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Veronika Johnson

Chief Accounting Officer and Controller at SEALED AIR CORP/DESEALED AIR CORP/DE
Executive

About Veronika Johnson

Veronika “Roni” Johnson is Interim Chief Financial Officer (Feb 12–Aug 25, 2025) and Chief Accounting Officer & Controller at SEE; she remains CAO after the permanent CFO’s start on Aug 25, 2025 . She joined SEE in 2015 and is a Certified Public Accountant; she holds a BBA from Ripon College and an M.S. from the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee and is age 42 . In 2024, SEE delivered $5.39B net sales, $1.11B Adjusted EBITDA, and $454M free cash flow; the AIP funded at ~122% on metrics weighted 50% Adjusted EBITDA, 25% Net Sales, 25% Free Cash Flow, underscoring pay-for-performance alignment in her compensation year as an NEO . She signed 2024 10‑K and 2025 8‑K filings in her role as Interim CFO, reflecting senior financial stewardship during a transition period .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
SEEInterim CFO; CAO & Controller2025 (Feb 12–Aug 25)Led finance during CEO transition; continued as CAO thereafter .
SEEChief Accounting Officer & Controller2023–2025Principal accounting officer overseeing reporting and controls .
SEEVP, Global Business Services2018–2023Led record‑to‑report, order‑to‑cash, procure‑to‑pay globally .
SEEAccounting leadership roles2015–2018Various accounting leadership posts since joining SEE .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Public accounting (firm not disclosed)Audit/Accounting roles of increasing responsibility~8+ years prior to 2015Built technical accounting and audit expertise; licensed CPA .

Fixed Compensation

Item2024Notes
Base salary (rate)$350,300Salary rate used for AIP target setting .
Salary paid (Summary Comp Table)$340,225Actual cash salary paid in 2024 .
Target bonus % (AIP)45% of baseRole-based AIP target percentage .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Plan Design (2024)

Performance MetricWeightingDefinition/Approach
Adjusted EBITDA50%GAAP earnings adjusted; emphasizes profitability .
Net Sales25%Consolidated external revenues .
Free Cash Flow25%Cash from operations less capex .
  • 2024 AIP funded at approximately 122% of target at the corporate level .

Annual Incentive – Individual Outcome (2024)

ItemTargetFinal Funding FactorActual Payout
Veronika Johnson$157,635152.6%$240,590 .

Long‑Term Incentives (LTI) – Program Structure (2024)

  • Mix: 50% PSUs (2024–2026), 50% RSUs (time‑vest) .
  • PSU performance metrics: 50% Adjusted EBITDA CAGR and 50% ROIC over 2024–2026; payout 50–200% of target, modified by relative TSR quartile multiplier (75% bottom quartile; 100% mid-quartiles; 125% top quartile) against a custom packaging peer set .
  • 2022–2024 PSU payout outcome: 75% of target (CAGR below threshold; ROIC above max; relative TSR first quartile reduced payout) .

2024 Grants (Johnson)

AwardGrant dateShares/TargetGrant‑date fair value
2024 PSUs (target)2/21/20243,163 target (threshold 1,186; max 7,908)$129,968 .
2024 RSUs2/21/20243,163$113,868 .
2024 CAO Retention RSUs (off‑cycle)2/21/20245,334$192,024; cliff vests after 2 years .

Vesting mechanics

  • 2024 RSUs: vest in equal annual installments over three years following grant date .
  • 2024 CAO retention RSUs: cliff vest after two years (grant 2/21/2024) .
  • PSUs: earned after 2024–2026 period based on goals, settled post‑certification (typically Feb following performance end) .

Stock vested in 2024

Metric2024
Shares vested4,192
Value realized on vesting$151,825

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial ownership (record date March 31, 2025)

HolderShares% Outstanding
Veronika Johnson23,813<1% .

Outstanding equity awards as of Dec 31, 2024

TypeShares/Units UnvestedMarket Value at 12/31/24
22RSU565$19,114
23RSU1,432$48,445
23RSU (CAO)3,162$106,970
24RSU3,163$107,004
24RSU (CAO retention)5,334$180,449
23PSU (target reference)920$31,124
24PSU (target reference)3,163$107,004

Ownership guidelines and risk controls

  • Executive stock ownership policy (illustrative levels): CEO 6x salary; Executive Leadership Team 3x; All other executive officers 2x. Until met, retention of 50–75% of after‑tax vested shares is required; as of March 31, 2025, all current NEOs had met or are retaining shares per policy .
  • Hedging and pledging of company stock are prohibited for executive officers and directors (red‑flag risk mitigant) .
  • Options: No option awards or option holdings were disclosed for Johnson in 2024 executive compensation tables .

