Christian Antoine Lucien Ribeyrolle
Senior Vice President, Biomaterials and President, Rayonier A.M. France SAS at RAYONIER ADVANCED MATERIALS
Executive
About Christian Antoine Lucien Ribeyrolle
Christian Antoine Lucien Ribeyrolle, age 63, is Senior Vice President, Biomaterials and President, Rayonier A.M. France SAS. He joined RYAM in 2017 with the Tembec acquisition; roles progressed from VP Manufacturing Center of Excellence (Mar 15, 2019) and VP Commercial-Manufacturing Liaison (Mar 26, 2019) to VP Biomaterials (Nov 1, 2021) and his current SVP role effective Jan 1, 2024. He holds a chemical engineering degree from l’École Nationale Supérieure de Chimie de Clermont-Ferrand in France . Company performance metrics during his tenure show mixed outcomes: 2023 annual cash incentive paid 60.6–83.1% of target driven by strong Adjusted Operating Cash Flow but below-target Adjusted EBITDA ; 2021 PSU cohort paid 0% due to negative three-year TSR and sub-threshold HPC EBITDA margin . Earlier long-term program (2020 cycle) paid 144.1% reflecting 117.4% absolute TSR at the 88th percentile and 10.8% Adjusted EBITDA margin .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tembec Inc. | Manager, Tartas pulp facility | Feb 2003–Jan 2008 | Operations leadership in specialty cellulose manufacturing |
| Tembec Inc. | Director of Sales, Specialty Cellulose | Jan 2008–Oct 2008 | Commercial leadership across specialty cellulose |
| Tembec Inc. | SVP, Specialty Cellulose | Oct 2008–Feb 2013 | Senior leadership in specialty cellulose business |
| Tembec France SAS | EVP, Specialty Cellulose & President, Tembec France SAS | Feb 2013–2017 | Executive P&L leadership in France |
| RYAM | VP, Manufacturing Center of Excellence & President, Rayonier A.M. France SAS | Mar 15, 2019–Mar 26, 2019 | Manufacturing excellence program oversight |
| RYAM | VP, Commercial-Manufacturing Liaison & President, Rayonier A.M. France SAS | Mar 26, 2019–Nov 1, 2021 | Bridged commercial and operations |
| RYAM | VP, Biomaterials | Nov 1, 2021–Dec 31, 2023 | Led biomaterials segment |
| RYAM | SVP, Biomaterials & President, Rayonier A.M. France SAS | Jan 1, 2024–present | Executive leadership of biomaterials |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | None disclosed in company filings |
Fixed Compensation
- Not disclosed for Mr. Ribeyrolle (he is not listed among NEOs with itemized pay); RYAM’s program for executive officers consists of base salary plus annual cash incentive . No individual base salary/bonus entries are provided for him in 2023–2025 proxies .
Performance Compensation
Program design and recent outcomes applicable to executive officers:
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (2023 ACI) | 50% | $200.0 | $141.4 | 0% | $ in millions; below threshold |
| Adjusted Operating Cash Flow (2023 ACI) | 20% | $58.5 | $99.6 | 200% | $ in millions; above max |
| Strategic Objectives (2023 ACI) | 15% | Various | Partially achieved | 87.5% | Committee assessment |
| Individual Objectives (2023 ACI) | 15% | Various | Varies by NEO | 50–200% | Committee assessment |
| PSUs TSR (2021 grant, 3-yr) | 50% | 50th percentile | 16th percentile; 3-yr TSR −48.1% | 0% | Relative TSR vs S&P SmallCap 600 Capped Materials |
| PSUs Adjusted HPC Segment EBITDA Margin (2021 grant) | 50% | 15.0% | 11% | 0% | HPC segment EBITDA margin target/payout |
| Long-Term Incentives (2024 grants) | Mix: PSUs 35% (CEO 65%), Performance Cash 35%, RSUs 30% (CEO 0%) | 3-year cliff | TSR (50%) & Cumulative Adjusted EBITDA (50%) | Performance-based | Applies to executive officers |
Vesting schedules:
- RSUs: Time-based, 3-year cliff vest .
