Janeen B. Kastner
RPM INTERNATIONAL INC/DE/About Janeen B. Kastner
Vice President – Corporate Benefits and Risk Management at RPM International Inc., with 28.3 years of credited service under the company pension plan, indicating long-tenured leadership across benefits and enterprise risk management domains . RPM’s FY2025 performance concluded MAP 2025 with gross margin expansion of 510 bps, adjusted EBIT margin up 260 bps, and improved working capital ratio by 320 bps versus FY2022, while net sales rose 0.5% to $7.37B and EPS increased 17.3% to $5.35, aligning executive pay with multi-year operational gains . Shareholders supported executive compensation with a 93% Say‑on‑Pay approval, underscoring alignment of incentives with outcomes .
Past Roles
No prior role details for Ms. Kastner are disclosed in the reviewed proxy statements .
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | — |
External Roles
No external directorships or roles for Ms. Kastner are disclosed in the reviewed proxy statements .
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | — |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $415,000 | $445,000 | $460,000 |
| Target Annual Bonus (% of Salary) | 100% (plan structure for NEOs) | 100% | 100% |
| Maximum Annual Bonus (% of Salary) | 150% | 150% | 150% |
| Actual Non‑Equity Incentive Paid ($) | $374,000 | $530,000 | $508,000 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Metrics (FY2025)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual/Payout Decision | Payout vs Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Profit Margin Improvement | up to 62.5% of target award | Target margin 41.8% | FY2025 margin 41.5%; Committee awarded 25% of target | 25% |
| Sales Growth Improvement | up to 50% of target award | Company & peer-relative growth | FY2025 sales +0.5%; Committee awarded 50% of target | 50% |
| Company Initiatives & Individual Goals (MAP 2025, CS‑168, digital) | up to 25% | Initiative progress | Significant progress; awarded 20% of target | 20% |
| SG&A Reduction | up to 25% | Peer-relative & YoY reduction | Adjusted SG&A % decreased; awarded 25% of target | 25% |
| Committee Discretion | up to 25% | — | Awarded 15% of target based on peer-relative performance | 15% |
| Resulting Payout (approx.) | — | Target = 100% of salary | Award equaled ~110% of salary for Kastner | 110% |
Performance Earned Restricted Stock (PERS) – FY2025 determination
| Performance Goal | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual (FY2025) | Vested (% of Target) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EBIT Margin | 50% | 13.5% | 14.0% | 15.0% | 13.2% | 0% |
| Working Capital Ratio | 50% | 23.6% | 22.0% | 20.9% | 22.1% | 96.9% |
| Total PERS Vesting | — | — | — | — | — | 48.4% of target |
Performance Stock Units (PSUs) – 3‑yr period ended FY2025
| Performance Goal | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual (FY2023‑FY2025) | Vested (% of Target) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBIT Margin | 50% | 15.0% | 16.0% | 17.0% | 13.2% | 0% |
| Adjusted Revenue Growth (CAGR) | 50% | 4.0% | 6.0% | 8.0% | 3.2% | 0% |
| Total PSU Vesting | — | — | — | — | — | 0% |
Equity Grants (FY2025 cycle)
| Instrument | Grant Date | Count/Target | Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| SERP Restricted Stock | 7/18/2024 | 1,276 shares | Vests at later of age 55 or 5 years from preceding May 31; accelerates upon death/disability/termination without cause/change in control |
| PERS (awarded) | 7/16/2025 | 970 shares | Based on FY2025 performance; vest schedule 2,700 on 7/19/2026 and 1,870 on 7/18/2027 for outstanding PERS lots |
| PSUs (target) | 7/18/2024 | 7,100 shares | 3‑yr performance (FY2025‑FY2027): 50% Adjusted EBIT margin; 50% Adjusted revenue growth; 25/100/200% vesting structure |
| SARs | 7/18/2024 | 14,100 SARs at $114.26 strike | Vests in 4 equal installments starting 7/18/2025 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 195,148 shares (0.2% of outstanding) |
| Composition | 121,644 shares directly; 72,403 shares via SARs currently/exercisable within 60 days; ~1,101 shares in RPM 401(k) |
| Unvested/Unearned Awards at FY2025 Year‑End | SERP restricted stock: 6,394 shares (market value $727,893 at $113.84 close) ; PERS (not vested): 4,570 shares (market value $520,249) ; FY2025 PERS estimated 2,500 unearned shares for change‑in‑control table purposes ; PSUs (maximum opportunity): 45,000 unearned shares (market/payout value shown for change‑in‑control scenarios) |
| Ownership Guidelines | 5x base salary for NEOs; executives meet or are within grace period |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors, officers, employees |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Term (Kastner) |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | Auto‑renewing one‑year term; minimum base salary $475,000 effective June 1, 2025 |
| Annual Incentive Eligibility | Per Incentive Compensation Plan; FY2025 pool = 1.5% of pre‑tax income; NEO share split includes 15% for Kastner; target 100% of salary; max 150% |
| Severance (Involuntary, not within 2 years of CIC) | Lump sum $1,160,667 plus 18 months health/welfare ($39,258), estate/financial planning ($16,000), executive life insurance ($34,009), SERP cash value ($217,890), accelerated SERP stock ($727,893); total $2,195,717 |
| Severance (Double‑trigger within 2 years of CIC) | Lump sum $1,160,667; health/welfare ($39,258); estate/financial planning ($16,000); executive life insurance ($58,432); SERP cash value ($217,890); accelerated SERP stock ($727,893); accelerated PSUs/PERS/SARs ($3,861,647); outplacement ($25,000); total $6,101,475 |
| Change‑in‑Control (single‑trigger provisions) | Accelerates PERS, PSUs, SERP stock; SARs immediate exercisable for certain executives incl. Kastner |
| Clawbacks | Legacy misconduct‑based clawback (2012) and NYSE‑mandated accounting restatement clawback (Oct 2023) |
| Non‑Compete/Non‑Solicit | 2 years post‑employment for NEOs |
