Tatiana Kalman
About Tatiana Kalman
Tatiana Kalman is Senior Vice President and General Manager, Latin America at Sylvamo (SLVM), serving since June 2023. She previously spent ~22 years at BASF across Europe, Latin America, and North America, most recently SVP Personal Care Europe & Managing Director (2022–2023), SVP Performance Chemicals North & South America (2020–2022), and VP Care Chemicals South America (2017–2020); she holds a Bachelor’s and Master’s in Economics from FAAP and PUC‑SP in Brazil and serves on the Brazilian Pulp and Paper Association Board . Age: 48 as of April 4, 2025 . Company performance context: 3‑year TSR of 166.73% and strong cash generation used to delever and reinvest ; multi‑year revenue and EBITDA shown below for pay‑for‑performance context (see table; values with * from S&P Global).
SLVM Multi‑Year Performance (context)
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD) | $3,628,000,000 | $3,721,000,000* | $3,773,000,000 |
| EBITDA ($USD) | $661,000,000* | $559,000,000* | $603,000,000* |
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 18.22%* | 15.02%* | 15.98%* |
Values retrieved from S&P Global for cells marked with *.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| BASF | SVP Personal Care, Europe & Managing Director, BASF Personal Care and Nutrition GmbH | 2022–2023 | Led European personal care operations and a legal entity; cross‑regional leadership |
| BASF | SVP Performance Chemicals, North & South America | 2020–2022 | P&L responsibility across the Americas in performance chemicals |
| BASF | VP Care Chemicals, South America | 2017–2020 | Regional leadership in consumer‑oriented chemicals |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brazilian Pulp and Paper Association | Board Member | Not disclosed | Industry engagement in Sylvamo’s core region |
Fixed Compensation
Kalman is not a Named Executive Officer (NEO); individual base salary, target bonus %, and actual bonus figures are not disclosed. Program structure for executive officers (including SVPs) emphasizes variable pay and ownership alignment:
- Annual Incentive Plan (AIP): Metrics and weights—Free Cash Flow (50%) and Adjusted EBITDA Margin (50%) .
- Long‑Term Incentive Plan (LTIP): Mix 60% PSUs (Absolute ROIC 50%, relative TSR 50%) and 40% RSUs; RSUs vest ratably over three years; PSUs settle after a 3‑year performance period .
Performance Compensation
2024 AIP Metrics and Outcomes (Company‑level; individual payouts for NEOs disclosed; Kalman not disclosed)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target Range | Maximum | Actual | % of Target Award Earned | Company Performance Achievement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin | 50% | 13.0% | 14.5%–16.1% | 17.6% | 16.8% | 146.67% | 73.33% |
| Free Cash Flow ($mm) | 50% | $177.6 | $210.9–$233.1 | $266.4 | $248.0 | 144.74% | 72.37% |
| Total | 100% | — | — | — | — | — | 145.71% |
Notes:
- Individual performance modifiers were applied to NEO payouts (110% for CEO/CFO; 120% for NA GM; others 100%); Kalman’s modifier is not disclosed .
LTIP Design and Vesting
| Component | Metric | Weight | Vesting | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024 grant) | Absolute ROIC | 50% | 3‑yr performance; settles Mar 1, 2027 | rTSR payout capped at 100% if TSR is negative; DEUs accrue on unvested awards |
| PSUs (2024 grant) | Relative TSR vs S&P 600 Small Cap Materials | 50% | 3‑yr performance; settles Mar 1, 2027 | Monte Carlo valuation used; total rTSR payout value capped at 400% of value granted |
| RSUs | Time‑based | — | 1/3 annually over 3 years | DEUs accrue on unvested RSUs |
Historical PSU performance example (applies to plan participants; illustrates pay‑for‑performance alignment):
- 2022 LTIP PSU 3‑year results: ROIC 26.56% paid 89.28%; rTSR 93rd percentile paid at capped 194.92%; total PSU payout 142.1% .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy Area | Requirements / Restrictions |
|---|---|
| Stock ownership guidelines | CEO: 6x base salary; SVP: 3x base salary. Unvested RSUs and DEUs count; PSUs do not. Officers must retain 50% of net (after‑tax) shares until compliant; requirement must be met within five years; reviewed annually by MDCC . |
| Hedging/pledging | Strictly prohibited: hedging/monetization (zero‑cost collars, forwards), short sales, options trading, pledging/margin accounts; trading blackout periods apply . |
| Compliance status | As of Dec 31, 2024, each NEO was in compliance; Kalman’s compliance not disclosed . |
| Beneficial ownership | Individual share counts disclosed for NEOs and directors; all current directors and executive officers as a group: 300,815 shares (<1%) . Kalman’s individual holdings are not disclosed. |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms |
|---|---|
| Severance (non‑CIC) | NEOs: lump sum equals one times salary (CEO: two times salary + target AIP); health benefits continuation up to 12 months for non‑CEO; outplacement . |
| Severance (CIC double‑trigger) | NEOs: 1.5x (CEO: 2.5x) of base salary + target AIP; pro‑rated AIP at target; 18 months medical/dental; replacement equity awards vest upon qualifying termination within two years post‑CIC . |
| Change‑in‑control definition | 30%+ stock acquisition, majority board change, merger/combination, sale of substantially all assets, or liquidation/dissolution approval . |
| Good reason (CIC) | Material diminution in role/comp, elimination/reduction of plans/benefits, failure to assume agreements, insufficient notice, relocation >50 miles . |
| Clawback | AIP and LTIP performance‑based awards clawed back upon specified financial restatements (SEC/NYSE) or misconduct per MDCC . |
| Non‑compete / Non‑solicit | Executive officers must enter one‑year post‑termination non‑compete and employee/client/customer non‑solicit covenants; violations can trigger forfeiture/clawback and severance ineligibility . |
| Tax gross‑ups | No excise tax gross‑ups for CIC benefits . |
| Non‑U.S. executives | Similar provisions provided in respective employment contracts for non‑U.S. executive officers . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and performance linkage: Short‑term AIP is tied to cash generation and margins (FCF and Adjusted EBITDA Margin), while LTIP PSUs tie awards to ROIC and rTSR—supporting capital discipline and shareholder returns . RSUs provide retention via time‑based vesting .
- Ownership and selling pressure: Hedging/pledging are prohibited and officers must meet ownership thresholds and retain net shares until compliant, reducing misalignment and near‑term selling pressure risk; Kalman’s individual ownership and compliance status are not disclosed .
- Severance and retention: Double‑trigger CIC, capped multiples, and mandated non‑compete/non‑solicit lower windfall risks while discouraging opportunistic exits; non‑U.S. executives have similar contractual protections, supporting retention .
- Execution context: Company delivered strong FCF ($248m), delevered to 0.9x net debt/Adjusted EBITDA, and reinvested in high‑IRR projects; rTSR outperformance (93rd percentile for the 2022 PSU cycle) indicates robust shareholder value creation during recent cycles .
- Governance environment: Recent board changes linked to Atlas cooperation termination and adoption of a limited‑duration rights plan reflect an active governance backdrop that could influence strategic decisions and leadership stability; monitor for changes affecting compensation and retention structures .
S&P Global disclaimer: Multi‑year revenue, EBITDA, and EBITDA margin values in the performance table are retrieved from S&P Global for cells marked with *.