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Lee E. Beckelman

Chief Financial Officer at Smart Sand
Executive

About Lee E. Beckelman

Lee E. Beckelman is Smart Sand’s Chief Financial Officer, serving since August 2014; he is 59 and holds a BBA in Finance (High Honors) from the University of Texas at Austin . The company’s pay-for-performance framework ties his annual incentives to net free cash flow (2024) and operational/financial metrics (2023), and his long-term equity includes performance-vesting restricted stock linked to ROAIC and free cash flow (and earlier, TSR vs peers) . Company performance context (Pay vs Performance): net income of $2,992,000 (2024), $4,649,000 (2023), and $(703,000) (2022); a $100 investment on 1/1/2022 was valued at $126 (2024), $108 (2023), and $101 (2022) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Hilcorp Energy CompanyEVP & CFODec 2009–Feb 2014Led finance at private E&P; upstream capital discipline and growth platform
Price Gregory Services, Inc.EVP & CFOFeb 2008–Oct 2009CFO through sale to Quanta Services; pipeline construction finance leadership
Hanover Compressor (later Exterran Holdings)Various finance roles2002–2007Supported merger integration and global oilfield services finance

External Roles

No public company directorships or external governance roles disclosed in the proxy materials reviewed .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)$400,000 $409,692 $412,000
Target Bonus (% of Salary)50% (NEOs; max 100%) 50% (NEOs; max 125%) 50% (NEOs; max 125%)
Actual Bonus Paid ($)$85,769 $258,106 $206,000
All Other Compensation ($)$38,132 $30,433 $24,457
Total Compensation ($)$927,902 $878,231 $1,242,456

Notes:

  • 2024 perquisites include apartment reimbursement ($8,657) and 401(k) employer match ($13,800) .
  • Base salaries for 2023 and 2024 were set at $412,000 for Beckelman .

Performance Compensation

Incentive TypeMetric(s)WeightingTargetActual/PayoutVesting
Annual Cash Bonus (2024)Net free cash flow (company definition and deductions) 50% of salary target Not disclosedCompany exceeded target benchmark; payout $206,000 Cash bonus for year earned/pays following year
Annual Cash Bonus (2023)Adj. EBITDA; sales volumes; total production costs/ton; free cash flow 50% of salary target Not disclosedExceeded: costs/ton target, FCF stretch; base benchmark for EBITDA & volumes; payout $258,106 Cash bonus for year earned/pays following year
RS — Performance (Grant Feb 2024)ROAIC (annual for 2024–2026); annual net free cash flow vs benchmarks; payout 0–150% 50% of 309,278 shares Not disclosedNot disclosed (performance period in flight)Vests Jan 1, 2027
RS — Performance (Grant Mar 2023)ROAIC (2023–2025); cumulative FCF vs benchmarks; payout 0–150% 50% of 109,091 shares Not disclosedNot disclosed (performance period in flight)Vests Jan 1, 2026
Historical Performance Metric (Grant Jul 2021)TSR vs peer group; ROAIC; cumulative FCF (three equal tranches) Part of 50% performance componentNot disclosedNot disclosedVested Jan 1, 2024 (subject to outcomes)

Equity Ownership & Alignment

MetricValue
Total Beneficial Ownership (Shares)1,101,541 (2.5% of 44,083,342 outstanding)
Shares Subject to Vesting (incl. performance)667,080 total; of which 339,620 performance-based
Outstanding Unvested Time-Based RS (12/31/2024)249,331 shares; market value $560,995 at $2.25/share
Outstanding Unearned Performance RS (12/31/2024)263,731 shares; market/payout value $934,034
Latest Annual RS Grant (Feb 2024)309,278 shares; 50% service-vest over 4 years, 50% performance-vest to Jan 1, 2027
Prior RS Grant (Mar 2023)109,091 shares; 50% service-vest over 4 years, 50% performance-vest to Jan 1, 2026
Hedging/PledgingProhibited (hedging, margin purchases, and pledging banned)
OptionsNo options granted in 2024; equity program consisted of restricted stock

Detailed Vesting Schedule (Service-based, as of 12/31/2024)

TrancheSharesVesting Dates
July 30, 202526,5107/30/2025
June 7, 2025 & 2026 (equal installments)27,2736/7/2025; 6/7/2026
March 17, 2025–2027 (equal installments)40,9093/17/2025; 3/17/2026; 3/17/2027
Feb 22, 2025–2028 (equal installments)154,6392/22/2025; 2/22/2026; 2/22/2027; 2/22/2028

Employment Terms

  • Change-in-control: Performance RSUs deemed achieved at target immediately prior to a change in control; time-based RSUs accelerate only on a double-trigger (termination without Cause or resignation for Good Reason within 18 months post-CIC). Good Reason is defined as a ≥10% reduction in current base salary and target bonus; Cause per the 2016 Plan .
  • Clawback/forfeiture: 2016 Plan authorizes forfeiture, rescission, and clawback, including Sarbanes-Oxley 304 and company policies; adverse action/cause triggers termination and recoupment of awards .
  • Retirement/benefits: NEOs participate in benefits; 401(k) match 100% up to 3% and 50% between 3–5% of eligible compensation; matching fully vested when made .
  • Severance multiples, non-compete/non-solicit, consulting: Not disclosed in reviewed proxies.

Compensation Committee Analysis

  • Committee members: Frank Porcelli (Chair), Timothy J. Pawlenty, Sharon Spurlin; all independent under NASDAQ and Exchange Act .
  • Consultant: Meridian Compensation Partners engaged since late 2020; independence assessed and affirmed; Meridian advised on executive and director comp and equity programs .

Performance & Track Record

Metric202220232024
Net Income ($)$(703,000) $4,649,000 $2,992,000
Value of $100 Investment (Start 1/1/2022)$101 $108 $126
  • 2024 annual bonus tied solely to net free cash flow reflects increased emphasis on cash generation; 2023 bonus design balanced operational efficiency, throughput, and profitability metrics .

Related Party Governance Context

  • CEO family members employed in operating and legal roles; related person transaction policy adopted and board oversight described (quarterly review) .

Investment Implications

  • Strong alignment through significant equity ownership (2.5% of shares) and large unvested balances, including performance tranches extending to 2026–2027; hedging and pledging prohibited, reducing misalignment risk .
  • Upcoming service-vesting tranches (2025–2028) may introduce periodic supply from vest-driven liquidity; 2025 tranche dates are clustered on 2/22, 3/17, 6/7, and 7/30 .
  • Incentive design has shifted toward cash generation (2024) from multi-metric (2023), potentially increasing near-term FCF focus; long-term PSUs tethered to ROAIC and FCF should sustain capital discipline and returns orientation .
  • CIC economics are moderate shareholder-friendly (double-trigger for time-based awards; performance at target), avoiding single-trigger windfalls; robust clawback language adds governance safeguards .
  • Governance considerations include CEO family employment; while the company outlines related party oversight, investors should monitor for potential conflicts and compensation rigor across the executive team .