| Tax Gross‑Up | Excise tax gross‑up under IRC 4999 applies to Kastner (red flag); “best‑net alternative” applies to newer form agreements for certain executives |
| Retirement Eligibility Implications | Retirement‑eligible NEOs (incl. Kastner) can immediately exercise unvested SARs and lapse PERS restrictions upon eligible retirement |
Multi‑Year Compensation Summary
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $415,000 | $445,000 | $460,000 |
| Stock Awards ($) | $996,392 | $1,107,528 | $1,064,314 |
| Option Awards ($) | $0 | $500,032 | $439,638 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive ($) | $374,000 | $530,000 | $508,000 |
| Pension Value Change ($) | $22,290 | $62,158 | $73,485 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $52,906 | $54,106 | $64,540 |
| Total ($) | $1,861,218 | $2,698,824 | $2,609,977 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: FY2025 saw reduced total compensation vs FY2024 driven by lower PERS outcomes (48.4% of target) and zero PSU vesting from the FY2023‑FY2025 performance cycle despite strong net income/EPS growth, reinforcing pay‑for‑performance discipline .
- Shift toward performance vehicles: The program emphasizes PERS/PSUs/SARs; FY2025 PERS at 48.4% of target and FY2025 PSUs for the prior cycle at 0% show tight calibration to EBIT margin and working capital/ARG targets .
- Benchmarking and target percentile: Willis Towers Watson found NEO salaries and target cash generally below median, with long‑term incentives and total direct compensation at/above median, preserving competitiveness while maintaining at‑risk pay .
- Governance safeguards: Double‑trigger vesting, two clawback policies, and hedging/pledging prohibitions mitigate risk; however, excise tax gross‑up provisions for certain executives (including Kastner) remain a governance concern .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Excise tax gross‑up for change‑in‑control payments (shareholder‑unfriendly) applies to Kastner .
- Accelerated vesting on retirement eligibility could create near‑term selling pressure if an executive retires, given immediate SAR exercisability and PERS lapse for retirement‑eligible NEOs (including Kastner) .
- No pledging/hedging permitted under policy, reducing alignment risk .
- Clawbacks in place (misconduct and restatement), lowering recoupment risk exposure .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- FY2025 Say‑on‑Pay support: 93% approval for NEO compensation program, indicating strong investor acceptance of pay design and outcomes .
- Peer group for performance comparisons and disclosure includes eight coatings/building materials peers (Akzo Nobel, Axalta, Carlisle, H.B. Fuller, Masco, PPG, Sherwin‑Williams, Sika), providing relevant context for TSR comparisons and program calibration .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Role scope: Corporate benefits and risk management across RPM’s global footprint; direct engagement with the Board on enterprise risk oversight processes and quarterly reviews, reflecting senior leadership in risk management .
Equity Ownership & Vesting Schedules
- PERS vesting schedule (outstanding lots): 2,700 (7/19/2026); 1,870 (7/18/2027) .
- SARs vesting schedule: 7/18/2025, 7/18/2026, 7/18/2027, 7/18/2028 (four equal tranches) for 7/18/2024 grant at $114.26 .
- PSUs: FY2024 grant targets a three‑year period ending FY2027 with EBIT margin and revenue growth hurdles (25/100/200%) .
Investment Implications
- Strong alignment: Annual bonus outcomes and equity vesting tied to operational metrics (EBIT margin, working capital, revenue) that directly drive RPM’s cash generation and margins; zero PSU vesting in FY2025 cycle underscores performance gating .
- Near‑term supply risk: Retirement eligibility accelerations (SAR exercisability, PERS lapse) could introduce trading flows if a retirement occurs; monitor 8‑Ks (Item 5.02) and Form 4s for signals .
- Governance posture: Robust safeguards (double‑trigger vesting, clawbacks, no hedging/pledging) support alignment, but excise tax gross‑up is a residual governance risk that may attract investor scrutiny in change‑of‑control scenarios .
- Ownership alignment: 0.2% stake and compliance with 5x salary ownership guideline promote skin‑in‑the‑game, with substantial unvested equity reinforcing retention and performance orientation .
Sources: RPM International Inc. DEF 14A (2025) **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:3]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:4]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:7]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:10]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:44]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:49]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:50]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:51]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:52]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:54]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:55]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:56]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:58]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:60]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:63]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:67]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:68]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:70]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:73]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:75]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:76]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:81]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:82]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:95]** **[110621_0001193125-25-185345_d22717ddef14a.htm:97]**; DEF 14A (2024) **[110621_0001140361-24-038170_ny20026761x2_def14a.htm:45]** **[110621_0001140361-24-038170_ny20026761x2_def14a.htm:51]** **[110621_0001140361-24-038170_ny20026761x2_def14a.htm:53]** **[110621_0001140361-24-038170_ny20026761x2_def14a.htm:54]**. ```