Ron Kurtz
About Ron Kurtz
Ron Kurtz, M.D., 62, is President, Chief Executive Officer, and a director of RxSight; he has served on the board since 2016 and as CEO/President since 2016. He holds a B.A. in Biochemistry from Harvard College and an M.D. from UC San Diego; he is an ophthalmologist and serial medtech founder (IntraLase; LenSx) with multiple successful exits (IntraLase IPO 2004; AMO acquisition 2007; LenSx acquisition by Alcon in 2010) . Operating performance under his leadership shows rapid scale-up: 2024 revenue was $139.9 million (vs. $89.1 million in 2023 and $49.0 million in 2022), with improved gross margin to 70.7%; the company sold 98,055 LALs (+79% YoY) and expanded the LDD installed base to 971 (+46% YoY) . “Pay versus performance” disclosure shows TSR values (initial $100 basis) of 112.62 (2022), 358.40 (2023), and 305.60 (2024), with net income of $(66.8)m, $(48.6)m, and $(27.5)m, respectively .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| LenSx Lasers, Inc. / Alcon LenSx, Inc. | Co‑founder; President & CEO; then General Manager at Alcon LenSx post-acquisition | Not disclosed | Built femto cataract platform; LenSx acquired by Alcon in 2010; integration leadership at Alcon LenSx |
| IntraLase Corp. | Co‑founder; initial President & CEO; later senior leadership | Not disclosed | Took company public (NASDAQ: ILSE) in 2004; acquired by Advanced Medical Optics in 2007 |
| Academia (UC Irvine; Univ. of Michigan) | Faculty | Not disclosed | Clinical/academic grounding in ophthalmology; supports product-clinical translation |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| University of California, Irvine | Faculty | Not disclosed | Academic and clinical engagement in ophthalmology |
| University of Michigan | Faculty | Not disclosed | Academic and clinical engagement in ophthalmology |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Detail |
|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $685,000 target; $678,333 paid in 2024 |
| Target Bonus (% of base) | 100% (raised from 90% in 2024) |
| Target Bonus ($) | $685,000 |
| Actual Bonus Payout (% of target) | 112% based on 2024 goal achievement |
| Actual Bonus ($) | $759,733 (paid Q1’25 for 2024) |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $6,504 (includes 401(k) match; $1,500 inventor bonus) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Plan (2024 structure and outcomes)
| Metric category | Weight | Threshold payout | Target payout | Max payout | Key financial targets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Delighted customers | 30% | 25% | 100% | 150% | Product launches and regulatory milestones (operational metrics) |
| Motivated employees | 30% | 25% | 100% | 150% | Employee satisfaction (operational metric) |
| Shareholder satisfaction | 40% | 25% | 100% | 150% | Revenue min/target/max: $125m/$135m/$150m+; Gross margin min/target/max: 64%/67%/68%+; Cash use min/target/max: $25m/$18m/<$18m |
| 2024 Outcome | — | — | — | — | Company achieved 112% payout of target for NEOs including CEO |
Long‑Term Incentives (Equity)
| Grant date | Instrument | Shares/options | Exercise price | Vesting | Grant‑date fair value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3/4/2024 | Stock options | 149,000 | $56.07 | 1/48 monthly over 4 years (service‑based) | $5,537,883 |
| Philosophy | 100% stock options for executives to align with shareholder value creation; grant sizing adjusted for 93% stock price increase from Dec’23 to Feb’24; CEO voluntarily reallocated a portion of his LTI to Co‑Presidents |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 1,437,084 shares (3.54% of outstanding as of 4/8/2025) |
| Components | 764,610 shares via Cricklewood LP; 63,450 directly; 609,024 options exercisable within 60 days |
| Options outstanding (selected grants) | 3/22/2021: 90,754 ex / 6,051 unex @ $15.60; 7/30/2021: 289,407 ex / 49,412 unex @ $16.00; 3/9/2023: 87,500 ex / 112,500 unex @ $14.95; 3/4/2024: 27,937 ex / 121,063 unex @ $56.07; older fully vested grants also outstanding |
| Option exercises in 2024 | 23,450 shares exercised; value realized $847,835 |
| Hedging/pledging | Company policy prohibits hedging and pledging of company securities by employees and prohibits pledging company securities as collateral |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | Confirmatory employment letter effective July 16, 2021; at‑will |
| Base salary and bonus target | Base salary $685,000 (effective 3/1/2024); target bonus 100% of base |
| Clawback | Compensation Committee administers Compensation Recovery Policy (clawback) |
| Severance (no CIC) | Lump sum: 12 months base salary + 12 months target bonus; up to 12 months COBRA |
| CIC severance (double‑trigger) | If terminated without cause/for good reason within CIC period: 18 months base salary + 18 months target bonus; up to 18 months COBRA; 100% acceleration of unvested equity (performance awards at target) |
| CIC equity (single‑trigger) | If employed through the CIC date: 100% acceleration of unvested equity (performance awards at target) |
| 280G treatment | “Best‑net” cutback to maximize after‑tax value; no excise tax gross‑ups |
Estimated CIC/Severance Economics (as of 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Cash severance | COBRA | Equity acceleration (intrinsic value) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Change in control (single trigger equity) | — | — | $3,207,716 |
| Termination without cause/good reason (no CIC) | $1,712,500 | $17,000 | — |
| Termination without cause/good reason in connection with CIC | $2,055,000 | $17,000 | $3,207,705 |
Board Governance
- Board service: Director since 2016; Class I; term expiring at 2025 meeting; nominated for re‑election to 2028 term .
