Christopher W. Sittard
About Christopher W. Sittard
Christopher W. Sittard, age 57, is Vice President, Sourcing at RYAM. He joined on January 2, 2024 after senior procurement leadership roles in specialty chemicals; he holds a B.A. in Chemistry from Assumption University . During his tenure period (calendar 2024), RYAM delivered a 104% one‑year TSR, a 60% increase in adjusted EBITDA, and improved loss from continuing operations to $42 million from $102 million in 2023, reflecting operational improvements and balance sheet optimization .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zep Inc. | SVP, Global Sourcing & Chief Procurement Officer | 2021–2023 | Oversaw procurement across manufacturing, distribution, and retail; drove cost optimization and supplier negotiations |
| Solenis LLC | SVP, Global Sourcing & Chief Procurement Officer | 2019–2021 | Led cross-functional teams on cost optimization, negotiation strategy, and procurement transformation |
| Solenis LLC | VP, Global Sourcing | 2014–2019 | Directed strategic sourcing initiatives and supplier relationship management for a diverse chemical portfolio |
| Specialty Chemicals Sector | Procurement, distribution, BD, sales roles | Pre‑2014 | Built extensive global supply chain expertise across specialty chemicals markets |
Fixed Compensation
- Sittard is not a Named Executive Officer (NEO) and his individual base salary, bonus, and grant amounts are not itemized in the proxy. RYAM’s executive program uses a mix of fixed salary plus an annual cash incentive and long-term incentives (PSUs, performance cash, and in some cases RSUs), designed to align with shareholder value creation and market benchmarks set by the Compensation Committee with support from FW Cook .
- Governance features include no guaranteed employment agreements, clawbacks compliant with Dodd‑Frank/NYSE, anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging, and double‑trigger CIC severance for designated executives .
Performance Compensation
RYAM’s 2024 Corporate Annual Incentive metrics and outcomes (these funding results drive executive annual bonuses; individual VP payouts are determined by role-specific targets and individual objectives):
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Achievement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA ($mm) | 50% | 166.4 | 208.0 | 249.6 | 211.5 | 53.7% |
| Adjusted Operating Cash Flow ($mm) | 20% | 53.7 | 67.1 | 87.2 | 97.2 | 40.0% |
| Strategic Objectives (Safety, Sustainability, Diversity) | 15% | Achieve 1 | Achieve 2 | Achieve 3 | Achieved 3 | 30.0% |
| Aggregate Company Metric Payout | — | 30% | 100% | 200% | — | 123.7% |
Long-term incentives emphasize multi-year performance and retention:
- PSUs and Performance Cash: 3-year performance period (2024–2026) with two metrics—Relative TSR (vs S&P SmallCap 600 Capped Materials Index) and cumulative Adjusted EBITDA; payout scale 0–200% with negative TSR cap provisions; interpolation between percentiles .
- RSUs: 3-year cliff vesting for time-based retention awards (min 1‑year vesting across awards; RSU dividends accrue and pay upon vesting) .
- Equity awarding uses an equity price floor ($7.00) to manage share usage; Committee has not granted stock options since inception in 2014 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Sittard/Executive Policy |
|---|---|
| Stock Ownership Guideline | Vice Presidents must hold Company stock equal to 1x base salary within five years; retention prohibitions on selling until compliant |
| Compliance Status | As of January 1, 2025, each executive officer was in compliance with stock ownership and retention guidelines |
| Hedging/Pledging | Strictly prohibited for officers, directors, immediate family members, and controlled entities; includes short sales, options, swaps, collars, exchange funds, pledging/margin accounts, and non‑approved standing/limit orders |
| Grant and Vesting Practices | Minimum one-year vesting; RSUs typically 3-year cliff; PSUs 36 months; dividends on unvested awards not paid and accrue; no option grants since 2014 |
| Beneficial Ownership | Individual holdings for non‑NEOs like Sittard are not itemized; directors/NEOs reported, with group holdings of 2,946,828 shares and no pledging permitted |
Note: We attempted to retrieve Form 4 insider filings for “Sittard” to assess current holdings and selling activity, but the insider-trades API returned an authorization error; therefore, ownership insights rely on proxy disclosures and Company policies [ReadFile insider-trades skill; tool error].
Employment Terms
| Term | Key Provisions |
|---|---|
| Non‑CIC Severance | For vice presidents and above, enhanced severance ranges from 9–24 months of base salary plus target annual cash incentive, depending on tier and responsibility; applies to involuntary terminations other than for cause |
| CIC Severance | Executive Severance Pay Plan covers NEOs and other executives designated by the Compensation Committee; “double trigger” (termination within 24 months post‑CIC for qualifying reasons) with tier‑based multiples; “best‑net” excise tax provision; no tax gross‑ups |
| Equity on CIC | Double‑trigger vesting for assumed awards; time‑based awards vest; PSUs vest at target if performance period ≤50% complete, or the greater of target/actual achievement if >50% complete; similar treatment if awards are not assumed at CIC |
| Clawback | Mandatory recovery of incentive compensation in the event of certain accounting restatements; supplemental clawback for detrimental conduct (illegal acts, willful policy violations) |
| Restrictive Covenants | Exercise/receipt of awards conditioned on refraining from competitive activity; breach within one year may require repayment of gain/value; exception after CIC |
| Anti‑Hedging/Pledging | Company insider trading policy bans all hedging and pledging of Company securities by officers/directors and related parties |
Company Performance Context
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA ($mm) | 139 | 222 |
| Loss from Continuing Operations ($mm) | (102) | (42) |
| One‑Year TSR (%) | — | 104% (calendar 2024) |
Investment Implications
- Strong pay‑for‑performance alignment: annual bonuses heavily weighted to Adjusted EBITDA (50%) and Operating Cash Flow (20%), alongside safety/sustainability/diversity objectives—supporting the Company’s deleveraging and biomaterials expansion priorities that drove improved 2024 results .
- Long-term incentives focus on multi-year TSR and cumulative EBITDA, with 3‑year cliff vesting, fostering retention and durable value creation; option-less equity since 2014 reduces repricing risk .
- Governance limits misalignment: strict anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging and ownership requirements (VP 1x salary; execs in compliance) mitigate selling pressure/pledging risks; say‑on‑pay support of ~96.7% in 2024 indicates investor alignment with incentive design .
- Retention risk appears contained: Sittard is a relatively recent hire (2024) with deep sourcing expertise; severance protections and double‑trigger CIC terms lower flight risk while multi‑year vesting and ownership requirements anchor long‑term alignment .
Related-party checks and disclosure controls: No related person transactions requiring disclosure in 2024; Section 16 reporting compliance affirmed, reducing governance red flags .