Dean Parrish
About Dean Parrish
Dean Parrish is Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer (COO) of SandRidge Energy, Inc. (NYSE: SD), appointed effective April 1, 2024; age 37; BS in Petroleum Engineering (University of Oklahoma). He joined SandRidge in January 2012 and advanced through operations roles to SVP, Operations in March 2022 and COO in April 2024 . In 2024, SandRidge’s cumulative shareholder return was essentially flat vs 2023 (cumulative return index 511.94 at 12/31/2023 vs 511.29 at 12/31/2024) while Net Income rose to $62,986K from $60,857K, aided by acquisition benefits and cost discipline . Operationally, 2024 scorecard results delivered strong cost control and production outcomes (e.g., Total Base Production 6.1 MMBoe; Lease Operating Expense $40.0MM), supporting PSU vesting and above-target AIP payouts .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| SandRidge Energy, Inc. | Senior Vice President & COO | Apr 2024 – Present | Operational leadership across Mid-Continent assets; drove cost/production KPIs used in incentives . |
| SandRidge Energy, Inc. | Senior Vice President, Operations | Mar 2022 – Mar 2024 | Led operations; promoted after VP Ops; foundational for 2024 COO elevation . |
| SandRidge Energy, Inc. | Vice President, Operations | Mar 2021 – Mar 2022 | Oversaw field operations optimization and cost initiatives . |
| SandRidge Energy, Inc. | Operating Manager | Feb 2020 – Mar 2021 | Managed operating performance; precursor to VP Ops role . |
| SandRidge Energy, Inc. | Senior Production Engineer | Jan 2012 – 2015 | Engineering and production roles supporting core asset base . |
| EXCO Resources, Inc. | Production Engineer | Pre-2012 | Upstream engineering experience prior to SandRidge . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $295,800 (effective Apr 2024) |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 45% |
| Annual Incentive Paid | $163,845 |
| One-time Retention Bonus | $40,000 |
| One-time Performance-based Award (Cherokee integration/pro forma filings) | $46,000 (paid in 2025; $10,000 paid in 2024) |
| Special Operational Incentive Payout | $40,018 (paid in 2025 for 2024 performance) |
| Other Compensation (Life insurance, 401(k) match, dividend equivalents) | $32,924 (Life: $112; 401(k) match: $24,063; Dividend equivalents accrued: $8,749) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Program (AIP) – 2024 Scorecard
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Result | Performance Factor | Weighted Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Health, Safety & Environmental Goals | 10% | 2 of 4 metrics | 4 of 4 metrics | Plus “Stretch” on 2 metrics | 4 of 4, plus 2 | 150% | 15% |
| Total CAPEX | 15% | $39.0MM | $36.0MM | $33.0MM | $26.8MM | 150% | 22% |
| Return on CAPEX | 10% | 20% | 35% | 50% | >50% | 150% | 15% |
| Base Oil Production | 10% | 0.80 MMBbls | 0.95 MMBbls | 1.10 MMBbls | 0.92 MMBbls | 91% | 9% |
| Total Base Production within CAPEX | 15% | 5.4 MMBoe | 5.9 MMBoe | 6.4 MMBoe | 6.1 MMBoe | 122% | 18% |
| Lease Operating Expense | 25% | $43.0MM | $39.5MM | $36.0MM | $40.0MM | 106% | 27% |
| Adjusted G&A Expense | 15% | $11.0MM | $9.8MM | $8.5MM | $9.3MM | 120% | 18% |
| Total | 124% |
Notes:
- AIP target payout was 45% of salary, multiplied by company weighted score and adjusted for individual performance, subject to a 150% cap; final payout to Parrish was $163,845 .
Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP) – 2024 PSUs
| Metric | Annual Target Range | Actual 2024 Result | Earned/Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted G&A Expense | $8.5MM – $11.0MM | $9.3MM | PSU achieved |
| Lease Operating Expense | $36.0MM – $43.0MM | $40.0MM | PSU achieved |
| Base Oil Production & CAPEX | 0.80–1.10 MMBbls & $33–39MM | 0.92 MMBbls | PSU achieved |
| Total Production & CAPEX | 5.4–6.4 MMBoe & $33–39MM | 6.1 MMBoe | PSU achieved |
| PSUs Granted to Parrish | 2,837 (5/17/2024) | Achieved | Earned and fully vested 3/12/2025 |
2024 Equity Grants (Time-vested RSUs)
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Shares | Vesting Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSU (LTIP) | 5/17/2024 | 5,674 | Vests in ~equal installments over 3 years, subject to service |
| RSU (Promotion award) | 6/18/2024 | 25,000 | Cliff vests on 3rd anniversary (6/18/2027), subject to service |
| RSU (Cherokee integration award) | 9/22/2024 | 4,000 | 25% on timely 2024 10-K filing; 25% on 9/1/2025; 25% on 9/1/2026; 25% on 9/1/2027 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned | % of Outstanding |
|---|---|---|
| Dean Parrish | 30,128 | ~0.08% (30,128 / 36,687,591) |
Policies:
- Stock ownership guidelines require executives to own stock equal to specified multiples; officers must hold 60% of net shares until in compliance .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging policies prohibit hedging transactions and pledging company shares as collateral .