- Role and independence: CEO and director; not independent under Nasdaq due to executive role .
- Board leadership: Chair is independent (J. Andy Corley); roles of Chair and CEO are separated, which the board believes enhances independent oversight .
- Committees: Audit, Compensation, and Governance Committees consist solely of independent directors; CEO is not listed as a member .
- Attendance: In 2024, the board held five meetings; each director attended at least 75% of board and applicable committee meetings .
- Director pay: CEO receives no additional compensation for board service .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and leverage: 2024 total direct comp heavily equity‑weighted (100% stock options for LTI); bonus moved to 100% of salary target to align with peer CEO norms .
- Metrics rigor: Annual plan used a balanced scorecard with explicit financial guardrails (revenue, gross margin, cash use) and operational goals; payout at 112% indicates above‑target performance without discretionary adjustments .
- Grant sizing and timing: Committee adjusted share counts to avoid unintended reductions from rapid stock appreciation between Dec’23 and Feb’24; CEO voluntarily reallocated a portion of his LTI to Co‑Presidents to support team retention .
- Governance safeguards: Clawback in place; prohibition on hedging/pledging; no excise tax gross‑ups (best‑net reduction under 280G) .
- Red flag to note: Single‑trigger equity acceleration upon a change in control (even without termination) is shareholder‑unfriendly relative to best practices, though cash severance requires a double trigger .
Director Compensation and Peer Benchmarking
- Say‑on‑Pay: 95.3% approval at the June 6, 2024 annual meeting, indicating strong shareholder support for the executive pay program .
- Peer group and targets: Peer set (17 medtech growth companies) used with pay positioning around the 65th percentile for salary/target cash and 50th–75th for LTI; examples include STAAR Surgical, Glaukos, Axonics, PROCEPT BioRobotics, Silk Road Medical, Sight Sciences, SI‑BONE, Alphatec, AtriCure, etc. .
Performance & Track Record (Selected Operating Indicators)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($ millions) | 49.0 | 89.1 | 139.9 |
| Net income ($ millions) | (66.8) | (48.6) | (27.5) |
| TSR (value of $100) | 112.62 | 358.40 | 305.60 |
| Gross margin (%) | — | 60.4 | 70.7 |
| LAL units sold | — | — | 98,055 |
| LDD installed base (year‑end) | — | — | 971 |
| Capital raise | — | — | $107.5m net (May 2024 CMPO) |
Equity Awards and Vesting Detail (CEO)
| Grant date | Exercisable | Unexercisable | Exercise price | Expiration | Vesting terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3/4/2024 | 27,937 | 121,063 | $56.07 | 3/3/2034 | 1/48 monthly (service‑based) |
| 3/9/2023 | 87,500 | 112,500 | $14.95 | 3/8/2033 | 1/48 monthly (service‑based) |
| 7/30/2021 | 289,407 | 49,412 | $16.00 | 7/29/2031 | 1/48 monthly (service‑based) |
| 3/22/2021 | 90,754 | 6,051 | $15.60 | 3/21/2031 | 1/48 monthly (service‑based) |
| 4/23/2020 | 19,186 | — | $15.08 | 4/22/2030 | Fully vested |
Note: In a change in control, 100% of unvested equity accelerates whether or not a termination occurs; with CIC‑related termination, both equity acceleration and enhanced cash severance apply (double trigger for cash; single trigger for equity) .
Board Service and Committee Roles (Dual‑Role Implications)
- Board tenure and roles: Director since 2016; standing for re‑election to 2028; no committee memberships listed (committees composed of independent directors) .
- Dual‑role assessment: CEO + director without Chair role; independent Chair and committee structure provide oversight, and Kurtz is not classified as independent (typical for sitting CEOs) .
- Attendance and engagement: ≥75% attendance for all directors in 2024; CEO receives no additional director pay (aligns with governance norms) .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Heavy use of service‑based options ties value to stock appreciation; KPI‑driven bonus with explicit financial thresholds produced a 112% payout consistent with strong topline growth and margin expansion in 2024 .
- Retention and overhang: Significant unvested options and CIC protections aid retention; however, single‑trigger equity acceleration at CIC is a governance risk that could increase dilution and reduce deal discipline .
- Ownership alignment: CEO’s 3.54% beneficial stake (including sizable exercisable options and LP holdings) supports alignment; policy bans hedging/pledging, mitigating misalignment and margin‑call risk .
- Execution track record: Rapid revenue growth, higher gross margin, expanding installed base, and capital raised in 2024 underpin continued scale; losses narrowing, with TSR strong over 2022–2024 despite 2024 pullback vs 2023 .
- Shareholder sentiment: 95.3% Say‑on‑Pay support indicates broad investor acceptance of program design and outcomes; continued scrutiny warranted on CIC equity acceleration and equity burn/dilution from option‑heavy LTI .