Rodrigo Davoli
About Rodrigo Davoli
Senior Vice President, Commercial Excellence & General Manager, North America at Sylvamo since July 2023; previously SVP & GM, Latin America from October 2021 to June 2023. Entered the paper and packaging industry in 1993; joined International Paper via Champion International’s merger in 2000. Education: bachelor’s degree in Law (Unipinhal University, Brazil) and International Executive MBA (São Paulo University, Brazil) . Company performance tied to his incentives has been strong: 2024 Adjusted EBITDA margin 16.8%, free cash flow $248 million, 3-year ROIC 26.56%, and 3-year TSR 166.73% (93rd percentile vs peers) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sylvamo | SVP & GM, North America | Jul 2023–present | Leads North America printing papers; transitioned from Latin America leadership |
| Sylvamo | SVP & GM, Latin America | Oct 2021–Jun 2023 | Led Latin America business post spin-off from International Paper |
| International Paper | VP, Latin America Printing Papers; President, IP Brazil | 2017–Oct 2021 | Ran Latin America printing papers and Brazil operations |
| International Paper | Marketing Manager, European Papers | 2011–2017 | Led Europe marketing for papers |
| International Paper (IPEX/export) | General Sales Manager; Commercial Director, LATAM printing papers | 2016–2017 | Managed export sales and LATAM commercial functions |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brazilian Pulp and Paper Association | Board member | Not disclosed | Serves on industry association board |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 395,840 | 430,000 |
| Bonus ($) | — | — |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan (AIP) Paid ($) | 190,100 | 488,800 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 491,391 (incl. Brazil departure/mobility items) | 331,207 (incl. 2024 relocation/mobility items) |
| Total Compensation ($) | 1,474,425 | 1,782,749 |
Notes:
- 2024 relocation/perquisite items totaled $294,312 (housing allowance, tax services, education, travel, company car) related to his U.S. assignment .
- 2023 Brazil exit payments: $118,047 indemnity, $23,092 vacation pay, $15,510 other; reimbursement of $119,538 due to forfeited Brazilian Previp Plan; relocation costs $156,598 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Structure and Outcomes
| Year | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Impact on Payout | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Adjusted EBITDA Margin | 50% (program weighting) | Not disclosed | 16.8% | Contributed to Davoli’s AIP of $488,800 | Cash paid following year |
| 2024 | Free Cash Flow | 50% (balanced two-metric design) | Not disclosed | $248 million | Contributed to Davoli’s AIP of $488,800 | Cash paid following year |
| 2023 | AIP payout | — | Target $263,900 (individual target opportunity) | Not disclosed | Actual payout $190,100 | Cash paid following year |
Program design notes:
- AIP uses two metrics to encourage balanced decisions (Adjusted EBITDA margin and free cash flow); EBITDA margin weighted 50% with thresholds and caps; FCF complements at the remaining weight .