- PSUs and Performance Cash: 3-year performance period; metrics are Relative TSR (50%) and Cumulative Adjusted EBITDA (50%) .
French participants vesting (France SAS Sub-Plan):
- Minimum 3-year vesting for French-qualified RSUs; blackout restrictions; grants limited by French law thresholds .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Policies and status:
- Stock ownership guidelines (compliance reviewed annually): SVP required to hold stock valued at 2x base salary within five years; retention requirements prohibit sales prior to meeting guideline (except tax withholding); hedging and pledging prohibited . As of Jan 1, 2024, all executive officers were in compliance with ownership and retention guidelines .
- Clawback: NYSE/SEC-compliant clawback policy effective Oct 2, 2023; recovery required upon certain accounting restatements; supplemental “detrimental conduct” clawbacks remain in place .
- Beneficial ownership: Current individual share counts are disclosed for directors and NEOs only; Mr. Ribeyrolle is not included. Directors/executive officers (group) beneficially owned 2,946,828 shares as of Mar 17, 2025; pledging prohibited .
- Historical ownership (pre-acquisition): At Tembec, Mr. Ribeyrolle beneficially owned 30,238 shares and 260,419 DSUs prior to RYAM’s acquisition .
Employment Terms
Severance and change-in-control (CIC) frameworks for executive officers:
- Non-CIC Severance Plan: Applies to VP level and above; benefits range from 9–24 months of base salary plus target annual incentive depending on tier; individual NEO multipliers (illustrative) shown in proxy tables, but Mr. Ribeyrolle’s tier is not disclosed .
- CIC Severance Plan: Double-trigger cash severance (3x for Tier I; 2x for Tier II), with annual cash incentive severance based on highest of recent bonus or target; no single-trigger cash payments or equity acceleration; no excise tax gross-ups (net-best provision) .
- Equity acceleration under CIC: Performance awards vest at target if performance period ≤50% complete; if >50% complete, vest at greater of target or actual performance; subject to plan caps .
- Perquisites: Executive physical program; senior executive tax/financial planning reimbursement ($25,000 CEO; $10,000 others); no car allowance, club dues, home security, or personal aircraft use; reimbursements not grossed-up .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- High at-risk weighting: Majority of executive pay is variable (ACI + LTIs); RSUs remain only 30% for non-CEO, with performance-based PSUs and performance cash at 70%—reinforces pay-for-performance alignment .
- Metrics emphasize TSR and EBITDA/cash flow: ACI linked to Adjusted EBITDA and Operating Cash Flow; LTIs split between Relative TSR and Cumulative Adjusted EBITDA; TSR negative outcomes capped; demonstrates sensitivity to both market-relative and operational performance .
- Governance features: No single-trigger CIC cash or equity acceleration; prohibition on hedging/pledging; robust clawback policy .
