Glenn Hiltpold
SAFETY INSURANCE GROUPAbout Glenn Hiltpold
Glenn R. Hiltpold is Vice President of Actuarial Services at Safety Insurance Group (SAFT), appointed to the role on March 1, 2021; he previously served as Director of Actuarial Services since 2004 and is a Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society. As of the 2025 proxy, he is 54 with 25 years at the company . Company performance context during his tenure includes strong long-term TSR (1,428% since IPO through 12/31/2024), record top-line growth, and profitability metrics used for pay programs (e.g., combined ratio and EBIT before specified items) .
| Performance Indicator | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Total Shareholder Return since IPO | 1,428% | Through 12/31/2024 |
| Direct Written Premium growth (2024) | 20.4% | Driven by policy counts + avg premium per policy |
| Combined Ratio (2024) | 101.1% | Inflationary pressures; non-GAAP EPS $4.16 |
| Annual incentive metric (2024) | EBIT before interest, taxes, changes in unrealized equity gains and credit loss | Core bonus metric |
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Safety Insurance Group | Director of Actuarial Services | 2004–2021 | Not disclosed in proxy |
External Roles
No external board or industry roles are disclosed for Hiltpold in the 2024–2025 proxies .
Fixed Compensation
- Executive officers’ base salaries are generally targeted at the median of compensation peers and (per employment contracts) were adjusted based on Boston-area cost-of-living changes; in 2024 the COLA adjustment was 3.75% for executive officers (CEO unchanged; CFO adjusted to market median) .
- Base salaries are set within an overall pay mix emphasizing “pay at risk” through annual and long-term incentives for executives .
Performance Compensation
Safety’s executive incentives comprise an annual cash bonus tied to operating profitability and long-term equity incentives tied to combined ratio and relative TSR.
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Performance Incentive (2024) | EBIT before interest, taxes, changes in unrealized equity gains and credit loss | 100% | $62.3M target | $86.4M actual | 139% of target factor | Cash, paid following year |
| Annual Bonus Opportunity (Other Executive Officers) | As above | N/A | 60% of salary at target | N/A | Range 30%/60%/90% of salary (threshold/target/max) | N/A |
| Long-Term Incentive – Performance Shares | 3-year average Combined Ratio | 60% | Grid set vs peer median | 2022–2024 CR 102.0% | 58% payout on CR leg | |
| Long-Term Incentive – Performance Shares | 3-year Relative TSR vs P&C peers | 40% | Grid (0–200%); capped if negative absolute TSR | 22nd percentile | 0% payout on TSR leg; overall cycle paid 34.8% | |
| Long-Term Incentive – Time-Based RS | N/A | N/A | Grant per role | N/A | N/A | 30%/30%/40% vest over 3 years (e.g., 2/27/2025, 2/27/2026, 2/27/2027 for 2024 grants) |
Notes:
- Executive officers are eligible for the Annual Performance Incentive Plan; the Committee amended and restated the plan in May 2024 to modernize terms and remove outdated limits .
- Eligibility for the Amended and Restated 2018 Long-Term Incentive Plan includes officers, directors, employees, and service providers; awards may be time-based RS or performance shares .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO at 5× salary; remaining executive officers at 3× salary; measured using current share price at the annual evaluation .
- Clawback (recoupment) policy adopted August 2023: requires recovery of erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation for both “Big R” and “little r” restatements, regardless of misconduct .
- Insider trading policy prohibits hedging and pledging of company equity and mandates pre-approved trading plans for insiders, which reduces opportunistic selling pressure .
Employment Terms
- Employment agreements and severance terms are explicitly disclosed for Named Executive Officers (CEO, CFO, and other NEOs); similar terms for Hiltpold are not disclosed. Key NEO terms include:
- Double-trigger change-of-control vesting under the LTI plan (acceleration only if a CoC occurs and the executive is terminated) .
- Severance: if terminated without cause or for Good Reason within three years after a change in control, CEO/CFO receive 3× salary+most recent annual bonus; other NEOs receive 2× salary+bonus; plus life/health benefits for 3 years (CEO/CFO) or 2 years (other NEOs) .
- Non-compete and non-solicit provisions are included in NEO employment agreements .
- The company’s LTI plan explicitly disallows option repricing and provides retirement provisions for RS and PS awards (full vest of time-based RS after age 62 with 10 years of service; prorated PS vesting on retirement) .
Investment Implications
- Incentive alignment: Hiltpold’s annual bonus eligibility ties to core operating profitability (EBIT before specified items), and the LTI plan focuses on underwriting performance (combined ratio) and shareholder value (relative TSR), indicating strong linkage to drivers of insurer value creation .
- Selling pressure risk mitigants: anti-hedging/pledging policy and mandated pre-approved trading plans reduce discretionary sell pressure; clawback strengthens governance signals for investors .
- Retention and CoC economics: while Hiltpold’s specific contract terms are not disclosed, disclosed NEO structures (double-trigger acceleration, salary/bonus multiples) suggest robust retention frameworks at the executive level, lowering transition risk in strategic scenarios .
- Transparency gap: exact compensation and ownership details for Hiltpold are not provided in the NEO tables, limiting direct pay-for-performance and skin-in-the-game quantification for this individual; rely on plan-level mechanics and governance policies for assessment .
Overall, Hiltpold operates under incentive structures that reward underwriting discipline and capital-efficient growth, with governance policies that constrain misaligned trading and mandate recoupment on restatements—supportive of alignment but with limited individual disclosure granularity.