Sandip Kapadia
Executive Vice President, Chief Actuary and Analytics Officer at Skyward Specialty Insurance Group
Executive
About Sandip Kapadia
Sandip Kapadia is Executive Vice President, Chief Actuary and Analytics Officer at Skyward Specialty Insurance Group (SKWD), serving in this role since November 2021 after leading Data Analytics and Underwriting Strategy from April 2020 to November 2021 . He holds a B.S. from Pennsylvania State University and is a Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society, a member of the American Academy of Actuaries, and a Designated Mentor to Columbia University’s Actuarial Science graduate program . Age: 44 as of the 2025 proxy record date . Under his and the leadership team’s tenure, SKWD delivered strong performance in FY2024: gross written premiums grew 19.4% to ~$1.743B, net income rose 38.2% to $118.8M, adjusted combined ratio was 91.2%, and ROE was 16.3% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Skyward Specialty Insurance Group | SVP, Head of Data Analytics & Underwriting Strategy | Apr 2020 – Nov 2021 | Built analytics underwriting frameworks positioning for profitable growth |
| Crum & Forster | Vice President | Sep 2015 – Apr 2020 | Led actuarial/analytics initiatives at specialty insurer |
| Partner Re; Everest Re; Aon Re | Analytical roles | Not disclosed | Multi-line actuarial, reinsurance and modeling experience |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Columbia University | Designated Mentor, Actuarial Science Graduate Program | Not disclosed | Talent pipeline and advanced actuarial mentoring |
| Casualty Actuarial Society | Fellow | Not disclosed | Technical credential signaling actuarial expertise |
| American Academy of Actuaries | Member | Not disclosed | Professional standards and policy engagement |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $400,000 | Committee reviewed; no 2024 increase for Kapadia |
| Target Bonus (%) | 40% of base ($160,000) | STIP tied to internal combined ratio and GWP growth, with OKRs overlay |
| Actual Bonus Paid | $225,000 (141% of target) | Reflects GWP +19.4% and internal CR 91.6% with exceptional OKR achievement |
Performance Compensation
| Metric/Award | Weighting | Target | Actual/Outcome | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 STIP – Internal Combined Ratio (CR) + GWP Growth | Company STIP matrix | CR: 92.5% target; GWP growth: 10–15% | Internal CR: 91.6%; GWP +19.4% | Company factor 140%; Kapadia paid 141% of target ($225,000) | Cash paid Mar 2025 |
| 2022–2024 Performance Cash Units (PCUs) – CR | N/A | CR target for 100%: 93.0% | 3-year avg internal CR: 91.9% | 116% of target; Kapadia earned $38,667 | Certified Feb 24, 2025 |
| 2022–2024 PSUs – CR | ~33% of LTI cohorts with CR metric | CR scale 0–150% | 3-year avg internal CR: 91.9% | 116% of target; Kapadia earned 2,937 PSUs | Certified Feb 24, 2025 |
| 2022–2024 PSUs – Relative GTBVPS | ~33% of LTI cohorts with BVPS metric | 50th percentile = 100%; 25th = 0%; 75th = 150% | Pending peer data (anticipated May 2025) | N/A until determination | Vested subject to performance determination |
| 2024 PSUs – Internal CR (half of grant) | ~33% of 2024 LTI | 3-year performance period ending 12/31/2026 | In progress | 0–150% scale | Eligible 1/1/2027, continued service |
| 2024 PSUs – Relative GBVPS (half of grant) | ~33% of 2024 LTI | Peer-relative average GBVPS over 2024–2026 (peer list specified) | In progress | 0–150% scale (75th=150%; 50th=100%) | Eligible 1/1/2027, continued service |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial Ownership: 15,347 SKWD shares owned directly (<1%) as of March 10, 2025 .
- Ownership Guidelines: Other ELT members required to hold stock equal to 1x base salary; 5-year compliance window; must retain 50% of after-tax shares until met (100% if not in compliance after 5 years); unearned PSUs/options do not count .
- Hedging/Pledging: Prohibited by Insider Trading Policy (short sales, puts/calls, hedging, margin accounts, pledging); trading windows and Rule 10b5-1 plan governance specified .
- Clawback: Dodd-Frank-compliant recoupment for incentive comp tied to financial reporting over prior 3 years in case of restatement; equity awards subject to clawback .
