Anthony Gaudlip
RANGE RESOURCESAbout Anthony Gaudlip
Anthony W. Gaudlip is Vice President – Appalachia Division and was first disclosed as a Named Executive Officer (NEO) in 2024; he is 54 years old as of December 31, 2024 . He has been a long-tenured Range participant, electing into the Company’s non-qualified Deferred Compensation Plan since 2009, indicating at least 15+ years of service . Company performance under the incentive framework that applies to Gaudlip includes 2024 net income of $266 million, net debt of $1.404 billion, free cash flow of $428 million, ROACE of 15.5%, and natural gas/NGL/oil sales of $2.2 billion, reflecting resilience through commodity cycles and disciplined capital allocation .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | — | $365,000 (as of Feb 2024) | $380,000 (as of Feb 2025) |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | — | 60% (Vice President) | Maintained program structure; VP mix unchanged |
| Actual Annual Bonus ($) | — | $219,000 (for 2024 performance, paid Feb 2025) | — |
| Long-Term Incentive Grant Value ($) | — | $485,000 (Feb 6, 2024) | $638,750 (Feb 2025) |
| All Other Compensation ($) | — | $63,317 total; includes: Deferred Comp Match $35,750; 401(k) Match $20,700; Executive Disability Premium $6,867 | — |
Notes:
- Gaudlip’s 2024 annual cash incentive was calculated as exactly 60% of salary (i.e., $219,000), rather than the formulaic payout used for CEO/CFO/SVPs .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (Company Metrics and 2024 Outcomes)
| Metric | Weighting | Unit | 2024 Threshold | 2024 Target | 2024 Excellent | 2024 Actual | Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Unit Costs | 15% | $ per mcfe | $2.19 | $1.99 | $1.80 | $1.92 | 137% |
| Free Cash Flow | 15% | $ millions | $300 | $425 | $550 | $428 | 102% |
| ROACE | 15% | % Return | 10% | 16% | 25% | 15.5% | 96% |
| D&C Cost per Unit of Production | 15% | $ per mcfe | $0.85 | $0.75 | $0.65 | $0.74 | 109% |
| Drilling Rate of Return | 15% | % Return | 30% | 40% | 55% | 59% | 200% |
| Discretionary (HSE/Strategic) | 25% | Various | — | — | — | Target Achieved | 134% |
Notes:
- CEO/CFO/SVP payouts are formulaic off these metrics; Vice Presidents (incl. Gaudlip) used a pre-set 60% of salary for 2024 .
Long-Term Incentive (Design and Grants)
| Year | Mix | TSR-PSUs (#) | RSAs (#) | Vesting/Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 LTI ($485,000) | 30% TSR-PSUs / 70% RSAs | 5,182 | 12,090 | RSAs cliff-vest at 3 years (Feb 6, 2027); TSR-PSUs 3-year cycle to Feb 2027 with relative TSR ranks and absolute cap if negative |
| 2025 LTI ($638,750) | VP mix maintained (relative/absolute TSR focus) | — | — | TSR-PSUs use weighted performance peer group; absolute negative TSR capped at 100% |
TSR-PSU payout schedule example (2024 grants):
- 1st rank: 200%; ranks 2–11: 108–183%; ranks 12–13: 100%; ranks 14–17: 50–88%; 18–24: 0%; absolute negative TSR cap at 100% .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Category | Shares | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Directly Owned | 625 | — |
| IRA/401(k) Accounts | 10,095 | — |
| Deferred Compensation Plan (shares) | 108,303 | Shares tracked within DCP |
| Total Common Shares Controlled | 119,023 | Less than 1% of outstanding |
| Unvested Restricted Stock (not in DCP) | 47,304 | Subject to standard vesting |
| Target PSUs (unvested) | 10,253 | Performance-contingent |
| Options | None disclosed (no option grants policy) | Company does not reprice options |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited; no pledges by NEOs/directors | Policy bans derivatives, short sales, pledging |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Executive ownership policy in place; officers must retain 50% of net shares until compliant | CEO/EVP/SVP multiples disclosed; VP multiple not specified in proxy |
Vesting pipeline (as of 12/31/2024):
- RS (23,381 shares) vest Mar 15, 2026; RS (12,090 shares) vest Feb 6, 2027; Matching Awards (1,221) vest Dec 31, 2025; Matching Awards (1,076) vest Dec 31, 2026; PSUs (5,182 target) complete performance in Feb 2027 .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Details |
|---|---|
| Employment Contracts | None; executives not covered by general severance |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) Plan | Amended Dec 2024 to remove all remaining tax gross-ups; adopts double-trigger for equity awards post-amendment |
| CIC Benefit Multiple (Gaudlip) | 2x (salary + higher of average prior 3 bonuses or target) plus prorated current-year bonus; continued benefits for 2 years |
| Potential CIC Payments (as of 12/31/2024) | Cash $1,387,000; Accelerated Awards $2,504,591; Benefits $68,940; Total $3,960,531 (assumes stock at $35.98 and specified PSU payout assumptions) |
| Clawback Policy | Company will promptly seek recovery of covered compensation upon accounting restatement per SEC rules (Comp Committee discretion) |
| Non-Disparagement/Release | Required under Executive CIC Plan as condition to payments |
| Deferred Compensation Plan | Active participation since 2009; 2024 Company match $35,750; aggregate balance $4,208,747; 2024 aggregate earnings $892,123 |
| Retirement Eligibility | As of 12/31/2024, retirement eligibility applicable to certain 2022 equity awards (accelerated one-year vesting for qualifying officers) |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Gaudlip’s at-risk pay is driven primarily by equity (RSAs and TSR-PSUs), with annual bonus for 2024 at a fixed 60% of salary, linking realized outcomes to TSR, FCF, ROACE, and capital efficiency metrics central to Range’s strategy .
- Vesting/sell pressure: Significant RS tranches vest Mar 2026 and Feb 2027, and DCP matching awards vest Dec 2025/Dec 2026; PSUs settle Feb 2027. These dates could be relevant for monitoring potential liquidity events, though pledging/derivative hedging is prohibited and officers must retain 50% of net shares until ownership guidelines are met .
- Retention and change-in-control: Double-trigger CIC with 2x multiple and removal of tax gross-ups reduces shareholder-unfriendly optics; explicit clawback policy adds governance rigor. Retirement eligibility on some prior grants can accelerate vesting, which moderates retention risk tied to long vesting tails .
- Program durability: Strong say-on-pay support (98% in 2024) indicates low external pressure to overhaul incentives, suggesting stability in compensation design tied to core operational and financial metrics that have delivered resilient performance through cycles .