Patrick Wilczynski
About Patrick Wilczynski
Patrick Wilczynski (age 56) serves as Senior Vice President, Operational Excellence at Sylvamo, a role he has held since October 2021 after joining Sylvamo at spin from International Paper, where he worked since 1992 across operations, technology, manufacturing, commercial, EHS and finance leadership roles; he holds a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering Technology from Pennsylvania State University . Company performance metrics relevant to his pay programs show strong alignment: 2024 Adjusted EBITDA Margin was 16.8% and Free Cash Flow was $248 million, driving 145.71% AIP achievement; 3-year TSR for the 2022 LTIP ranked at the 93rd percentile with a 166.73% TSR and ROIC of 26.56%, with the rTSR payout capped at 194.92% due to a 400% value cap, yielding a total PSU payout of 142.1% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| International Paper | Vice President, Capital Effectiveness | 2019–2021 | Led capital effectiveness, supporting high-return project deployment and portfolio discipline . |
| International Paper | Vice President, Global Technology & Strategic Initiatives | 2018–2019 | Drove global technology and strategic initiatives to enhance manufacturing and cost structure . |
| International Paper | Vice President & GM, Coated Paperboard & Foodservice | 2016–2018 | General management of coated paperboard and foodservice businesses . |
| International Paper | Vice President, Global Manufacturing Safety | 2015 | Led global manufacturing safety after returning from overseas assignment . |
| International Paper | Vice President, Manufacturing, EMEA (St. Petersburg, Russia) | 2012 | Oversaw manufacturing across Europe, Middle East and Africa . |
| International Paper | Various roles in maintenance, engineering, operations (printing papers mills) | 1992–2012 | Progressively senior roles across operations and engineering . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $460,000 |
| 2024 Increase ($) | $0 (salary freezes for NEOs as part of Project Horizon) |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Company Metrics
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target Range | Max | Actual | % of Target Earned |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin | 50% | 13.0% | 14.5%–16.1% | 17.6% | 16.8% | 146.67% |
| Free Cash Flow ($mm) | 50% | $177.6 | $210.9–$233.1 | $266.4 | $248.0 | 144.74% |
| Total Company Performance Achievement | 100% | — | — | — | — | 145.71% |
2024 AIP – Individual Outcome (Patrick)
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| AIP Target (% of Base) | $276,000 |
| Individual Performance Modifier | 100% |
| Company Performance Achievement | 145.71% |
| 2024 AIP Earned Award ($) | $402,200 |
2024 Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – Grant Detail (Patrick)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Weighting | Units (Threshold) | Units (Target) | Units (Max) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (ROIC & rTSR) | 3/1/2024 | 60% | 267 | 4,862 | 9,724 | $329,366 | Settles Mar 1, 2027 based on 3-year ROIC and rTSR; negative TSR caps rTSR at 100% . |
| RSUs (time-based) | 3/1/2024 | 40% | — | 3,633 | — | $219,470 | Vests ratably one-third on Mar 1, 2025/2026/2027 . |
Prior LTIP Performance – 2022 PSU Outcome (Company-wide, applies to NEOs)
| Metric | Result | Payout |
|---|---|---|
| 3-Year Absolute ROIC | 26.56% | 89.28% for ROIC units |
| 3-Year rTSR vs S&P 600 Materials | 93rd percentile | Max 200% achievement; capped at 194.92% due to 400% value limit |
| Total 2022 PSU Award Payout | — | 142.1% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (Shares) | 30,717; includes 595 shares owned by spouse; <1% of outstanding |
| Ownership Guidelines | SVP must hold 3x base salary; officers must retain 50% of net shares until compliant |
| Compliance Status | As of Dec 31, 2024, all NEOs in compliance |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited (no short sales, options trading, hedging, pledging, margin accounts) |
| Stock Options | Company does not grant stock options |
Stock Vested (2024)
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Shares Acquired on Vesting (#) | 9,570 |
| Value Realized ($) | $578,124 |
Outstanding Equity Awards (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Grant Date | Type | Not Vested (#) | Market Value ($) | Unearned PSUs (#) | PSU Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/22/2022 | RSUs | 1,802 | $142,394 | — | — |
| 2/22/2022 | RSUs | 10,074 | $796,047 | — | — |
| 3/1/2023 | RSUs | 2,720 | $214,934 | — | — |
| 3/1/2023 | PSUs (unearned) | — | — | 8,683 | $686,131 |
