Eric Weisblum
About Eric Weisblum
Eric Weisblum is SILO’s founder, Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer. He previously originated, structured, traded and placed financing transactions at M.H. Meyerson & Co. (1993–2002), and served as a registered representative at Domestic Securities; he holds a B.A. from the University of Hartford’s Barney School of Business . Age: 56 (2025) with continuous service as CEO and Chairman; he has nearly 20 years of experience in structuring and trading financial instruments and in licensing and assisting therapeutic asset development . Performance context under his tenure shows persistent net losses and low TSR: Net Income was $(3.9)M in 2022, $(3.7)M in 2023, and $(4.39)M in 2024; the “Value of a $100 Investment” (TSR proxy metric) was 15.83 (2022), 6.79 (2023), and 6.19 (2024) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| M.H. Meyerson & Co., Inc. | Originated/structured/traded/placed structured financing transactions | 1993–2002 | Built capital markets and structuring expertise |
| Domestic Securities (NJ broker-dealer) | Registered representative (Series 7, 63, 55) | Not disclosed | Securities trading and compliance credentials |
| Private investor and advisor | Investor, board member, advisor to several companies | Not disclosed | Licensing and development experience in therapeutics |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Various companies (not specified) | Private investor/board member/advisor | Not disclosed | Supports deal sourcing/licensing; details not disclosed |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $350,151 | $350,000 |
| Target Bonus ($) | Up to $350,000 (discretionary) | Up to $350,000 (discretionary) |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | $200,000 | $200,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $18,858 | $80,051 |
| Total ($) | $569,009 | $630,051 |
Performance Compensation
| Incentive Type | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual cash bonus | Committee-determined criteria; not disclosed | Not disclosed | Up to $350,000 | $200,000 (2023, 2024) | Paid in cash | N/A |
| Equity awards | RSUs/Options (plan capacity exists) | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | None outstanding for NEOs as of 12/31/2024 | N/A | N/A |
Notes:
- The Amended and Restated 2020 Omnibus Equity Incentive Plan includes standard option/SAR/RSU mechanics and allows performance goals, with clawback provisions tied to SEC Rule 10D .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shares beneficially owned | 160,854 | 184,432 | 197,932 |
| Ownership (%) | 5.17% | 4.11% | 2.09% |
| Options exercisable included in ownership | 6,000 | 4,000 | — (none disclosed) |
| Shares pledged as collateral | None (as of 12/31/2024) | None (as of 12/31/2024) | — |
Additional alignment policies:
- Anti-hedging/short-sale policy in place for officers/directors; pledging prohibited unless pre-cleared; no pledging reported as of 12/31/2024 .
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Agreement date | Employment agreement dated October 12, 2022 |
| Base salary | $350,000 per year |
| Annual bonus | Discretionary, up to $350,000, subject to Compensation Committee criteria |
| Severance (death/total disability; Good Reason; without Cause; or termination within 40 days of Change in Control) | 24 months base salary; pro‑rated bonus (at least $200,000); 24 months COBRA at employee premium share; plus accrued amounts |
| Equity acceleration | Any equity grants immediately vest upon termination for Good Reason or by Company without Cause (with 90 days’ notice) |
Severance and Change‑of‑Control Economics
| Component | Amount/Provision | Citation |
|---|---|---|
| Cash severance | 24 months base salary = $700,000 | |
| Pro‑rated bonus guarantee | At least $200,000 in certain terminations | |
| COBRA subsidy | Employee premium share for 24 months | |
| Equity vesting | Immediate upon Good Reason or termination without Cause (90 days’ notice) | |
| CoC trigger | Termination within 40 days post‑Change in Control qualifies for severance |
Board Governance and Director Service
- Role: Chairman of the Board and CEO (dual-role). Board rationale: combined role strengthens communication and strategy execution; no Lead Independent Director deemed necessary at current size .
- Board independence: 3 of 4 directors are independent (Linsley, Muñoz, Pavell) under Nasdaq rules; Audit Committee independence compliant with Rule 10A-3 .
