Kelly Laferriere
About Kelly Laferriere
Kelly Laferriere is President of Slam Corp (SLAMF) and a senior operator across sports, media and entertainment with 25+ years of experience. She previously served as Chief Business Officer at A‑Rod Corp beginning June 2020, and earlier held senior roles at ESPN (VP, Programming & Acquisitions, 1999–2005) and Six Flags (Regional VP, Park Strategy & Management, 2006–2010). She holds a BA from Georgetown University and is age 50 per the company’s latest Form 10‑K. Highlights include helping lead ESPN’s acquisition/management of multimedia rights to the NFL, NBA, NHL alongside ratings growth, the ABC Sports merger, and network expansion (ESPNews, ESPN Classic, ESPN U), and revamping performance of Six Flags’ east coast parks responsible for a significant portion of company operating revenues .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disney’s ABC Television Group | Producer | 1995–1999 | Early production leadership in broadcast media |
| ESPN | Vice President, Programming & Acquisitions | 1999–2005 | Led team acquiring/managing multimedia rights to NFL/NBA/NHL; contributed to ratings growth, ABC Sports merger, and launch of ESPNews, ESPN Classic, ESPN U |
| Six Flags | Regional VP, Park Strategy & Management | 2006–2010 | Revamped east coast parks’ performance; responsible for a significant portion of overall operating revenues |
| In Order to Succeed | Chief Operating Officer | 2015–2017 | Operations leadership (COO) |
| SellersEaston Media | SVP, Content Strategy & Business Development | 2016–2020 | Content strategy and business development |
| Various Global Brands | Independent Consultant | Not disclosed | Advisory to global brands in sports/media/entertainment |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| A‑Rod Corp | Chief Business Officer | June 2020–present |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 | Policy/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | None | “None of our executive officers or directors have received any cash compensation for services rendered to us.” |
| Target Bonus % | Not applicable | No cash compensation prior to initial business combination |
| Actual Bonus Paid | None | No bonuses paid prior to initial business combination |
| Cash/Perquisites | Office space, secretarial & administrative services reimbursed to Sponsor $10,000/month | Company reimburses Sponsor or affiliate starting Feb 23, 2021 until earlier of business combination or liquidation |
| Expense Reimbursement | Yes | Out‑of‑pocket expenses reimbursed; quarterly audit committee review |
After completion of the initial business combination, executives who remain may be paid consulting or management fees determined by independent directors; currently no agreements providing benefits upon termination .
Performance Compensation
| Incentive Type | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting/Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre‑combination Executive Incentives | None disclosed | — | — | — | — | No equity/bonus plans disclosed for executives prior to business combination |
| Clawback Policy | Accounting restatement recoupment | Applies to executive officers | N/A | N/A | N/A | Board‑adopted clawback policy under Exchange Act Section 10D; administered by Compensation Committee; filed as exhibit |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Multi‑period beneficial ownership snapshot:
| Metric | As of Nov 22, 2024 | As of Jun 5, 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Total Ordinary Shares Outstanding (Company) | 23,452,959 | 16,140,267 |
| Laferriere Beneficial Ownership (Class B) | 30,000 shares | 30,000 shares |
| Ownership % of Class | Less than 1% (*) | Less than 1% (*) |
| Class A Beneficial Ownership | None disclosed | None disclosed |
Alignment and trading constraints:
- Initial Shareholders (includes Laferriere as “Other Class B Shareholder”) agreed not to transfer, assign or sell Founder Shares until the earlier of: (A) one year after the initial business combination or sooner if, post‑combination, Class A trades at or above $12.00 for 20 days in any 30‑day period commencing at least 150 days after the business combination; or (B) following a transaction where shareholders can exchange for cash, securities, or property .
- Sponsor Letter Agreement: Laferriere agreed to vote Covered Shares in favor of the Merger/Warrant Conversion, waive anti‑dilution protections on Class B shares, and not redeem Covered Shares .
- Insider Trading Policy prohibits pledging Company Securities as collateral and holding in margin accounts; hedging transactions and publicly‑traded options are prohibited .