Outstanding Equity Awards (as of 12/31/2024)
| Award Type | Quantity | Vesting Date(s) | Market/Grant Value Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 RSUs | 1,745 units | 1/1/2027 | Grant-date fair value $63,570 |
| 2024 PSUs (target) | 3,490 units | Eligible 1/1/2027; performance required | Grant-date fair value $127,141 |
| 2023 RSUs | 2,020 units | 1/1/2026 | Market value uses $50.54 close (proxy reference) |
| 2023 PSUs (target) | 4,040 units | 3-year period ends 12/31/2025; certification thereafter | Market value uses $50.54 close (proxy reference) |
| IPO RSUs (Grant A) | 10,000 units | 50% on 1/12/2025; 50% on 1/12/2026 | Market value uses $50.54 close (proxy reference) |
| IPO RSUs (Grant B) | 10,000 units | 50% on 1/12/2026; 50% on 1/12/2027 | Market value uses $50.54 close (proxy reference) |
| Options (Non-Qualified) | 40,000 at $15.00 strike | 50% on 1/12/2026; 50% on 1/12/2027 | Option terms per proxy; exercise price $15.00 |
| 2022 Restricted Shares | 2,532 shares | Fully vested on 1/1/2025 | Market value uses $50.54 close (proxy reference) |
| 2022 PSUs – CR | 2,937 earned | Certified 2/24/2025 (116% of target) | Earnout based on 91.9% avg internal CR |
Stock Vested (2024 activity)
| Date | Award | Quantity | Value Realized |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1/1/2024 | 2021 RSUs | 5,362 shares | $181,665 (at $33.88 close) |
Employment Terms
- Severance Agreement (non-CEO NEO framework): 12 months base salary and 12 months COBRA premiums upon termination without cause or for good reason; requires execution and non-revocation of release and continued compliance with confidentiality/non-solicitation obligations .
- Equity Award Treatment: Double-trigger vesting around change in control (CIC) with award-specific protection periods; 2023/2024 awards feature vesting contingent upon, or within 12 months following, CIC with target/actual performance considerations as specified; 2024 PSUs provide CIC-related vesting based on actual performance within defined pre-closing window .
- Insider Trading Policy: Trading windows/10b5-1 plan rules, restrictions on hedging/pledging .
Potential Payments (if separation occurred on 12/31/2024)
| Type | Involuntary/Good Reason (pre-CIC) | Involuntary/Good Reason (in connection with CIC) | Death/Disability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Severance | $400,000 | $400,000 | — |
| Health & Welfare (COBRA) | $34,717 | $34,717 | — |
| Performance Units (PCUs) Acceleration | — | $33,300 | $33,300 |
| Equity Awards Acceleration (RSUs/PSUs) | — | $3,278,241 | $3,278,241 |
| Total | $434,717 | $3,746,257 | $3,311,541 |
Compensation Structure Notes and Peer Benchmarking
- Mix shift: 2024 LTI targeted ~$175,000 for Kapadia (+46% YoY), with ~67% PSUs and ~33% RSUs, strengthening performance-levered pay and retention through 2026–2027 .
- Performance alignment: STIP and PSUs linked to internal CR and peer-relative GBVPS, directly incentivizing underwriting profitability and capital growth .
- Peer groups: Compensation reference group (for pay context): AMERISAFE, Argo Group, Employers Holdings, Global Indemnity, James River, Kinsale, Palomar, ProAssurance, RLI, Safety Insurance, SiriusPoint, Tiptree, Trisura, United Fire Group, Universal Insurance . GBVPS PSU peer set: Axis Capital, Employers, Global Indemnity, Hamilton Group, James River, Kinsale, Old Republic, Palomar, ProAssurance, RLI, SiriusPoint .
- Governance enhancements: No tax gross-ups for CIC, no option repricing without shareholder approval, no executive perquisites, clawback policy in place .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Kapadia’s pay is tightly linked to underwriting profitability (CR) and capital creation (GBVPS), with a meaningful 2024 bonus outcome tied to strong company performance, indicating high pay-for-performance sensitivity .
- Retention vs. Selling Pressure: A substantial slate of unvested RSUs/PSUs and 2023 IPO awards vesting across 2025–2027 creates strong retention hooks; while vesting dates (2025–2027) can coincide with trading windows, hedging/pledging bans and ownership guidelines temper misalignment risk .
- Change-of-Control Economics: Double-trigger treatment and target/actual-based accelerations could drive sizable equity vesting under a CIC ($3.28M equity acceleration as of 12/31/2024 scenario), representing potential talent risk/cost in strategic transactions .
- Ownership: Direct ownership is modest (<1%), but policy requires stock accumulation to 1x salary and retention of after-tax shares until compliance, supporting ongoing alignment as tenure progresses .
- Execution Risk: Performance metrics favor underwriting discipline and capital growth; the pending relative GTBVPS PSU settlement (May 2025) adds a peer-relative scorecard, highlighting competitive execution risk versus specialty peers .