- Committees:
- Audit: Linsley (Chair), Muñoz, Pavell; Linsley is audit committee financial expert .
- Compensation: Linsley (Chair), Muñoz, Pavell .
- Nominating & Corporate Governance: Linsley (Chair), Muñoz, Pavell .
- Meetings and attendance: In FY2024, Board held 4 meetings; Audit 4; Compensation and Nominating acted by written consent; no director attended fewer than 75%; independents meet separately without management .
- Director compensation (non-employee): Cash retainers of $45,000 (Linsley) and $25,000 (Muñoz, Pavell) in 2024; earlier 8‑K (Dec 29, 2021) set annual retainers and option grants for non-employee directors, with additional fees for committee chairs; employee directors (e.g., CEO) are not in this program .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Income (Loss) ($) | $(3,908,551) | $(3,700,683) | $(4,392,880) |
| Value of Initial $100 Investment (TSR proxy) | 15.83 | 6.79 | 6.19 |
| CEO Compensation Actually Paid ($) | $352,500 | $569,009 | $630,051 |
Operational highlights:
- Lead program SPC‑15: pre‑IND submission (June 4, 2024), pre‑IND meeting (Sept 2024) to align on 505(b)(2); GLP toxicology/PK PD underway; first dosing in IND‑enabling study completed March 2025; targeting IND submission in 2025 .
- SP‑26 (ketamine implant for fibromyalgia): preclinical work initiated in early 2025; pursuing 505(b)(2) path .
- SPC‑14 (Alzheimer’s): under Columbia sponsored research; exclusive license in 2024 .
- SPU‑16 (CNS homing peptide): UMB license; U.S. patent issued 2023 for peptide‑targeted liposomal delivery .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Legal/SEC: No material proceedings; directors and officers compliant on Section 16(a) filings (FY2024) .
- Anti‑hedging/pledging: Prohibited; no pledging reported as of 12/31/2024 .
- Pay‑for‑performance transparency: Bonus criteria not disclosed; performance metrics (revenue/EBITDA/TSR targets) not specified .
- Change‑of‑control protections: 2× salary cash severance ($700k) plus guaranteed pro‑rated bonus (≥$200k) and equity acceleration upon certain terminations; termination within 40 days of change in control triggers severance .
- Governance: Combined CEO/Chair; no Lead Independent Director; board majority independent .
- Dilution risk: 2025 proposal to expand plan reserve to 1.4M shares with evergreen up to 5% per year (capped); burn rate disclosed; potential future equity issuance .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Year-over-year mix: CEO total compensation rose from $569,009 (2023) to $630,051 (2024), driven by stable salary and bonus, and higher “All Other Compensation” (benefits) .
- Cash vs equity: No outstanding equity awards for NEOs as of 12/31/2024, emphasizing cash-heavy pay; plan permits equity grants and clawback but limited recent NEO equity .
- Discretionary bonuses: Annual cash bonuses paid despite ongoing losses; bonus determination remains at Committee discretion without disclosed performance metrics .
- Clawback: Equity plan includes recoupment for restatements per SEC 10D; positive alignment feature .
- Change-of-control/Severance: Robust protections (2 years salary; guaranteed bonus; COBRA; equity acceleration) may elevate cost of turnover or M&A; triggers include termination within 40 days post-transaction .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Weisblum’s beneficial stake (~2.09% in 2025) and anti‑hedging/pledging policy support alignment, but pay is predominantly cash with limited disclosed performance linkage; bonuses paid during loss years raise pay‑for‑performance concerns .
- Retention/M&A: Employment agreement ensures significant severance and guaranteed bonus/acceleration under multiple termination scenarios, potentially increasing transaction costs in a sale or leadership transition .
- Governance: Combined CEO/Chair without a Lead Independent Director increases independence risk; board majority is independent and committees are fully independent, partially mitigating this .
- Execution risk: Net losses and weak TSR underscore the importance of hitting development milestones (SPC‑15 IND, SP‑26 preclinical path) and securing financing; equity plan expansion introduces potential dilution but could fund talent and growth .