| 3/1/2024 | RSUs | 3,691 | $291,663 | — | — |
| 3/1/2024 | PSUs (unearned) | — | — | 7,110 | $561,832 |
| Pricing Basis | — | — | $79.02 close on 12/31/2024 | — | $79.02 close on 12/31/2024 |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreements | None; no guaranteed compensation or ongoing employment |
| Severance (no CIC) | CEO: 2x salary+target AIP; other NEOs: 1x salary; capped cash severance |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) | Double trigger; CEO: 2.5x salary+target AIP; other NEOs: 1.5x salary+target AIP; equity vests if no replacement awards; otherwise pro-rata rules apply |
| Equity Treatment on Termination | RSUs pro-rated for service in death/disability/severance/retirement; PSUs pro-rated and paid at target for death/disability or actual performance at end of period for other terminations; unvested awards accrue DEUs |
| Clawback | Company will recover AIP and LTIP incentive compensation for restatements per SEC/NYSE and misconduct per MDCC |
| Non-Compete/Non-Solicit | Required for executive officers; violations may trigger forfeiture/clawback and ESP ineligibility |
Potential Payments – Patrick Wilczynski (Assuming termination on Dec 31, 2024)
| Scenario | Severance ($) | 2024 AIP ($) | Unused/Earned Vacation ($) | Continued Benefits ($) | Vesting of Equity ($) | Total Pre-Tax Benefit ($) | Retirement Plan Annuity ($) | Pension Restoration Annuity ($) | Total Annuity ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Retirement | — | 402,200 | 111,815 | — | 1,326,272 | 1,840,287 | 94,419 | 90,250 | 184,669 |
| Involuntary Termination (no cause) | 460,000 | 402,200 | 111,815 | 92,387 | 1,326,272 | 2,392,674 | 94,419 | 90,250 | 184,669 |
| Involuntary Termination (with cause) | — | — | — | — | — | — | 94,419 | 90,250 | 184,669 |
| Qualifying Termination after CIC | 1,380,000 | — | 111,815 | 101,080 | 2,108,649 | 3,701,544 | 94,419 | 90,250 | 184,669 |
Retirement & Deferred Compensation
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Pension – Credited Service (years) | 26.58 |
| Pension – Present Value (Qualified) ($) | 1,157,968 |
| Pension – Present Value (Restoration) ($) | 1,106,838 |
| Pension – Total Present Value ($) | 2,264,806 |
| Deferred Comp – Executive Contributions (2024) ($) | 53,023 |
| Deferred Comp – Company Contributions (2024) ($) | 35,790 |
| Deferred Comp – Aggregate Earnings (2024) ($) | 175,792 |
| Deferred Comp – Aggregate Balance (12/31/2024) ($) | 1,302,902 |
| Deferred Comp – 2024 Contribution Rate | 15% of base salary |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Target total direct compensation is benchmarked to median of a 17-company peer group (BPG) and industry surveys; SVP base salaries were frozen in 2024 under Project Horizon cost initiative, increasing at-risk mix .
- AIP design emphasizes balanced cash generation and profitability through 50/50 weighting of Free Cash Flow and Adjusted EBITDA Margin with defined threshold/target/max ranges; 2024 outperformance drove a 145.71% company achievement .
- LTIP mix of 60% PSUs (ROIC and rTSR) and 40% RSUs balances performance alignment and retention; 2022 PSU payout at 142.1% confirms strong multi-year value creation with rTSR cap enforcing payout discipline .
- No stock options granted and anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies reduce misalignment risks; robust clawback and ownership requirements support governance quality .
Investment Implications
- Strong pay-for-performance alignment: outsized AIP and capped PSU outcomes are tied to concrete cash flow, margin, ROIC and rTSR results, indicating incentives geared to durable value creation rather than short-term optics .
- Retention risk appears moderate: CIC and severance protections are standard (1x salary; 1.5x salary+target AIP under CIC) with double-trigger requirements; equity pro-ration and three-year RSU vesting cadence create ongoing retention hooks .
- Insider selling pressure: RSUs vest annually on March 1 for 2024–2027 tranches, which can create calendar-driven liquidity windows; however, anti-hedging/pledging and blackout policies mitigate opportunistic trading risk .
- Alignment and skin-in-the-game: ownership guidelines (3x salary for SVP), mandatory 50% net share retention until compliant, and current compliance status indicate continued alignment; beneficial ownership is <1% by design for an SVP at a ~$41 million-share base .
- Execution edge: Wilczynski’s deep operations and capital effectiveness background aligns with Sylvamo’s ongoing cost reductions and reinvestment program; sustained FCF and margin performance underpin support for future capital projects and deleveraging .