Olivier Le Peuch
SLB LIMITED/NVAbout Olivier Le Peuch
SLB Chief Executive Officer and director since 2019; master’s in Microelectronics from Bordeaux University. Background spans global operations, digital/software leadership, and manufacturing, with prior roles as COO (2019), EVP Reservoir & Infrastructure (2018–2019), Cameron Group President (2017–2018), Completions President (2014–2017), and VP Engineering, Manufacturing & Sustaining (2010–2014) . 2024 company performance delivered revenue +10% to $36.29B, adjusted EBITDA $9.07B (+12%), and free cash flow $3.99B; STI paid below target on EBITDA and non‑financial metrics, while 2022–2024 LTI paid 114% aggregate (strong ROCE vs peers; weak relative TSR) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| SLB | Chief Operating Officer | 2019 | Global ops execution before CEO transition |
| SLB | EVP, Reservoir & Infrastructure | 2018–2019 | Portfolio leadership across asset lifecycle |
| SLB (Cameron Group) | President | 2017–2018 | Integration and margin capture in subsea/surface equipment |
| SLB | President, Completions | 2014–2017 | Technology/product leadership in completions |
| SLB | VP, Engineering, Manufacturing & Sustaining | 2010–2014 | Global engineering and industrial footprint management |
| SLB | GeoMarket Manager, North Sea; President, Schlumberger Information Solutions | Earlier | Regional P&L; digital/software leadership |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No current public company board roles; “Other Current Public Boards: None” |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 1,550,000 | 1,550,000 | 1,650,000 (6.5% raise in Jan-2024) |
| Target STI (% of salary) | 150% | 150% | 150% |
| Actual STI ($) | 1,929,750 | 3,502,150 | 2,042,370 |
| All Other Comp ($) | 234,058 | 174,845 | 424,342 |
| Total Reported Pay ($) | 15,713,757 | 18,249,585 | 17,310,864 |
Notes
- 2024 STI design unchanged vs 2023; financial metrics increased in difficulty (higher EBITDA and FCF targets) .
Performance Compensation
LTI Structure and 2024 Grants
- Mix: 75% PSUs (25% FCF margin; 25% ROCE relative; 25% TSR relative), 25% 3‑yr time‑based RSUs; PSU max: 250% (FCF/ROCE), 200% (TSR) .
- CEO 2024 target LTI grant-date value: $12,374,997; target raised ~3.1% vs 2023 (to $12.375M) .
- CEO 2024 award details (granted 1/17/2024): FCFM PSU 69,057 target; ROCE PSU 69,057 target; TSR PSU 62,766 target; RSU 69,057; grant-date fair values ~$3.09M per component .
2024 Short‑Term Incentive (Company and Individual)
| Metric | Weight | 2024 Target | 2024 Actual/Result | Payout vs Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 35% | $9.20B target; 0–243% payout curve | $9.07B (12% YoY) | 84% |
| Free Cash Flow | 35% | $4.05B target; 0–243% payout curve | $3.99B | 95% |
| Quantitative ESG (Scope 1&2 intensity) | 5% (half of 10%) | 14% reduction target | 11% reduction | 82% of this component |
| Quantitative ESG (Gender balance) | 5% (half of 10%) | 25.2% women target | 25.0% women | 50% of this component |
| Strategic Personal Objectives (CEO) | 20% | Board‑approved goals | 66% achievement for CEO | 66% |
| Total CEO STI Payout | — | — | — | 83% of target |
PSU Outcomes (2012–2024 Grant Cohorts Vesting Jan 2025)
| Grant Cohort | Metric | Weight | Target | Outcome/Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 | FCF Margin (absolute, 3‑yr) | 25% | 10.0% cumulative FCF margin | 9.7% | 85% of target |
| 2022–2024 | ROCE (relative, 3‑yr) | 25% | Above peer avg; 0–250% scale | +347 bps vs group; 2024 ROCE >10% | 230% (preliminary) |
| 2022–2024 | TSR (relative, 3‑yr) | 25% | 60th percentile target; floor 25th | 33rd percentile | 42% of target |
| 2022–2024 | RSUs (3‑yr time-based) | 25% | Service | Vested Jan-2025 | 100% |
| 2021–2023 | FCF Margin (3‑yr) | 25% | 10.0% | 10.0% | 100% |
| 2021–2023 | ROCE (relative, 3‑yr) | 25% | Above peer avg | +477 bps; 2023 ROCE 16% | 250% (prelim, 80% delivered pending audits) |
| 2021–2023 | TSR (relative, 3‑yr) | 25% | 60th percentile target | 41st percentile | 59% |
Total LTI payout for 2022–2024 awards (incl. RSUs): 114% of target; below‑target TSR offset strong ROCE . Total LTI payout for 2021–2023 awards: 127% of target .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership (Jan 31, 2025): 1,386,579 shares for O. Le Peuch; includes options to purchase 69,000 shares; no pledged shares reported .
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 6x base salary; mandatory 50% net‑share retention until in compliance; all NEOs in compliance as of 1/31/2025; anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging policy in place .
- Options: Company ceased option grants after 2017; as of 12/31/2024, all NEO stock options were underwater .