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – PSUs and RSUs
| Cycle | Metric | Weighting | Actual Performance | Payout Basis | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 LTIP (performance period ended 12/31/2024) | Relative TSR | 50% | 3-year TSR 166.73% (93rd percentile vs peers) | Actual PSU achievement for rTSR units 194.92% (based on 2/14/2025 closing price) | Pays following performance end; equity settlement per plan |
| 2022 LTIP (performance period ended 12/31/2024) | ROIC (3-year avg) | 50% | 26.56% | Actual performance achievement 89.28% for ROIC units | Pays following performance end |
| 2023 LTIP | PSUs (ROIC, rTSR) | 50%/50% | In progress | Assumes max 200% for rTSR and 100% target for ROIC based on cumulative performance to date | Vest based on performance on 3/1/2026 |
| 2024 LTIP | PSUs (ROIC, rTSR) | 50%/50% | In progress | rTSR capped at 400% of value granted; PSU max 200% overall | Vest based on performance on 3/1/2027 |
| 2024 | RSUs | — | — | — | RSUs vest ratably over 3 years beginning 3/1/2025 |
Stock vested:
- 2024 vesting: 5,396 shares vested (value realized $325,972 at $60.41 close preceding vest date) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 23,077 shares as of March 18, 2025 (less than 1% of 40,720,315 shares outstanding; ≈0.06%) |
| Outstanding RSUs (time-based) | 2/22/2022: 1,272 ($100,513); 2/22/2022: 7,112 ($561,990); 3/1/2023: 2,247 ($177,558); 3/1/2024: 3,583 ($283,129) |
| Unearned PSUs (performance-based) | 3/1/2023: 7,172 ($566,731); 3/1/2024: 6,900 ($545,238) |
| Ownership guidelines | SVPs must hold shares equal to 3x base salary; must retain 50% of net shares until guideline met; PSUs excluded from calculation; compliance reviewed annually; NEOs were in compliance as of 12/31/2024 |
| Hedging/pledging | Strictly prohibited for employees, officers, directors; no margin accounts, pledging, short sales, or monetization/hedging transactions |
| Options | Sylvamo does not grant stock options |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment agreements | No guaranteed employment agreement for U.S.-based NEOs (including Davoli) |
| Severance (non-CIC) | 1x base salary lump sum for NEOs; CEO 2x salary + target AIP |
| Severance (CIC; double-trigger) | 1.5x salary + target AIP lump sum for NEOs; pro‑rata current-year AIP at target; CEO 2.5x salary + target AIP |
| COBRA/outplacement | Continuation of health coverage at active rates (up to 12 months for NEOs; 18 months for CEO) plus outplacement |
| Restrictive covenants | One-year post-termination non-compete and non-solicit; perpetual confidentiality and non‑disparagement; release required for severance |
| Tax gross-ups | No excise tax gross-ups on CIC benefits; generally no tax gross-ups for NEO compensation (except mobility-related) |
| Clawback | NYSE/SEC-compliant clawback policy adopted July 2023; recovery on restatement and MDCC-directed misconduct; AIP subject to clawback for detrimental acts; LTIP awards subject to clawback/forfeiture |
Potential payments examples:
- 12/31/2024 scenario: Involuntary termination without cause total pre-tax benefit $2,103,270; Qualifying termination after CIC total pre-tax benefit $3,254,754 .
- 12/31/2023 scenario: CIC total pre-tax benefit $2,387,266 (severance $1,357,673; continued benefits $104,304; accelerated equity $925,289); non-CIC involuntary termination severance $673,023; equity vesting $516,539; continued benefits $94,518 .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: AIP targets cash generation and margins; LTIP ties to ROIC and rTSR with demonstrated high rTSR outperformance and solid ROIC, yielding strong PSU outcomes (rTSR 194.92% achievement; ROIC 89.28%) . Equity-heavy mix with RSU/PSU and 50% net-share retention supports alignment and reduces near-term sell pressure versus options .
- Vesting cadence and potential selling: RSUs vest annually (e.g., 5,396 shares in 2024, $325,972 realized), with required retention mitigating discretionary selling; monitor vest dates (March 1 cycles) for withholding-related flows .
- Retention and change-of-control economics: Non-CIC severance is modest (1x salary), but CIC double-trigger benefits increase to 1.5x salary + target AIP with equity acceleration; restrictive covenants (non-compete/non-solicit) and no tax gross-ups indicate shareholder-friendly governance, limiting agency risk while providing transaction continuity .
- Governance and risk: Strict anti-hedging/pledging, robust clawback, and ownership requirements (3x salary) reduce misalignment and speculative behavior; no stock options and no employment agreement lessen repricing or guaranteed pay risks .
- Performance backdrop: Strong 2024 metrics (FCF $248m, EBITDA margin 16.8%, ROIC 26.56%, TSR 93rd percentile) underpin incentive payouts and suggest execution competency in North America operations during Davoli’s tenure .