Sharon Goodwine
SYNOVUS FINANCIALAbout Sharon Goodwine
Executive Vice President and Chief Human Resources Officer at Synovus Financial Corp. since May 2021; age 52. Prior experience includes over 20 years in leadership roles at Wells Fargo (Head of Enterprise Talent, EVP and other senior HR positions) and an early banking career in commercial banking at SunTrust starting in 1995 . Synovus delivered a 41% total shareholder return in 2024 (highest among banks in the KBW Nasdaq Regional Bank Index), with adjusted EPS growth and top-quartile operating metrics, alongside RWA optimization and CET1 improvement—key context for pay-for-performance alignment across executive programs .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wells Fargo | Head of Enterprise Talent; Executive Vice President; other senior HR roles | Over 20 years | Enterprise-wide talent leadership; senior HR governance at scale |
| SunTrust | Commercial Banking | 1995 | Early career foundation in commercial banking |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Goodwine in the latest proxy .
Fixed Compensation
- Goodwine is an executive officer but not a named executive officer (NEO) in 2024; Synovus discloses detailed fixed pay only for NEOs. Her base salary, target bonus %, and actual bonus were not disclosed .
- CHCC sets executive compensation and uses market benchmarking (Meridian) and a defined peer group to align pay levels; the CEO received a base increase in 2024, while other NEO base salaries were unchanged, illustrating discipline in fixed pay adjustments .
Performance Compensation
| Incentive Type | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive (Cash) | Adjusted EPS | 50% | CHCC-established annual goal | Above maximum in 2024 | NEO payouts 150–173% of target; individual CHRO payout not disclosed | Cash (paid after year-end) |
| Annual Incentive (Cash) | Adjusted ROAA | 25% | CHCC-established annual goal | Above maximum in 2024 | Included in 150–173% NEO payouts; CHRO not disclosed | Cash |
| Annual Incentive (Cash) | Strategic & Individual Objectives | 25% | Defined annually | Above target | Included in 150–173% NEO payouts; CHRO not disclosed | Cash |
| Long-Term Incentive (PSUs) | Adjusted ROATCE | Part of 60% of LTI | Target PSUs | Performance-tested over 3 years | 0–150% payout range | 3-year cliff vest, subject to risk-based discretion and clawbacks |
| Long-Term Incentive (PSUs) | Relative TSR | Part of 60% of LTI | Target PSUs | Performance-tested over 3 years | 0–150% payout range | 3-year cliff vest; clawback eligible |
| Long-Term Incentive (RSUs) | Time-based | 40% of LTI | N/A | N/A | N/A | Vests one-third per year over three years; clawback eligible |
Notes:
- Executive equity awards (including CHRO) are subject to mandatory clawback (restatements) and discretionary clawback (materially inaccurate metrics or material risk management failures), and possible downward discretionary adjustment based on risk considerations .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines apply to executive officers and directors; guidelines require meaningful ownership and prohibit hedging and pledging by executive officers and directors .
- Specific multiples are defined for NEOs: CEO 6x base salary; all other NEOs 3x. Executives must retain 75% of net shares until guideline compliance; the CEO must hold 50% of net shares until retirement .
- Goodwine’s personal shareholdings (vested/unvested, options) are not disclosed in the proxy’s ownership table (which covers directors and NEOs) .
Employment Terms
- Synovus maintains strong governance: limited employment contracts; “double-trigger” change-of-control provisions are standard with 2–3x salary+bonus severance, and no excise tax gross-ups on new agreements since June 2012 .
- Clawback policies: mandatory (SEC/NYSE compliance) and discretionary risk-based; anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies for executive officers .
- Non-compete, non-solicit, and garden leave terms for Goodwine are not specifically disclosed in 8-K filings; recent 5.02 agreements focus on CEO/CFO in connection with the Pinnacle merger and outline definitions (e.g., Good Reason) and severance accelerations for those roles .
Company Performance Context
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD) | $409.336M | $404.010M | $239.604M |
| Net Income ($USD) | $757.902M | $543.705M | $482.460M |
| Diluted EPS (Continuing Ops) | $4.95 | $3.46 | $3.03 |
| Metric | Q4 2024 | Q1 2025 | Q2 2025 | Q3 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD) | $125.587M | $116.466M | $134.135M | $140.697M |
| Net Income ($USD) | $190.426M | $195.014M | $217.715M | $196.994M |
| Diluted EPS (Continuing Ops) | $1.251 | $1.30 | $1.48 | $1.33 |
Additional performance highlights:
- 2024 TSR 41% (top in KBW Nasdaq Regional Bank Index); adjusted EPS increased; capital and liquidity improved; CET1 10.84% (+62 bps YoY); RWA optimization reduced RWA by >$2.0B; $1.6B investment securities repositioning (realized net losses ~$257M) to improve forward NIM; 6.4M shares repurchased .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Executive incentives are tied to earnings quality and returns (adjusted EPS, adjusted ROAA, adjusted ROATCE, and relative TSR), with robust clawbacks and risk-based downward adjustment—positive for agency risk and long-term alignment .
- Ownership discipline: Strict stock ownership guidelines plus bans on hedging/pledging reduce misalignment risk; CEO hold-until-retirement policy strengthens top-level alignment. Goodwine’s specific holdings are undisclosed, limiting precision on “skin-in-the-game” assessment for her individually .
- Vesting calendar dynamics: RSUs vest annually and PSUs at 3 years; these can create predictable liquidity windows and potential selling pressure around vest dates. Absent Form 4 data for Goodwine, monitor future Section 16 filings to assess insider selling pressure and timing .
- Change-of-control safeguards: Double-trigger severance and clawbacks mitigate perverse incentives while ensuring retention; no tax gross-ups on new agreements reduce shareholder-unfriendly outcomes .
- Execution risk: With Synovus’ 2024 repositioning and capital optimization complete, incentives tied to ROATCE and TSR push sustained execution; CHRO stewardship over talent and culture is strategically important given growth ambitions in middle market, CIB, and treasury/payments .