than pure single‑trigger but still generous versus many peers .
  • Performance execution: 2024 bonus paid at 76.1% due to softer revenue and net income, but ROIC remained solid at 17%; prior PSU cycles earned above target (112.5% for 2022 cycle), indicating rigor yet achievable targets; governance is robust with split Chair/CEO and fully independent committees .