Outstanding Equity at 12/31/2024
| Award | Grant Date | Unvested Units (#) | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSU | 3/15/2022 | 1,579 | $18,490 (using $11.71/share) |
| RSU | 4/05/2023 | 3,135 | $36,711 |
| RSU | 5/17/2024 | 5,674 | $66,443 |
| RSU (Promotion) | 6/18/2024 | 25,000 | $292,750 |
| RSU (Cherokee) | 9/22/2024 | 4,000 | $46,840 |
| PSU (earned post-FY) | 5/17/2024 | 2,837 (unearned at 12/31/24) | $33,221; fully vested 3/12/25 |
| Options | n/a | 0 | n/a (no options outstanding) |
Alignment signals:
- Large unvested RSU pool with staggered vesting enhances retention and aligns value with future performance .
- Dividend equivalents accrue on RSUs/PSUs but pay only upon vesting, reinforcing hold-through-vesting behavior .
Employment Terms
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | Company does not maintain formal agreements with continuing NEOs; participation via plan award agreements and policies . |
| Severance Plan | Involuntary termination without Cause: cash severance equals weeks of salary based on tenure; Parrish eligible for 22 weeks; estimated cash $125,146 as of 12/31/2024 . |
| Change-in-Control | Equity awards generally do not accelerate upon termination/change-in-control unless Compensation Committee exercises discretion; Severance Plan does not address equity treatment . |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank/NYSE-compliant clawback adopted Oct 2, 2023 with 3-year lookback; applies regardless of fault; additional legacy misconduct clawbacks remain in plans/agreements . |
| Insider Trading | Insider Trading Policy in place; prohibits unauthorized disclosure/use of MNPI; awards not timed around MNPI . |
| Non-compete / Non-solicit | Not specifically disclosed for Parrish; AIP/LTIP eligibility contingent on signed codes/confidentiality/clawback acknowledgements . |
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Net Income ($000s) | $60,857 | $62,986 |
| Total Production (Mboe/d) | 16.9 | 16.5 |
| Cumulative TSR Index (Dec 31) | 511.94 | 511.29 |
Highlights:
- 2024 AIP total weighted score 124%, reflecting strong cost and production execution (LOE near target; Total Base Production achieved; CAPEX efficiency; HSE stretch goals achieved) .
- 2024 PSUs fully earned and vested in March 2025 based on achieving all annual ranges, indicating operational performance against budget .
Board Governance, Compensation Committee & Say-on-Pay
- Compensation Committee: Independent; Chair Randolph C. Read; members Nancy Dunlap, Jaffrey Firestone, Vincent Intrieri; 6 meetings in 2024; oversees CEO and senior management compensation, clawback enforcement .
- 2025 Say-on-Pay advisory vote approved: For 22,574,286; Against 1,364,932; Abstain 1,103,492; Broker Non-Votes 5,910,923 .
- PvP Peer Group for disclosures: S&P Oil & Gas E&P Select Industry Index used in pay-versus-performance context .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shift: 2024 LTIP composed of 2/3 RSUs (time-vested) and 1/3 PSUs (one-year performance), balancing retention with measurable operating goals .
- At-risk pay: Significant portion tied to scorecard (AIP) and PSUs; AIP capped at 150% of target; PSUs forfeited if goals missed, limiting risk-taking incentives .
- Discretionary items: One-time retention and performance awards linked to Cherokee acquisition integration and filings; structured as both cash and RSUs with milestone vesting to secure retention through 2027 .
- Clawbacks and anti-pledging: Robust clawback coverage and prohibition on pledging reduce misalignment/financing risks .
Investment Implications
- Strong execution posture: Above-target AIP score (124%) and full PSU vesting signal effective operational leadership under Parrish, particularly on LOE/G&A discipline and production targets—supportive for near-term cash flow quality .
- Retention risk mitigated: Large unvested RSU pool (≈39K units at year-end, plus earned PSUs vesting in Mar-25) and milestone vesting schedules through 2027 suggest continued alignment and lower near-term attrition risk .
- Limited COC protection: No automatic equity acceleration and modest severance (~22 weeks) imply manageable golden parachute risk; potential value leakage in change-of-control scenarios is constrained, but executives may be less insulated in a transaction .
- Selling pressure watch: Upcoming RSU vest dates (including 9/1/2025 and 9/1/2026/2027) may create periodic net-share settlements; anti-pledging and ownership guidelines requiring 60% net share holds temper opportunistic selling risk .
- Governance backdrop favorable: High say-on-pay approval and independent Compensation Committee oversight reduce compensation-related governance overhangs .