Alan Farquharson
About Alan Farquharson
Alan W. Farquharson is Senior Vice President – Reservoir Engineering & Economics at Range Resources (RRC), serving in this role since January 2012 and at Range since 1998; he previously served as Manager and Vice President of Reservoir Engineering and was promoted to SVP – Reservoir Engineering in February 2007 . He holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Penn State . He was 67 years old as of December 31, 2024 . His pay is tightly linked to operational and capital-efficiency metrics: 2024 bonus criteria covered Cash Unit Costs, Free Cash Flow, ROACE, Drilling & Completion cost per unit, Drilling Rate of Return, and HSE/discretionary factors, with company-level actuals yielding payout factors in the 96–200% range by criterion .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Range Resources | Senior Vice President – Reservoir Engineering & Economics | Jan 2012–present | Oversees reservoir engineering and strategic capital allocation |
| Range Resources | Senior Vice President – Reservoir Engineering | Feb 2007–Jan 2012 | Led reservoir engineering; foundation for current economics oversight |
| Range Resources | Manager/VP – Reservoir Engineering | Not disclosed | Built engineering processes; supported development of unconventional resources |
| Union Pacific Resources (Anadarko) | Engineering Manager – Business Development (International) | Not disclosed | Business development and engineering leadership in international projects |
| Amoco Corporation | Various technical/managerial roles | Not disclosed | Upstream technical expertise |
| Hunt Oil | Various technical/managerial roles | Not disclosed | Upstream technical expertise |
Fixed Compensation
Base Salary – snapshots by decision date:
| Metric | Mar 2023 | Feb 2024 | Feb 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 415,000 | 435,000 | 450,000 |
Annual Cash Incentive – target and payout:
| Role | Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 2024 Payout (% of Salary) |
|---|---|---|
| Senior Vice Presidents | 75% | 98% |
Summary Compensation (reported):
| Metric ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | 388,923 | 410,192 | 432,692 |
| Stock Awards (grant-date fair value) | 900,001 | 899,990 | 960,250 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation | 263,250 | 507,338 | 424,125 |
| All Other Compensation | 71,181 | 70,577 | 80,193 |
| Total | 1,623,355 | 1,888,097 | 1,897,260 |
Bonuses (earned for performance year; paid following February):
| Year | Bonus ($) |
|---|---|
| 2022 | 263,250 |
| 2023 | 507,338 |
| 2024 | 424,125 |
All Other Compensation detail (2024):
| Component | 2024 ($) |
|---|---|
| Active Deferred Compensation Plan Match | 43,269 |
| 401(k) Plan Match | 20,700 |
| Executive Disability Premium | 16,224 |
| Total | 80,193 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive – 2024 criteria, targets, and outcomes (company-level basis used for NEO payouts):
| Criterion | Weight | Unit | Threshold | Target | Excellent | Actual 2024 | Payout % Achieved |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Unit Costs | 15% | $ per mcfe | 2.19 | 1.99 | 1.80 | 1.92 | 137% |
| Free Cash Flow | 15% | $ in millions | 300 | 425 | 550 | 428 | 102% |
| ROACE | 15% | % return | 10% | 16% | 25% | 15.5% | 96% |
| Drilling & Completion Cost/Unit | 15% | $ per mcfe | 0.85 | 0.75 | 0.65 | 0.74 | 109% |
| Drilling Rate of Return | 15% | % return | 30% | 40% | 55% | 59% | 200% |
| Discretionary (HSE/strategy) | 25% | Various | — | — | — | Between target and excellent | 134% |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) grants & mix:
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| LTI Target Value ($) | 900,000 | 900,000 |
| Mix (PSUs vs RSAs) | 100% time-based RS for other NEOs | 50% PSUs (TSR), 50% RSAs for SVPs |
| PSUs – Units Granted | — | 16,026 |
| RSAs – Units Granted | 37,375 | 16,025 |
| RS Grant Date/Fair Value per Share | 03/15/23; $899,990 | 02/06/24; $28.08; $449,982 |
| PSU Grant Date/Valuation | — | 02/06/24; Monte Carlo; $510,268 |
Performance share design notes:
- 2025 program for SVPs remains 50/50 PSUs/RSAs; PSUs are relative and absolute TSR with payout capped at 100% if absolute TSR is negative .
- Prior internal-metrics PSUs: 2021 PSUs paid 130% combined (Debt/EBITDAX 59.4%; Emissions Performance 200%) .
