Asaf Alperovitz
About Asaf Alperovitz
SolarEdge’s Chief Financial Officer since March 3, 2025, Mr. Alperovitz is a seasoned finance executive with 30+ years of experience across CFO and CEO roles in public companies, with an MBA and BA in Accounting & Economics from Tel Aviv University . He is age 56 per SolarEdge’s 2025 proxy and serves as CFO and principal accounting officer; he holds no other public boards . The compensation framework around his role is explicitly pay-for-performance: 2024 annual bonuses paid zero to NEOs due to sub-threshold results on company financial measures, and the final tranche of 2022 PSUs paid zero as relative TSR fell below threshold; 2024 annual PSU design remains 3-year relative TSR vs S&P 500 peers alongside RSUs, anchoring long-term alignment . He joined amid a governance reset (say-on-pay support 77.1% in 2024) and tightened alignment policies (clawback; anti-hedging/pledging; stock ownership/retention) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delta Galil Industries Ltd. | Chief Financial Officer | 2019–2024 | CFO of a global high-tech apparel company; led finance and transformation initiatives . |
| AllMed Medical Solutions Ltd. | Chief Executive Officer | 2012–2019 | Led strategic transformation; executive leadership experience . |
| Syneron Candela (Syneron Medical) | Senior executive (CEO/CFO roles across public companies) | — | Capital markets and operating leadership at NASDAQ/NYSE/TASE-listed firms . |
| Omrix Biopharmaceuticals (acq. by J&J) | Senior executive | — | Public company finance/operations; acquisition context . |
| Tefron | Senior executive | — | Public company finance/operations . |
| Ernst & Young | Senior management roles | — | Audit/finance leadership foundation . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | Other current public boards: None . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Detail |
|---|---|
| Base salary (monthly) | 155,000 NIS, subject to a 10% temporary reduction until certain company financial goals are met . |
| Target annual bonus | 75% of non-reduced annual base salary; pro-rated for 2025 . |
| Benefits | Participation in standard executive benefit plans; includes Israeli “Manager’s Insurance” policy per Israeli law . |
| Clawback | Company-wide clawback compliant with Exchange Act Rule 10D-1, covering cash and equity incentive compensation upon financial restatement . |
| Anti-hedging/pledging | Hedging and pledging strictly prohibited for all employees and directors; no margin accounts or similar transactions allowed . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive (Plan Design and 2024 Outcomes)
| Metric | Weighting | Target mechanics | Actual result (2024 company) | Payout mechanics | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | Part of 100% combined | Pre-set annual goals; thresholds set by Compensation Committee . | Below minimum threshold for the plan year; NEO bonuses = 0 . | 50% payout at threshold; 200% at maximum . | Cash, annual . |
| Non-GAAP Operating Income (Loss) | Part of 100% combined | Pre-set annual goals; thresholds set by Compensation Committee . | Below minimum threshold for the plan year; NEO bonuses = 0 . | 50% payout at threshold; 200% at maximum . | Cash, annual . |
Note: The 2025 CFO-specific annual incentive metrics were not disclosed as of the 2025 proxy and appointment 8‑K; target level for the CFO is 75% of base .