Founder Share Amendment allows conversion of Class B to Class A prior to business combination at holder’s election, but converted Class A remains non‑redeemable and subject to founder share restrictions under the Letter Agreement .
Employment Terms
| Term | Disclosure |
|---|---|
| Employment start date at SLAMF | Not disclosed |
| Role | President |
| Contract term/expiration | Not disclosed |
| Severance provisions | None; “We are not party to any agreements with our executive officers and directors that provide for benefits upon termination of employment.” |
| Change‑of‑control economics | Not disclosed |
| Clawback provisions | Yes; restatement‑based recoupment under SEC 10D |
| Non‑compete/Non‑solicit | Not disclosed |
| Garden leave/Post‑termination consulting | Policy continues to apply post‑termination to trading; consulting arrangements may be negotiated by management with post‑combination company, but not pre‑set |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Not disclosed |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- No cash compensation pre‑combination: Pay structure is entirely non‑cash before business combination, minimizing pay‑for‑performance concerns in the pre‑deal period but shifting incentives toward equity outcomes via founder shares .
- Governance protections: Clawback policy and strict insider trading restrictions (no pledging/hedging) support alignment and reduce adverse trading signals .
- Founder shares/lock‑up: Lock‑up and Sponsor Letter constraints limit near‑term selling pressure; early conversion to Class A remains restricted and non‑redeemable, containing dilution/redemption risks .
Related Party and Sponsor Arrangements
- Monthly reimbursement to Sponsor: $10,000 per month for office, secretarial and administrative services until business combination or liquidation; out‑of‑pocket expenses to Sponsor/executives/directors reimbursed with quarterly audit committee review .
- Sponsor deemed “promoter”; independent directors and “Other Class B Shareholders” (including Laferriere) party to Sponsor Letter Agreement to vote for Merger/Warrant Conversion, waive anti‑dilution, and refrain from redemption .
Performance & Track Record
- ESPN impact: Led programming/acquisitions team for league rights; period marked by ratings growth, ABC Sports merger, and network expansions (ESPNews, ESPN Classic, ESPN U) .
- Six Flags operations: Revamped east coast parks performance and managed a significant portion of company operating revenues .
- A‑Rod Corp: Chief Business Officer since June 2020, crafting and executing investment and multimedia content strategy .
Board Governance
- Not a director; President on management team; Compensation Committee comprised of Reggie Hudlin and Lisa Harrington (chair), both independent; charter covers CEO/CFO/President compensation review and plan administration .
- Audit Committee independence; Alexandre Zyngier is audit committee financial expert .
Equity Ownership Mechanics and Vesting Signals
- Founder shares are convertible to Class A (one‑for‑one) at or after business combination; early conversion permitted following Founder Share Amendment but remains restricted and non‑redeemable .
- Evidence of vesting/repurchase options exists for certain directors (Sponsor repurchased unvested founder shares on resignations), indicating vesting conditions tied to continued service; Laferriere’s specific vesting schedule is not disclosed .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Laferriere’s 30,000 founder shares (Class B) and Sponsor Letter commitments align her incentives with consummating the business combination and post‑deal value creation, while prohibitions on hedging/pledging reduce misalignment risk .
- Supply overhang: Lock‑up terms (one‑year or $12/share release conditions post‑combination) suggest limited near‑term insider selling pressure, but potential supply could emerge after thresholds are met; monitor post‑deal lock‑up releases and “$12 for 20/30 days” trigger .
- Governance/compensation risk: Absence of pre‑combination cash comp and severance/change‑of‑control benefits reduces fixed‑pay risk; watch for post‑combination employment/consulting agreements and new incentive plans that may alter risk/reward or introduce dilution .
- Trading signals: Strict insider trading policy (no margin, pledging, hedging, and discouraged standing orders) lowers probability of adverse optics from executive trading; any Rule 10b5‑1 usage would be visible and subject to policy requirements .
Overall: Pre‑deal governance and founder share restrictions indicate disciplined alignment; key monitoring items post‑combination include new compensation plans, lock‑up expirations, and any changes to ownership/pledging policies that could affect retention and trading dynamics.