Vesting schedule and overhang:
| Award Type | Units | Status/Key Date | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time-Based Restricted Stock (2024 grant) | 16,025 | Vested Feb 6, 2025 | One-year vest due to retirement eligibility |
| PSUs (2024 grant; TSR) | 16,026 | Earn/settle 02/06/27 if goals met | Market/relative TSR; payout 0–200% |
| Matching Awards (Deferred Comp) | 1,541 (2024 award) | Vest Dec 31, 2026 | One-year vest for retirement-eligible participants |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership (as of March 17, 2025):
| Category | Shares |
|---|---|
| Directly Owned | 442,454 |
| IRA/401(k) Accounts | 6,473 |
| Shares Owned by Family | 7,406 |
| Deferred Compensation Plan Shares | 50,429 |
| Total Common Shares Controlled | 506,762 |
| Percent of Outstanding Shares | <1% |
Additional deferred compensation shares:
- Shares in Deferred Compensation Plan as of Dec 31, 2024: 49,240 .
Ownership policy and derivative/pledging restrictions:
- Stock ownership requirement: Senior Vice President must hold 3.0× base salary; all senior officers are in compliance, with 50% net-share retention until compliant .
- Prohibitions: No options trading, no short sales, no derivatives on Company stock, and pledging of Company equity for new credit is prohibited; as of the proxy date, no NEOs or directors have pledged Company equity .
Option practices:
- Range does not currently grant options or similar instruments; no option exercises in 2024 .
Employment Terms
Key features:
- No employment agreements or general severance plan; benefits governed by the Amended & Restated Executive Change in Control Severance Benefit Plan (Executive CIC Plan), amended December 2024 to remove all remaining tax gross-ups and implement double-trigger equity vesting for awards issued after adoption .
- Benefit multiple for 2024: Farquharson at 3× .
- Double-trigger severance: Requires Change in Control and Involuntary Termination during protection period; lump-sum cash equal to multiple times (base salary + greater of average prior three bonuses or target bonus, plus prorated current-year bonus) and continued benefits for the multiple years; release, non-disparagement terms apply; Section 409A timing considerations may apply .
Potential Change-in-Control Payments (as of Dec 31, 2024; stock price $35.98):
| Item | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Benefit Multiple | 3× |
| Cash Payments | 2,881,388 |
| Accelerated Awards Value | 4,339,014 |
| Benefits Value | 108,592 |
| Total | 7,328,994 |
Other post-employment vesting and disability coverage:
| Scenario | Time-Based RS ($) | Performance RS ($) | Disability Payments ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Death/Disability (age 67) | 3,757,306 | 581,708 | 1,078,800 | 5,417,814 |
| Normal Retirement | 3,296,784 | 161,585 | — | 3,458,369 |
| Involuntary Termination | 3,296,784 | 581,708 | — | 3,878,492 |
Clawback:
- Company will seek recovery from covered officers for incentive compensation upon financial restatements or error corrections under its clawback policy .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Farquharson’s 2024 LTI is 50% TSR-PSUs and 50% RSAs, with strict ownership and anti-pledging policies; SVP ownership requirement of 3× salary and compliance indicates substantial skin-in-the-game .
- Performance levers: Annual incentives emphasize capital efficiency (CUC, DCC unit costs), FCF generation, and returns (ROACE, DRR), with 2024 outcomes delivering 96–200% payout factors by criterion; Farquharson’s 2024 bonus of $424k reflects these formulaic results with SVP payout at 98% of salary .
- Vesting/flow signals: Retirement eligibility accelerates time-based vesting (e.g., Feb 6, 2025 vest), and matching awards vest on set year-end dates (Dec 31, 2026); expect periodic withholding-related share dispositions around vest dates rather than discretionary selling pressure; PSUs settle in early 2027 contingent on TSR performance .
- Governance and severance risk: No individual employment agreements, double-trigger CIC terms, and removal of tax gross-ups reduce shareholder-unfriendly features; Farquharson’s CIC total exposure (~$7.3M as of YE 2024) is notable but structurally standard for SVP level .
- Say-on-pay support and peer calibration: 98% say-on-pay approval in 2024 and maintenance of SVP LTI mix for 2025, plus TSR peer group updates (adding Ovintiv) and increased FCF weighting, suggest ongoing investor alignment and emphasis on cash generation through commodity cycles .