Equity Awards (Granted in connection with CFO appointment)
| Award type | Grant value | Performance/vesting conditions | Vesting schedule |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | ~$600,000 | Time-based; continued employment required . | 25% on May 31, 2026; then in 12 quarterly installments thereafter (4-year schedule) . |
| PSUs | ~$900,000 | Absolute stock price hurdles measured by 30-day successive average trading price; minimum two years’ employment; performance period ends Dec 5, 2027 . | 33.3% at $40; 33.3% at $70; 33.3% at $100 30-day average price; any earned PSUs vest upon achievement within the performance period . |
Additional context on long-term incentives: Annual equity for NEOs is typically 50% PSUs (3-year relative TSR vs S&P 500) and 50% RSUs (4-year quarterly vesting); no stock options granted in 2024 . The final 3-year tranche of 2022 PSUs was not earned because relative TSR fell below threshold .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (as of Apr 8, 2025) | 0 shares; “*” = less than 1% of outstanding; shares outstanding 59,042,917 . |
| Vested vs unvested | Initial CFO RSU/PSU awards are unvested per schedules above; earliest RSU vest date May 31, 2026 . |
| Options outstanding | Company did not grant options in 2024; no options disclosed for CFO appointment . |
| Pledging/hedging | Prohibited for all employees and directors . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | CEO: 4x salary; other executive team (incl. CFO): 2x salary; 50% of net shares from vesting/exercise must be held until guideline met . |
| Compliance status | As of the record date, all executives and directors either met the guideline or are in compliance with the holding requirement . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Detail |
|---|---|
| Start date / role | Appointed CFO and principal accounting officer effective March 3, 2025 . |
| Base/bonus | 155,000 NIS per month base (10% temporary reduction until goals met); 75% target bonus (pro-rated for 2025) . |
| Notice period | 90 days’ termination notice for termination without Cause . |
| Severance | Participation in Israeli “Manager’s Insurance” per Israeli law; no special executive-only retirement plans . |
| Change-in-control (CIC) | Double-trigger: upon termination by the Company without Cause or by the executive for Justifiable Reason within 12 months post-CIC, all outstanding equity awards fully accelerate . |
| PSU treatment on CIC (plan-level) | Company PSU award agreement converts PSUs to time-based RSUs at CIC based on performance through CIC; accelerates upon qualifying termination within 12 months; death/disability vests at target . |
| Clawback | Company policy to recoup incentive comp upon restatement, compliant with Rule 10D-1 . |
| Hedging/pledging | Strictly prohibited . |
| Ownership/retention policy | 2x salary for CFO; hold 50% of net profit shares until guideline met . |
| Tax gross-ups | Company states no executive entitlements such as tax gross-ups . |
| Compensation committee | Members: Dana Gross (Chair), Yoram Tietz, Betsy Atkins . |
| Peer group / positioning | 2025 peer set includes Enphase, Generac, Wolfspeed, etc.; 2024 base/STI set below median; LTI set at/below median; off-cycle awards used for transition/retention . |
| Say-on-pay | 77.1% support in 2024; Company implemented CEO 20% base pay cut and 10% cuts for direct reports in 2024 . |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- High at-risk mix and performance contingency: New-hire PSUs require multi-year service and absolute price hurdles ($40/$70/$100 30-day average), and company’s annual PSUs use 3-year relative TSR vs S&P 500, reinforcing alignment and penalizing underperformance (e.g., 2022 PSUs not earned) .
- Cash alignment and discipline: 2024 annual bonuses paid zero to NEOs as company performance missed thresholds (metrics: Revenue and Non-GAAP Operating Income), and 2024 salary reductions followed a 77.1% say-on-pay outcome, indicating responsiveness to shareholders and performance .
- Equity design and selling pressure: First RSU vest for the CFO is May 31, 2026 with subsequent quarterly vesting; PSUs require achieving price hurdles and at least two years’ service before potential vest, limiting near-term selling pressure from his awards .
- Governance controls: Robust clawback, anti-hedging/pledging, stock ownership/retention rules (2x salary for executives) and independent compensation oversight reduce misalignment risk .
Investment Implications
- Alignment/retention: The mix of large performance-conditioned PSUs with multi-year service and price hurdles, plus delayed RSU vesting starting mid-2026, ties the CFO’s upside to sustained equity value recovery and aids retention through 2027+ .
- Near-term trading pressure: With zero beneficial ownership as of April 8, 2025 and first RSU vest in May 2026, incremental insider selling pressure attributable to the CFO appears limited over the next 12 months; PSUs add potential supply only if price hurdles are met .
- Downside governance protections: Double-trigger equity acceleration upon CIC with strict anti-hedging/pledging and a 10D-1 clawback framework support investor protections, while say-on-pay feedback has already driven cost and pay discipline (salary cuts, bonus zeroes) .
- Execution context: The 2024 pay-for-performance outcomes (zero bonuses; missed TSR tranche) underscore a rigorous payout gate; the CFO’s background in IPOs, capital markets, and turnarounds may be instrumental as SolarEdge targets operational/financial recovery under the current incentive architecture .