Abdellah Merad
SLB LIMITED/NVAbout Abdellah Merad
Abdellah Merad is Executive Vice President, Core Services and Equipment at SLB, a role he has held since April 2022; he is 51 years old and previously served as EVP, Performance Management (2019–2022) and President, Production Group (2017–2019) . SLB’s performance during his tenure has been strong: 2024 revenue rose 10% to $36.29B, adjusted EBITDA grew 12% to $9.07B, and free cash flow reached $3.99B, supporting $3.27B in capital returns; 2022–2024 PSU outcomes reflected 230% ROCE payout, 85% FCF margin payout, and 42% TSR payout, with total LTI payout at 114% for the 2022 grants .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| SLB | EVP, Core Services & Equipment | Apr 2022–present | Portfolio execution across Core segments; personal STI objectives tied to cost leadership, integration business growth, and operational execution . |
| SLB | EVP, Performance Management | May 2019–Mar 2022 | Company-wide performance management; supported shift to returns-focused strategy evidenced in later PSU outcomes (ROCE/FCF) . |
| SLB | President, Production Group | Oct 2017–Apr 2019 | Led production-focused businesses; foundation for current emphasis on production/recovery reflected in Core growth . |
External Roles
No external public company directorships or roles are disclosed for Mr. Merad in SLB’s filings .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $787,500 | $800,000 | $900,000 (12.5% increase in Jan 2024) |
| Target STI (% of Base) | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Actual STI Paid ($) | $620,150 | $1,213,600 | $736,380 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $290,716 | $235,407 | $256,208 |
| Total Compensation ($) | $5,198,361 | $5,829,183 | $5,592,521 |
Performance Compensation
| Component | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout (% of Target) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (Company) | 35% | $9.20B | $9.07B | 84% |
| Free Cash Flow (Company) | 35% | $4.05B | $3.99B | 95% |
| ESG – Scope 1&2 emissions intensity reduction | 5% (half of 10%) | 14% reduction | 11% reduction | 82% (quantitative ESG component averaged with gender) |
| ESG – Gender balance | 5% (half of 10%) | 25.2% women | 25.0% women | 50% (quantitative ESG component averaged with emissions) |
| Strategic Personal Objectives | 20% | Multiple goals (cost leadership, divestiture milestones, integration business growth, etc.) | Mixed (several achieved; fatality-free operations not achieved) | 63% (Merad) |
| Total STI Paid (as % of Target) | — | — | — | 82% (Merad 2024) |
Long-term incentives (granted 2024; 3-year performance/vesting):
- PSU metrics and weighting: FCF margin (25%), ROCE (25%), TSR (25%); RSUs (25%, time-based) .
- 2022–2024 PSU results for awards vesting in Jan 2025: FCF margin 85% of target; ROCE 230% of target (prelim. 80% shares issued pending final audits); TSR 42% of target; total LTI payout 114% including RSUs vesting at 100% .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 250,502 shares (<1% of outstanding); includes right to acquire shares within 60 days; includes 40,000 options . |
| Ownership Guidelines | EVPs must hold ≥3x base salary; executives must retain 50% of net shares until guidelines met; compliance confirmed as of Jan 31, 2025 . |
| Anti-Hedging/Pledging | Hedging and pledging prohibited (directors/executives); none of the shares are pledged . |
| DSPP Participation | Purchased 1,352 shares under DSPP (2021–2024) with $49,435 value . |
Outstanding awards and vesting (as of Dec 31, 2024):
| Award Type | Grant Date | Target/Outstanding (#) | Vest Date | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Options (exercisable) | 04/16/2015 | 20,000 | 04/16/2025 | Exercise price $91.74; underwater vs $38.34 price . |
| Options (exercisable) | 04/20/2016 | 20,000 | 04/20/2026 | Exercise price $80.525; underwater . |
| PSUs (2022 cycle) | 01/19/2022 + 04/19/2022 | 70,191 target combined (64,587 + 5,604) | Jan 2025 | Actually vested shares issued: 74,089 . |
| RSUs (2022 grants) | 01/19/2022 | 22,321 | 01/19/2025 | Time-based vest . |
| RSUs (additional 2022) | 04/19/2022 | 1,799 | 04/19/2025 | Time-based vest . |
| PSUs (2023 cycle) | 01/18/2023 | 45,576 target | Jan 2026 | Performance-based; mix FCF/ROCE/TSR . |
| RSUs (2023) | 01/18/2023 | 15,780 | 01/18/2026 | Time-based vest . |
| PSUs (2024 cycle – FCF, ROCE, TSR) | 01/17/2024 | 60,060 target (20,647 + 20,647 + 18,766) | Jan 2027 | Performance-based . |
| RSUs (2024) | 01/17/2024 | 20,647 | 01/17/2027 | Time-based vest . |
Grant details (2024 LTI):
| Award | Grant Date | Target Shares (#) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| FCF Margin PSUs | 01/17/2024 | 20,647 | $924,986 |
| ROCE PSUs | 01/17/2024 | 20,647 | $924,986 |
| TSR PSUs | 01/17/2024 | 18,766 | $924,976 |
| RSUs (3-year) | 01/17/2024 | 20,647 | $924,986 |
Insider selling pressure signals:
- Options are deeply underwater at YE 2024 (strike $80.525–$91.74 vs $38.34), limiting incentive to exercise/sell near term .
- Notable upcoming PSU/RSU vesting cohorts: Jan 2026 (≈61k shares: 45.6k PSUs at target + 15.8k RSUs) and Jan 2027 (≈80.7k shares: 60.1k PSUs at target + 20.6k RSUs), creating potential liquidity/supply events subject to performance/payouts .
Employment Terms
- No employment, severance, or change-in-control agreements for NEOs; they serve at the will of the Board .
- Officer Departure Guidelines: discretionary arrangements may include prorated STI at departure, continued vesting of prior LTI during an agreed term, and non-compete/non-solicit/non-disparagement covenants; cash during term generally below pre-termination base salary .
- Change-of-control: no automatic acceleration; Board may, at its discretion, substitute, accelerate, or cash out awards; Restoration Savings Plan accelerates payment; Merad’s accelerated amount would be $1,279,533 based on YE 2024 .
- Clawback: policy adopted in 2023 covering recovery of performance-based equity and cash incentives under certain circumstances .
- Securities policy: strict anti-hedging and anti-pledging for executives/directors .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is robust: 70% of STI tied to adjusted EBITDA and FCF, 10% to quantitative ESG goals, and 75% of LTI in PSUs linked to FCF margin, ROCE, and TSR; 2022–2024 PSU outcomes show strong capital efficiency (ROCE) and cash conversion, with TSR underperformance a watch item .
- Near-term selling pressure appears contained: stock options are underwater at YE 2024; larger vesting events in Jan 2026 and Jan 2027 could add supply depending on PSU payouts; monitor Form 4 activity around these dates .
- Alignment and governance are favorable: ownership guidelines (3x base for EVPs) with confirmed compliance, and prohibitions on hedging/pledging reduce misalignment and collateral risk; say-on-pay support was >97% at the 2024 AGM .
- Retention risk: compensation is targeted between the 50th–75th percentile versus peer groups amid fierce talent competition; absence of fixed severance/CIC agreements provides flexibility but increases reliance on ongoing equity awards and guidelines for retention .