Performance Compensation (Detailed Table)
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Cash Incentive (2023) | Adjusted EBITDA | 50% | $200.0 | $141.4 | 0% | Cash; annual |
| Annual Cash Incentive (2023) | Adjusted Operating Cash Flow | 20% | $58.5 | $99.6 | 200% | Cash; annual |
| Annual Cash Incentive (2023) | Strategic Objectives | 15% | Various | Partially achieved | 87.5% | Cash; annual |
| Annual Cash Incentive (2023) | Individual Objectives | 15% | Various | Varies | 50–200% | Cash; annual |
| PSUs (2021–2023 cycle) | Relative TSR | 50% | 50th percentile | 16th percentile; −48.1% TSR | 0% | 3-year cliff |
| PSUs (2021–2023 cycle) | Adjusted HPC Segment EBITDA Margin | 50% | 15.0% | 11% | 0% | 3-year cliff |
| PSUs/Perf Cash (2024–2026 cycle) | Relative TSR | 50% | Matrix (25th/50th/75th percentiles) | In progress | Matrix-driven | 3-year cliff |
| PSUs/Perf Cash (2024–2026 cycle) | Cumulative Adjusted EBITDA | 50% | 3-year goals | In progress | 30–200% range | 3-year cliff |
| RSUs (2024 grants) | Time-based | 30% of LTI (CEO 0%) | — | — | N/A | 3-year cliff |
Equity Ownership & Alignment (Policies Table)
| Policy Area | RYAM Policy | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | SVP: 2x base salary within 5 years | Retention: no sales until guideline met; counts common, restricted, RSUs; excludes unvested performance and options; international execs may be excluded if local regs conflict |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for executives | Reinforced across proxies since 2017 |
| Clawbacks | SEC/NYSE-compliant recovery on restatements; supplemental detrimental conduct clawbacks | Administered by Compensation Committee; applies to incentive comp |
| CIC Equity Treatment | No single-trigger acceleration | Double-trigger cash; performance vesting rules as described |
| Ownership Compliance | All executive officers in compliance as of Jan 1, 2024 | Committee review annually |
Employment Terms (Severance & CIC Economics Summary)
- Non-CIC Severance (VP+): 9–24 months of base + target incentive depending on tier; other benefits may include health/welfare, outplacement; tiers/multipliers disclosed for NEOs; Mr. Ribeyrolle’s tier not disclosed .
- CIC Severance: Double-trigger with multipliers (3x Tier I; 2x Tier II); bonus severance based on highest of recent awards or target; net-best provision—no excise tax gross-up .
- Equity under CIC: Performance awards vest at target if ≤50% complete, else greater of target/actual; subject to plan caps .
Track Record, Value Creation, and Execution Risk
- TSR outcomes have been volatile across cycles: 2017–2020 cycle produced strong TSR-driven payouts (117.4% absolute TSR; 88th percentile, total 144.1% payout) ; 2021–2023 cycle paid 0% due to negative TSR and sub-threshold HPC margins . 2023 ACI showed strong OCF versus weak EBITDA, signaling mixed operational performance .
- Integration context: RYAM completed Tembec acquisition in 2017; combined company diversified HPC and adjacent products and doubled revenues—context for Mr. Ribeyrolle’s transition from Tembec leadership into RYAM France leadership and Biomaterials .
Related Policies and Committees
- Compensation Committee uses independent consultant (F.W. Cook) and benchmarks against a specialty chemicals/manufacturing peer group (e.g., 2023 peers: AdvanSix, Ecovyst, Hawkins, Ingevity, etc.) . Committee sets metrics, weights, and targets; reviews payouts .
- Say-on-Pay historical example: 2016 approval 89.38% (context on shareholder support) .
Equity Ownership (Historical – Tembec)
| Date | Company | Instrument | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | Tembec | Common Shares | 30,238 |
| 2017 | Tembec | DSUs | 260,419 |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong pay-at-risk design (ACI + PSUs/Perf Cash) tied to TSR and EBITDA/cash flow supports shareholder alignment; strict no-hedge/no-pledge and ownership guidelines (SVP 2x salary) reduce misalignment risk .
- Retention: Three-year cliff vesting for RSUs/PSUs and French Sub-Plan minimum vesting likely reduce near-term selling pressure; CIC terms are double-trigger with structured vesting rules, limiting windfalls .
- Performance sensitivity: Negative TSR cycle with 0% PSU payout underscores significant exposure to market-relative performance; 2023 ACF beat vs EBITDA miss suggests internal focus on cash generation—watch EBITDA recovery vs TSR path for future PSU payouts .
- Data gaps: As a non-NEO, individual salary/bonus/equity grant sizes and current RYAM share ownership are not disclosed; monitor future proxies and any Item 5.02 updates for role/comp changes. Historical Tembec holdings establish prior equity exposure but do not translate to current RYAM ownership .