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William Bosway

William Bosway

President and Chief Executive Officer at GIBRALTAR INDUSTRIESGIBRALTAR INDUSTRIES
CEO
Executive
Board

About William Bosway

William T. Bosway is Chairman of the Board (since January 2022), President and Chief Executive Officer (since January 2019) of Gibraltar Industries (ROCK); age 59 as of March 17, 2025, with prior leadership roles at Dover Corporation and Emerson Electric. He holds a BS in Finance (Miami University) and an MS in Industrial Marketing & Strategy (Purdue Krannert) . Under his tenure, 2024 net sales were $1.31B with adjusted EPS of $4.25, ROIC of 15.9%, and free cash flow equal to 11.8% of net sales; the value of a $100 investment in ROCK stood at $117 at year-end 2024 (company TSR series) . In 2023, GAAP and adjusted operating income grew 34% and 16%, respectively, with adjusted EBITDA up 15% on essentially flat sales, reflecting operational improvements and portfolio actions .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact/Scope
Dover Corporation (Refrigeration & Food Equipment)President & CEO, Division2016–2018Led a diversified global manufacturing division focused on refrigeration/food equipment .
Emerson Electric (Emerson Climate Technologies)Group VP, Solutions & Technology2008–2016Oversaw technology/solutions across climate technologies with global industrial exposure .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsCommittees / Notes
Sterling Infrastructure, Inc. (Nasdaq: STRL)Independent DirectorSince Feb 2024Audit; Corporate Governance & Nominating .

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)% Change YoY
2024880,000 3.5%
2023850,000
Perquisites (2024)Amount ($)
401(k) Match11,914
Healthcare Expense Reimbursement7,449
Personal Use of Company Auto2,406
Tax Planning1,670
Total23,439

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Incentive (MICP) – Design and 2024 Outcomes

  • Structure: 75% weighted to Net Sales and Adjusted EPS via a 9×9 matrix; 25% to Days Working Capital (DWC); payout range 0–200% with 35% at threshold .

  • 2024 Company Actuals vs Targets and Payout Factors:
    | Metric | Threshold | 100% Target | 200% | Actual 2024 | Payout Factor | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:| | Net Sales ($mm) | 1,296 | 1,464 | 1,648 | 1,309 | 35.0% | | Adjusted EPS ($) | 4.17 | 4.71 | 5.30 | 4.25 | 35.0% | | DWC (days) | 57.9 | 53.0 | 48.4 | 52.4 | 100.0% |

  • CEO 2024 MICP mechanics and result:
    | Item | Value | |---|---| | Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 120% | | Target Bonus ($) | 1,056,000 | | Actual Payout (%) | 51.3% | | Actual Payout ($) | 541,728 |

Long-Term Incentive (LTI): RSUs and PSUs

  • 2024 LTI Target Mix (CEO): RSUs = 125% of salary ($1,100,000); PSUs = 225% of salary ($1,980,000); CEO’s award weighted 64% PSUs, with time-vested RSUs 19% of target mix .
  • Vesting & Metrics: RSUs vest ratably over 4 years; PSUs are earned on a one-year ROIC performance determination and cliff-vest after 3 years (max 200% of target) .
  • Prior-Year PSU Performance Example: 2023 PSUs paid at 200% of target based on ROIC at the 200% achievement level .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Ownership Snapshot (as of Mar 17, 2025)Value
Beneficially Owned Shares106,898; <1% of outstanding
All Directors & Officers as a Group (12 persons)160,138 shares; 0.5% of outstanding
Anti-Hedging / Anti-PledgingProhibited; no director or officer has hedged/pledged ROCK shares
  • Outstanding Awards (FY 2023 year-end disclosure – selected): Bosway held multiple unvested RSU grants (e.g., 4,182; 5,856; 16,456; 19,882 units by grant), and PSUs (e.g., 71,574 units earned for 2023 cycle), indicative of multi-year vesting overhang that can create scheduled delivery windows .
  • Nonqualified Deferred Compensation (2018 MSPP): CEO had $7,730,367 of total MSPP value as of Dec 31, 2024, including $7,225,601 in hypothetical units tracking ROCK stock; deferred balances earn interest at average quarterly 10-year Treasury rates + 2% until distribution, and the company match vests after five years of service .
  • Stock Ownership Guidelines: The company maintains executive stock ownership guidelines (specific multiples not disclosed in the excerpts cited) .