- Outstanding awards and upcoming vesting (CEO):
- Unearned PSUs (target): 156,260 (2023 grants, vest Jan 2026); 200,880 (2024 grants, vest Jan 2027) .
- Unvested RSUs: 54,103 (vest Jan 18, 2026); 69,057 (vest Jan 17, 2027) .
- Legacy options outstanding: 24,000 @ $91.74 expiring 4/16/2025; 30,000 @ $80.525 expiring 4/20/2026; 15,000 @ $87.38 expiring 1/19/2027 .
Employment Terms
- No employment, severance, or change‑in‑control agreements (NEOs serve at will); no automatic acceleration of equity upon CIC; no excise tax gross‑ups .
- Clawback: 2023 policy covering performance‑based equity and cash adopted; filed as Exhibit 97 to 2024 Annual Report .
- Officer Departure Guidelines (non‑binding framework): potential reduced cash payments, pro‑rated STI for year of departure, continued vesting of outstanding LTI during a defined consulting/transition term in exchange for non‑compete/non‑solicit/non‑disparagement and availability commitments .
- Pensions (present value at 12/31/2024): STC Pension Plan $918,353; STC Supplementary $1,018,429; SLB Supplementary $5,291,633; International Staff Pension $1,939,954 .
Board Governance (Director Service)
- CEO and director since 2019; not independent; no committee assignments .
- Independent Board Chair (Jim Hackett); roles of Chair and CEO separated since 2019; regular executive sessions of non‑employee directors .
- Committee independence and composition: fully independent Audit, Compensation, and Nominating & Governance; 2024 board/committee attendance averaged 98% .
- Employee directors (incl. CEO) receive no director compensation .
Director/Shareholder Signals
- Say‑on‑pay support: ~94.5% in 2025 AGM; >97% support in 2024 AGM; strong investor endorsement of program design .
- Peer benchmarking: Core peer group (BKR, HAL, NOV, COP, OXY, etc.) and broader industrial/tech peers maintained; pay positioning targeted at 50th–75th percentile to address intense talent competition .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: ~90% of CEO 2024 target pay “at risk” (STI + PSUs/RSUs), consistent with shareholder alignment .
- Metrics rigor: 2024 raised EBITDA and FCF targets; ESG metrics retained but represent 10% of STI, with under‑target results constraining payout .
- LTI emphasis on capital efficiency: Continued 25% FCF margin absolute and 25% relative ROCE; TSR target set above median (60th percentile) to avoid windfall .
- No option repricing; underwater legacy options remain outstanding; no hedging/pledging permitted .
Equity Ownership & Trading Pressure Indicators
- Upcoming vesting overhang: Large 2023/2024 PSU tranches (target 156,260 and 200,880 shares) scheduled to settle in Jan 2026/Jan 2027 could create post‑vesting liquidity events depending on performance outcomes and window availability .
- Pledging/Hedging: Prohibited for executives; none of CEO’s reported shares pledged .
- Holding requirements: 6x salary guideline and 50% net‑share retention reduce near‑term sell pressure .
Company Performance Context (FY)
| Metric | FY 2020 | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($) | 23,601,000,000* | 22,929,000,000* | 28,091,000,000* | 33,135,000,000* | 36,289,000,000* |
| EBITDA ($) | 3,652,000,000* | 4,469,000,000* | 5,820,000,000* | 7,348,000,000* | 8,254,000,000* |
| EBIT ($) | 1,656,000,000* | 2,765,000,000* | 4,151,000,000* | 5,589,000,000* | 6,369,000,000* |
| Diluted EPS – Continuing Ops ($) | -7.57* | 1.32* | 2.39* | 2.91* | 3.11* |
| *Values retrieved from S&P Global (GetFinancials). |
Ownership Snapshot (as of Jan 31, 2025)
| Holder | Shares | % of Class |
|---|---|---|
| Olivier Le Peuch | 1,386,579 (incl. 69,000 options) | <1% (of 1,359,855,277 outstanding) |
Employment & Contracts (Key Terms)
- No CIC agreements/automatic vesting; clawback applies to cash and equity .
- Departure/retirement handled under Officer Departure Guidelines with non‑compete/non‑solicit; continued vesting may apply under specified arrangements .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance linkage is intact: 2024 CEO STI paid 83% of target due to sub‑target EBITDA/ESG results; 2022–2024 PSUs paid 114% overall, with strong ROCE offset by below‑target TSR—a mixed signal on relative shareholder returns .
- Alignment safeguards (no pledging, high ownership multiple, 50% net‑share retention, no CIC acceleration, robust clawback) reduce agency risk and curb opportunistic selling, though substantial PSU vesting in 2026–2027 remains a potential liquidity event to monitor .
- Strategy execution and capital efficiency are emphasized in incentives (FCF margin, ROCE); if macro tailwinds support sustained double‑digit FCF margin and peer‑beating ROCE, forward PSU payouts skew positive; continued TSR underperformance vs peers would cap TSR PSU outcomes .
- Shareholder sentiment remains supportive (94.5% say‑on‑pay in 2025), lowering near‑term governance risk despite Russia/geopolitics oversight complexity residing at the board level rather than pay design .