Daron Evans
About Daron Evans
Daron Evans (age 52 as of September 22, 2025) is Rezolute’s Chief Financial Officer, appointed January 23, 2024. He holds a B.S. in Chemical Engineering (Rice), an MBA (Duke), and an M.S. in Biomedical Engineering (UT Arlington/UT Southwestern) . Company performance over his tenure shows cumulative TSR value of an initial $100 investment at $30 (FY2024) and $31 (FY2025), with net losses of $(68.459) million and $(74.412) million, respectively .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| AlloRock, Inc. | Chief Executive Officer | Not disclosed | Executive leadership in cardiometabolic biotech |
| Specialty Renal Products, Inc. | Chief Executive Officer | Not disclosed | Executive leadership in dialysis devices |
| Nephros, Inc. | Chief Executive Officer | Not disclosed | Executive leadership in medical devices |
| Nile Therapeutics, Inc. | Chief Financial Officer | Not disclosed | Corporate finance leadership in therapeutics |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| PoC Capital, LLC | Managing Director | Since 2015 | Public life sciences investing; capital markets expertise |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $121,267 | $421,458 |
| Base Salary terms | Increased to $460,000 effective Sep 15, 2024 | $460,000 base in effect |
| Target Bonus (%) | 40% of base (effective Sep 15, 2024) | 40% of base |
| Bonus Paid ($) | $59,734 (paid Feb 2024 for CY2023; table includes FY amounts) | $231,112 (paid Feb 2025 for CY2024; plus 50% of CY2025 target accrued as of 6/30/25) |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $2,039 | $46,639 |
| All Other Compensation detail | $839 insurance; $1,200 health club | $22,826 insurance; $3,000 health club; $20,813 401(k) match |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Bonus Plan
| Component | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Performance Metrics | Not specifically disclosed (Board-set criteria) | Not specifically disclosed (Board-set criteria) |
| Target | 40% of base salary (effective Sep 15, 2024) | 40% of base salary |
| Estimated Achievement at FY-end | ~50% of target as of June 30, 2024 | ~50% of target as of June 30, 2025 |
| Payout Timing | Approved by Board; paid in February following calendar year | Approved by Board; paid in February following calendar year |
| Actual Bonus $ | $59,734 (FY amounts) | $231,112 (FY amounts) |
Equity Grants and Vesting
| Grant Date | Award Type | Shares/Units | Strike ($) | Expiration | Vesting Schedule |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 23, 2024 | Stock Option (Inducement) | 275,000 | $1.02 | Jan 2029 | 25% on Jan 23, 2025; monthly thereafter over 36 months |
| Sep 23, 2024 | Stock Option | 100,000 | $4.79 | Sep 23, 2034 | 25% on Sep 23, 2025; monthly thereafter over 36 months |
| Feb 16, 2025 | Stock Option | 45,000 (5,000 ex., 40,000 unex.) | $4.61 | Feb 16, 2035 | Monthly over 36 months beginning Mar 16, 2025 |
| Jun 10, 2025 | Stock Option | 15,000 (unexercisable) | $4.39 | Jun 10, 2035 | Monthly over 36 months beginning Jul 10, 2025 |
| Feb 16, 2025 | RSUs | 77,000 | — | — | Equal annual tranches over 3 years starting Mar 1, 2026 |
| Jun 10, 2025 | RSUs | 26,000 | — | — | Equal annual tranches over 3 years starting Jul 1, 2026 |
Notes:
- As of June 30, 2025, no NEO held performance-vesting options or restricted stock awards; RSUs are time-based .
- Equity grant practices: Company does not time awards around MNPI; no NEO awards were granted in the window starting four business days before and ending one business day after MNPI filings in FY2025 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership (as of Sep 22, 2025) | 418,628 shares/rights |
| Ownership % of Shares Outstanding | Less than 1% |
| Breakdown | 165,900 shares directly; 92,000 shares owned by related parties; 160,728 options exercisable within 60 days |
| Options – Exercisable vs Unexercisable (as of Jun 30, 2025) | 102,395 exercisable; 332,605 unexercisable |
| Unvested RSUs (as of Jun 30, 2025) | 103,000 unvested |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging, short sales, options trading, margin accounts prohibited; pledging generally prohibited except limited pre-approved exceptions by Audit Committee |
| Ownership Guidelines | Not disclosed |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Appointment date | January 23, 2024 |
| Current base salary | $460,000 (effective Sep 15, 2024) |
| Target bonus | 40% of base salary |
| Severance (no change-of-control) | 12 months salary; pro-rata bonus; 12 months medical/dental; 12 months accelerated vesting for equity scheduled over next year; 6-month post-termination exercise window |
| Severance (change-of-control related) | 18 months salary; pro-rata bonus; 18 months medical/dental; full acceleration of unvested equity; 6-month post-termination exercise window |
| Non-compete/Non-solicit | Not specifically disclosed for Evans (general confidentiality/non-compete obligations are disclosed for other NEOs) |
| Clawback policy | Company-adopted clawback aligned with SEC/Nasdaq rules; 3-year lookback for restatements; enforced regardless of fault |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Evans’ cash incentives are tied to Board-defined metrics (not disclosed), with FY-end accruals at ~50% of target for both 2024 and 2025; equity is largely time-based (no performance vesting), which lowers risk for the executive but dilutes pay-for-performance rigor .
- Upcoming vesting supply: RSUs start vesting March 1, 2026 and July 1, 2026, creating foreseeable sellable supply; options vest monthly across 2025–2028, adding ongoing liquidity potential—monitor Form 4s for selling pressure .
- Retention and change-of-control economics: Double-trigger-like protection with substantial severance (18 months under CoC) and full equity acceleration on CoC-related termination reduces retention risk but increases potential acquisition costs and may influence executive incentives around strategic transactions .
- Alignment safeguards: Hedging/pledging prohibitions and a formal clawback policy improve governance and reduce misalignment or risk-taking incentives .
- Company performance headwinds: TSR remained depressed ($30→$31) and net losses widened (FY2024 $(68.459)mm to FY2025 $(74.412)mm), suggesting future bonus outcomes may be sensitive to pipeline and commercialization milestones rather than profitability until earnings inflect .