Vesting schedule and potential supply

  • Near‑term vesting cadence includes annual tranches from 2024 RSUs through 2027 and cliff vest of 5,334 CAO retention RSUs on 2/21/2026; PSUs from the 2024–2026 cycle settle post‑certification in early 2027 (subject to performance/modifier) .
  • Note: We attempted to retrieve Johnson’s recent Form 4 filings to assess actual insider sales, but access to the insider-trades API was unavailable. Monitoring vest dates above can help anticipate mechanical sell pressure from tax withholding and diversification [ReadFile('/public/skills/insider-trades/SKILL.md')] (tool access failure noted).

Employment Terms

Executive Severance Plan (coverage includes Johnson)

  • Without CIC: severance equals one year of base salary plus target bonus (paid over 12 months) and 12 months of health/welfare benefits; vesting follows standard award terms .
  • With CIC (double‑trigger within two years): severance equals two years of base salary plus target bonus (lump sum), up to 18 months of health/welfare benefits, and accelerated vesting of outstanding equity awards at target or based on performance through the quarter before CIC per plan; equity plans require termination in connection with CIC for vesting (double‑trigger) .
  • No excise tax gross‑ups; benefits conditioned on release and restrictive covenants (non‑compete, non‑disparagement, confidentiality) .

Johnson’s severance illustrations (excludes equity acceleration)

Scenario (as of 12/31/2024)Amount
Termination without cause/good reason — No CIC$515,267
Termination without cause/good reason — Within 2 years after a CIC$1,026,868

Clawbacks

  • Dodd‑Frank compliant clawback policy effective Oct 2, 2023 covering incentive compensation paid on financials later restated; expanded internal policy extends recovery to other key executives; provisions are incorporated into award documents .

Compensation Structure Details (Pay-for-Performance)

  • Cash vs equity mix: For 2024, Johnson’s compensation included $340,225 salary, $240,590 AIP, and $435,860 in stock awards, reflecting a material at‑risk equity component (LTI PSUs/RSUs) and AIP funding above target for strong FCF/EBITDA execution .
  • Shift toward RSUs/PSUs: 2024 LTI evenly split between PSUs and RSUs; an off‑cycle 2‑year cliff RSU grant added targeted retention value tied to cost optimization priorities .
  • Performance rigor: PSU metrics center on multi‑year Adjusted EBITDA CAGR and ROIC with a relative TSR modifier against a packaging peer set; 2022–2024 payout was trimmed to 75% by low TSR quartile despite strong ROIC, indicating downside sensitivity to shareholder returns .

Performance & Track Record Highlights

  • SEE 2024 performance (used in incentives): Net sales $5.39B, Adjusted EBITDA $1.11B, FCF $454M; AIP funded ~122% overall .
  • Johnson served as principal financial officer during the interim CFO period and executed SEC certifications of the 2024 10‑K and 2025 earnings 8‑Ks .

Governance and Committee Oversight (Context)

  • People & Compensation (P&C) Committee members are independent; the committee uses independent advisor Pearl Meyer and maintains best practices (pay-for-performance, measurable goals, double‑trigger equity vesting, ownership policy; no hedging/pledging, no CIC tax gross‑ups) .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and incentives: Johnson’s pay is tied to EBITDA growth, ROIC, and relative TSR via PSUs and a 45% bonus target tied to EBITDA/Net Sales/FCF, aligning her incentives with profitability, capital efficiency, and cash generation .
  • Retention risk and supply: She holds multiple unvested RSU tranches with a meaningful 2‑year cliff grant vesting 2/21/2026; these provide retention value but can create known vest‑date supply (especially tax‑withholding sales). Absent Form 4 data (API access issue), watch vest dates for near‑term technicals (insider-trades tool note above).
  • Ownership and discipline: Beneficial ownership is modest at <1% but governance mitigants (strict ownership guidelines, retention requirements, and no pledging/hedging) reduce misalignment and forced‑sale risks .
  • Execution signal: The 2022–2024 PSU payout at 75% (penalized by relative TSR) and 2024 AIP >100% reflect a program that pays for internal performance yet is sensitive to shareholder returns—supportive of pay discipline through cycles .

Net takeaway: Johnson’s compensation structure emphasizes multi‑year EBITDA/ROIC value creation with TSR accountability, while sizeable unvested RSUs and a 2026 cliff vest support retention. Monitor upcoming vest dates and any Form 4 filings for potential short‑term supply; structurally, governance policies (no pledging/hedging, ownership guidelines, clawbacks) reinforce alignment and risk control .