Employment Terms

Severance and Change-in-Control (CiC)

ProvisionCEO Terms
Severance (termination without cause or CEO resignation for good reason)2× base salary, payable over 2 years
CiC Plan (double-trigger within 24 months post-CiC)Lump sum 2.5× (salary + target annual bonus); plus 2.5× COBRA subsidy differential, subject to release of claims
Equity Treatment at TerminationRSUs pay upon certain terminations (incl. CEO good reason, retirement with age/service conditions); PSUs pay for earned cycles; unassumed awards under CiC may pay at target for in-flight cycles
  • Payments on Hypothetical Termination (as of 12/31/2024; stock price $58.90):
    | Scenario | Severance ($) | Non-Equity Incentive ($) | Nonqualified Deferred Comp ($) | LTIP (RSUs/PSUs) ($) | Total ($) | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:| | Voluntary Termination | — | — | 7,730,367 | — | 7,730,367 | | Good Reason | 1,760,000 | 866,765 | 7,730,367 | 8,829,287 | 19,186,419 | | Retirement | — | 866,765 | 7,730,367 | 7,320,034 | 15,917,166 | | Termination without Cause | 1,760,000 | 866,765 | 7,730,367 | 8,829,287 | 19,186,419 | | For Cause | — | — | 7,730,367 | — | 7,730,367 | | Death | — | 866,765 | 7,730,367 | 8,829,287 | 17,426,419 | | Disability | 440,000 | 866,765 | 7,730,367 | 8,829,287 | 17,866,419 |

  • Clawback and Taxes: Clawback policy applies; no excise tax gross-ups on parachute payments .

Board Governance (director service, committees, dual-role implications)

  • Board Service: Director since 2019; Chairman since 2022; currently the combined Chair/CEO structure is in place .
  • Independence: Bosway is not independent; all committee members are independent under Nasdaq/SEC rules .
  • Lead Independent Director: Atlee Valentine Pope; independent directors meet in executive session each quarterly meeting; Lead Independent Director has robust authorities (agenda consult, executive sessions, liaison with Chair/CEO) to mitigate combined-role concerns .
  • Committees: Four standing committees (Audit & Risk; Capital Structure & Asset Management; Compensation & Human Capital; Nominating, Governance & CSR), all composed solely of independent directors .
  • Attendance: In 2024 the Board met eight times; each director attended at least 75% of meetings and committee meetings during their service .

Performance & Track Record (selected)

Measure20242023Notes
Net Sales ($)1,308,764,000 ~1.4B flat vs 2022 (from 2024 proxy) 2024 down 5% YoY; portfolio optimization actions noted .
Adjusted EPS ($)4.25 4.11 Non-GAAP reconciliation in appendices .
ROIC (%)15.90 15.10 Company-selected pay linkage metric .
Free Cash Flow (% of Sales)11.8% 15% (2023) 2023: FCF equal to 15% of sales .
TSR ($100 start)$117 $157 Pay vs Performance table (company TSR) .
Adjusted EBITDA Growth+15% (2023) On essentially flat sales .

Compensation Governance, Peer Group, and Say‑on‑Pay

  • Pay Mix and Alignment: In 2024, 64% of CEO target compensation was performance-based with an additional 19% in time-vested RSUs; PSUs vest after 3 years based on ROIC; annual MICP caps at 200% and uses net sales, adjusted EPS, and DWC .
  • Peer Group & Advisors: 2024 peer group includes AAON, Albany International, American Woodmark, Apogee, Armstrong World, Array Technologies (added), Eagle Materials, Griffon, Insteel, L.B. Foster, Masonite, PGT Innovations, Quanex, Simpson Manufacturing, Trex; Willis Towers Watson (independent) advised in 2024–2025; Korn Ferry advised in 2023 .
  • Say‑on‑Pay Support: 97% support at the 2024 annual meeting; 98.2% support in 2023 .

Employment & Contract Highlights

TermDetail
Start as CEOJanuary 2019
ChairmanSince January 2022
Non-Compete/Non-SolicitNot detailed in cited excerpts (no disclosure provided in the sections reviewed).
Deferred Compensation2018 MSPP with company match (5-year service vest), interest accrual at average quarterly 10-year Treasury + 2% until distribution .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags (as disclosed)

  • No hedging or pledging of company stock by directors or executives; policy prohibits both .
  • No excise tax gross-ups on CiC payments; clawback policy in place .
  • Double‑trigger CiC protections; no single‑trigger equity cash‑outs if assumed/substituted .
  • Related‑party transactions: none in 2024 requiring review/approval under policy .
  • Compensation risk assessed as aligned with long‑term value creation (balanced measures, caps, ownership rules) .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance is credible: 2024 bonus paid at 51.3% amid softer top-line, while multi-year PSUs are tied to ROIC with capped leverage—limiting windfalls and aligning to capital discipline .
  • Retention risk appears moderate: sizable deferred compensation balance ($7.7M MSPP) and ongoing multi-year equity vesting create stickiness; severance is measured (2× salary) outside CiC but higher under double-trigger CiC (2.5× salary+target bonus) .
  • Selling pressure windows: annual RSU tranches (4-year) and 3-year PSU cliffs can create periodic delivery events; anti‑hedge/pledge policy reduces misalignment risk from derivatives or collateralized holdings .
  • Governance check: combined Chair/CEO structure is mitigated by an empowered Lead Independent Director and fully independent committees; strong Say‑on‑Pay (97%) suggests investors currently view incentives as aligned .