Daniel Huber
SOLAREDGE TECHNOLOGIESAbout Daniel Huber
Daniel Huber, age 43, is SolarEdge’s Chief Revenue Officer (CRO) since May 2023. He joined SolarEdge in 2010, previously serving as VP & GM for the Rest of World Division (2019–May 2023) and VP & GM for Australia & Japan (2016–2019). He holds a B.Sc. in Industrial Engineering & Management from Tel Aviv University; he previously worked at Baccini Cell Systems in Applied Materials’ Solar Business Group, and has no current public board roles . Company performance under his CRO tenure shows revenues moving from $265.4M in Q2 2024 to $340.2M in Q3 2025, while EBITDA remained negative but improved from -$139.2M to -$41.5M over the same span (values with asterisks are from S&P Global)* [GetFinancials].
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| SolarEdge | Chief Revenue Officer | May 2023–present | Global revenue leadership across segments and regions |
| SolarEdge | VP & GM, Rest of World Division | 2019–May 2023 | Led international growth outside core geographies |
| SolarEdge | VP & GM, Australia & Japan | 2016–2019 | Expanded APAC commercial footprint |
| SolarEdge | Executive Sales/Business Mgmt roles | 2010–2016 | Built sales infrastructure and market channels |
| Applied Materials (Baccini Cell Systems) | Business roles (Solar BG) | Pre-2010 | Upstream solar manufacturing exposure |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| None | — | — | “Other Current Public Boards: None” |
Fixed Compensation
- Specific base salary and bonus figures for Huber (not a Named Executive Officer) are not disclosed in recent proxies .
- Company-wide annual cash incentive plan (for executives/NEOs) requires minimum 70% achievement on financial parameters and YoY profitability growth; in 2023 no cash bonuses were awarded to executives due to underperformance .
Performance Compensation
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target/Structure | Actual (Latest disclosed) | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Long-Term Incentive | RSUs | 50% of LTI | Time-based | Not applicable | N/A | Quarterly over 4 years |
| Long-Term Incentive | PSUs (Relative TSR vs S&P 500) | 50% of LTI | Percentile thresholds: 25th/Median/75th → 25%/100%/150% earnout | 2022 two-year tranche TSR was -62.44%, ranked 481; no earnout | 0% | 3-year performance period for 2023 grants; 2022 used 1-, 2-, 3-year tranches |
Notes:
- Since 2022, options were removed from executive LTI; mix is 50% PSUs (relative TSR) and 50% RSUs (retention) .
- Executives did not receive 2023 annual cash bonuses due to failing plan thresholds .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Shares owned directly | 10,705 | As of April 8, 2025 |
| RSUs vesting within 60 days of April 8, 2025 | 3,601 | Near-term vest/settle by early June 2025 |
| Total beneficial ownership | 14,306 | Sum of shares + near-term RSUs |
| Ownership as % of shares outstanding | ~0.024% | 14,306 / 59,042,917 shares outstanding on Apr 8, 2025 |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited | Insider Trading Policy bans hedging and pledging for all employees/directors |
| Stock ownership guideline | 2× base salary (exec team) | CEO 4×; Board 5× cash retainer |
| Guideline compliance | In compliance (as of 2024 record date) | Executives/directors subject to policy were in compliance |
Employment Terms
- Standardized executive employment agreements (Israeli law): at-will employment; base salary; vacation; sick leave; contributions to pension/severance fund and Israeli recreational fund; manager’s insurance; recuperation pay .
- Change-of-control: double-trigger acceleration of equity for executive management .
- Clawback: updated October 2, 2023 to comply with Exchange Act Rule 10D-1; recoupment of incentive compensation upon restatement .
- Insider Trading: hedging, pledging, margin accounts prohibited for all employees/directors .
- Perquisites: executives do not receive special perquisites not extended to other employees .
Company Performance During Huber’s CRO Tenure
| Metric | Q2 2024 | Q3 2024 | Q4 2024 | Q1 2025 | Q2 2025 | Q3 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($USD) | $265.405M [GetFinancials] | $235.435M* [GetFinancials] | $170.749M* [GetFinancials] | $219.480M [GetFinancials] | $289.429M [GetFinancials] | $340.177M [GetFinancials] |
| EBITDA ($USD) | -$139.188M* [GetFinancials] | -$862.482M* [GetFinancials] | -$226.984M* [GetFinancials] | -$90.421M* [GetFinancials] | -$64.070M* [GetFinancials] | -$41.467M* [GetFinancials] |
*Values retrieved from S&P Global.
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Modest direct share ownership (~0.024%) plus ongoing RSU vesting supports retention but leaves limited “skin-in-the-game” compared to outstanding shares . Anti-hedging/pledging and strict stock ownership guidelines (2× salary for executives) reduce governance risk and encourage alignment .
- Incentive design: Removal of options and heavier reliance on PSUs tied to relative TSR introduce market-linked performance accountability; the 2022 two-year PSU tranche paid zero, evidencing willingness to withhold payouts when TSR underperforms . Annual cash incentives are gated by revenue, gross margin, and profitability thresholds (none paid in 2023), reinforcing pay-for-performance discipline .
- Retention vs. selling pressure: Near-term RSU vesting (3,601 shares by ~June 2025) implies scheduled share settlement, a standard retention mechanism; insider selling pressure cannot be assessed without Form 4 data (not disclosed here) .
- Change-of-control: Double-trigger equity acceleration reduces single-trigger windfalls but ensures protection in a transaction scenario, balancing retention and shareholder alignment .
Citations:
- Biography/roles/age/education:
- Ownership tables and footnotes:
- Compensation program (RSU/PSU mix; TSR thresholds; no options; 2022/2023 structure/outcomes):
- Annual bonus gating and 2023 no bonus:
- Stock ownership guidelines and compliance:
- Clawback policy updates:
- Anti-hedging/pledging:
- Company performance (financials): GetFinancials (S&P Global)*