Brenton Taylor
About Brenton Taylor
Brenton Taylor, age 43, is Executive Vice President, Operations at Sight Sciences (SGHT), appointed in November 2024. He brings 20+ years of medtech operations experience, including co-founding and leading engineering at Inogen and C-level roles at NEXT Energy Technologies; he holds a B.S. in Microbiology (high honors) from UC Santa Barbara . Company-level performance during 2024 included revenue of $79.9M (-1% YoY) and an 8% reduction in adjusted operating expenses to $101.3M, with executive cash bonuses paying out at 120.4% of target based on weighted corporate objectives (revenue, OpEx, market access, clinical, R&D, and “kickers”)—key context for pay-for-performance alignment across senior executives .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| NEXT Energy Technologies | EVP Engineering; COO; CEO | 2022–2024 | Led scaling of photovoltaic technology ops, culminating in CEO role prior to SGHT appointment |
| Inogen, Inc. | EVP Engineering; Co-founder | 2001–2022 | Built and led engineering for a high-growth respiratory medtech platform from inception to public-company scale |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| None disclosed in SGHT proxy executive section | — | — | — |
Fixed Compensation
No Brenton-specific base salary or target bonus percentages were disclosed in SGHT’s 2025 proxy (NEO details presented for CEO/CFO/CLO only) .
Performance Compensation
Senior executives’ 2024 cash bonuses were 100% tied to pre-set corporate objectives, with overall payout determined at 120.4% of target by the Compensation Committee. Below are the 2024 company objectives, weightings, and achievement—these governed executive payouts and indicate the levers driving incentives: revenue, OpEx discipline, market access, clinical publications, R&D milestones, and two “kickers” (OMNI Medicare coverage via Final LCDs and litigation outcome) .
| Metric | Weight | Target | 2024 Actual | Achievement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Revenue (SG + Dry Eye) | 30% | ≥$85M for 100%; max ≥$105M; min ≥$70M | $79.9M | 87.2% |
| Adjusted Operating Expenses | 30% | ≤$107M for 100%; max ≤$100M; min ≤$115M | $101.4M | 143.0% |
| Market Access (Payor Wins) | 10% | ≥4 wins for 100% | 3 wins | 75.0% |
| Market Access (Avg TearCare Payment) | 10% | Thresholds undisclosed | Target exceeded | 112.8% |
| Clinical: SAHARA 12M submission timing | 5% | By Mar 31, 2024 | Submitted Feb 2024 | 125.0% |
| Clinical: 36M Standalone submission | 5% | By Sep 30, 2024 | Submitted Sep 2024 | 100.0% |
| R&D: Helix 6M Animal Implantation | 5% | By Oct 31, 2024 | Completed Sep 2024 | 125.0% |
| R&D: TearCare Label Expansion | 5% | Signs/symptoms expansion | Not met | 0.0% |
| Kicker: OMNI Coverage/Reimbursement | 10% | Final LCDs or code/APC outcomes | Final LCDs effective Nov 2024 | 100.0% |
| Kicker: Litigation Outcome | 5% | Trial win or settlement > threshold | $34.0M jury verdict | 100.0% |
Total payout determination: 120.4% of target (applies to NEOs; senior execs followed the same corporate scorecard) .
Notes on program design and changes:
- Elevated 2024 target bonus percentages (except CEO) were adopted to offset reduced equity retentive value and LCD-driven market uncertainty; target percentages were lowered materially for 2025 as conditions normalized .
- Committee continued to prioritize time-based RSUs in 2024–2025 amid burn-rate limits, with intent to introduce performance-vested equity in 2026 (subject to change) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Practice | Details | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Anti-hedging and anti-pledging | Hedging, short sales, margin purchases, and pledging prohibited (except pledges pre-IPO) | Reduces misalignment/hedging risk |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Other executive officers: 1× annual base salary; compliance within 5 years of role | Encourages “skin-in-the-game”; retention of net shares until compliant |
| RSU vesting cadence | Quarterly installments over 4 years for annual RSU grants (since 2024) | Regular vesting creates potential quarter-end liquidity events |
| Form 4 status | A Form 4 for Brenton Taylor was filed on Nov 18, 2024 after an initial delinquency note in the proxy; specific holdings not disclosed in proxy tables | Confirms reportable equity activity; magnitude/details not available in proxy |
No Brenton-specific beneficial ownership (shares, options) was itemized in the proxy’s ownership table (directors and NEOs detailed; all insiders in aggregate shown) .
Employment Terms
| Element | Company Disclosure | Brenton-specific Status |
|---|---|---|
| Employment agreement | NEOs have employment agreements with severance and change-in-control terms | Brenton’s agreement was not filed/disclosed in proxy |
| Severance (non-CIC) | CEO: 18 months salary + COBRA; CFO/CLO: 12 months; bonus treatment varies | Not disclosed for Brenton |
| Change-in-control (CIC) | CEO: 24 months salary + 2× target bonus + COBRA + full vest acceleration; CFO/CLO: 18 months + 1.5× target bonus + COBRA + full vest acceleration | Not disclosed for Brenton |
| Clawback | Mandatory clawback policy for erroneously awarded incentive comp | Applies to executive officers |
| Equity grant practice | RSUs; time-based vesting; annual grants sized to dollar value under burn-rate cap (~6% in aggregate) | Likely applies to senior execs; Brenton’s specific grants not disclosed |
Governance on trading/ownership applies company-wide (insider trading policy, hedging/pledging prohibitions) .
Investment Implications
- Incentive alignment: Senior exec bonuses hinge on revenue and adjusted OpEx with explicit thresholds, plus market access and clinical/R&D milestones; 2024 payout >100% was driven by OpEx outperformance and strategic “kickers” (Final LCDs, litigation), indicating high accountability to controllable value drivers despite reimbursement noise .
- Retention risk: Company highlighted reduced retentive value of equity due to stock pressure and burn-rate caps limiting grant value; 2025 bonus targets were reduced from 2024, potentially lowering near-term cash incentives; watch for Brenton’s individual grant cadence and compliance with ownership guidelines as retention indicators .
- Potential selling pressure windows: Quarterly RSU vesting across executives increases probability of periodic insider selling around quarter-ends; the proxy noted a delinquent Form 4 later corrected for Brenton in Nov 2024, confirming active reporting obligations .
- Governance safeguards: Anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies, clawbacks, and stock ownership guidelines materially limit misalignment risks; change-in-control terms for NEOs include full time-based equity vesting acceleration—monitor any disclosed terms for Brenton in future 8-Ks or proxies .
Data gaps: Brenton-specific base salary, bonus targets, grant sizes, vesting schedules, option positions, and severance/CIC terms were not disclosed in the 2025 proxy; monitor future 8-K Item 5.02 filings and Form 4s for individual-level updates .