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John W. Rogers, Jr.

Director at RYAN SPECIALTY HOLDINGS
Board

About John W. Rogers, Jr.

Independent Class III director of Ryan Specialty since 2014 (age 66; term expires 2027). Founder, Chairman, Co‑CEO (since 2019; CEO 1983–2019) and CIO of Ariel Investments; current director at NIKE, Inc. and The New York Times Company; vice chair of the University of Chicago board of trustees; Barack Obama Foundation board since 2016. BA, Princeton University; recipient of Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson Award (2008). Determined by the Board to be independent under NYSE rules.

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleTenureCommittees/Impact
Ariel InvestmentsFounder; Chairman; CEO (1983–2019); Co‑CEO and CIO (2019–present)1983–presentBuilt and led long‑tenured investment franchise; CIO oversight
Exelon CorporationDirector2000–2019Large-cap utility board experience
McDonald’s CorporationDirector2003–2023Global consumer company governance

External Roles

OrganizationRoleTenureNotes
NIKE, Inc.DirectorCurrentPublic company board
The New York Times CompanyDirectorCurrentPublic company board
University of ChicagoVice Chair, Board of TrusteesCurrentHigher-ed governance
Barack Obama FoundationDirectorSince 2016Nonprofit board
Ariel Investments TrustMutual fund board memberCurrentFund governance

Board Governance

  • Committee assignments: Compensation and Governance Committee member; Executive Committee member. Not a committee chair.
  • Independence: Board affirmatively determined Rogers is independent.
  • Attendance and engagement: Board held 4 regular and 2 special meetings in 2024; each director other than Michael O’Halleran attended at least 75% of aggregate Board/committee meetings—Rogers met the threshold.
  • Years of service: Director since 2014; Class III; current term expires 2027. Lead Director is D. Cameron Findlay; independent directors hold executive sessions four times a year.

Fixed Compensation

Component (Director)2024 Amount (USD)Detail
Annual cash retainer$100,000Standard non‑employee director retainer
Equity grant (RSUs)$122,5002,496 RSUs granted 4/30/2024; fully vested at grant; settlement within 30 days or deferred at director election
Total$222,500Sum of cash and stock

Director compensation policy changes effective 1/1/2025: cash retainer increased to $120,000; annual equity grant to $200,000; chair and Lead Director fees raised to $35,000 (Audit) and $25,000/$35,000 (Comp/Lead).

Performance Compensation

Metric/InstrumentTermsNotes
Director equity grant (RSUs)2,496 RSUs (grant date 4/30/2024), fully vested at grant; one RSU = one Class A share; settlement within 30 days or deferred until separation/change‑in‑control (if elected)No performance metrics for non‑employee director awards; equity enhances alignment

Other Directorships & Interlocks

ItemDisclosure
Compensation committee interlocksNone disclosed for Rogers; interlock noted between Patrick G. Ryan (Geneva Re comp committee) and Michael D. O’Halleran (RYAN director)
Executive Committee roleMember; committee can exercise Board powers between meetings, including declaring dividends, subject to limits

Expertise & Qualifications

SkillBoard matrix indication
Leadership experienceYes
Public company experienceYes

Equity Ownership

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership102,353 Class A shares; less than 1% of Class A outstanding; no Class B shares
Deferred RSUs7,190 RSUs fully vested; settlement deferred until separation from Board
Ownership guidelinesNon‑employee directors must hold 5× annual cash retainer within 5 years; Rogers’ compliance date April 21, 2026; all directors currently in compliance
Hedging/pledgingCompany prohibits pledging and hedging of Company stock by directors absent explicit approval; Insider Trading Policy enforced

Governance Assessment

  • Strengths: Independent status; deep capital markets expertise and multiple public company board experiences; active role on Compensation & Governance Committee; meets attendance expectations; complies with stock ownership guidelines; anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging policy enhances alignment.
  • Potential considerations: Executive Committee membership alongside insiders centralizes decision‑making between Board meetings; Ryan Parties retain significant voting control via Class B high‑vote shares (76.5% combined voting power), though Board proposes declassification, majority voting, removal of springing supermajority standards, and a defined sunset (September 30, 2029) for Class B high‑vote—positive for minority shareholder rights if approved.
  • No Section 16 filing delinquencies disclosed for Rogers; related‑party transactions in proxy do not identify Rogers as a participant.

RED FLAGS: None disclosed specific to Rogers (no pledging; no related‑party transactions; attendance threshold met). Structural governance risks (dual‑class voting, nomination rights) are firm‑level rather than director‑specific but mitigated by proposed charter amendments.