Peter Platzer
Spire GlobalAbout Peter Platzer
Peter Platzer, 55, is Executive Chairman and Board Chair of Spire Global; he served as CEO from August 2021 to December 2024 and as President through March 5, 2025, and has been a director since August 2021 . He co-founded Legacy Spire and previously held senior investing and trading roles at Vegasoul Capital, Deutsche Bank, and TRG (The Rohatyn Group); he holds a Dipl. Ing in Physics (TU Vienna), an M.Sc. in Space Science & Management (International Space University), and an MBA summa cum laude (Harvard Business School) . 2024 incentive program metrics used for NEOs were ARR, non-GAAP operating loss, and revenue per head; the weighted score was 50.2% of target, but short‑term bonuses were canceled, signaling a focus on profitability in 2025 . Spire adopted an NYSE-compliant clawback policy following restatements (FY 2022-2023 and certain 2024 periods); no recovery was required since no incentive-based pay was received for the restated periods .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legacy Spire | Co‑founder, CEO, Director | 2012–2021 | Built global space data platform; led through SPAC merger and public listing |
| Deutsche Bank AG | Director, Proprietary Trader | 2007–2010 | Led prop trading; quantitative market expertise |
| TRG Management LP | Head of Quantitative Research | 2003–2007 | Developed quant strategies for EM asset manager |
| Vegasoul Capital, LLC | Senior Portfolio Manager | 2010–2011 | Managed portfolios; risk and alpha generation |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not disclosed in 2025 proxy | — | — | No current public company board service disclosed for Platzer in the proxy |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary | Currency/Notes | Target Bonus % | Actual Bonus Paid | Other Compensation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | $489,003 | Paid in EUR; €441,176 rising to €475,000 on Sep 1, 2024 | 100% of base | $0 (bonus program canceled) | $15,241 (personal travel, tax prep) |
| 2023 | $477,310 | Paid in EUR; €441,176 | Not disclosed | $0 | $19,817 |
| 2025 (Exec Chairman) | €300,000 | Restated Managing Director Service Agreement effective Jan 1, 2025 | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting/Payment Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR) (as of 12/31/2024) | 33.3% | Not disclosed | $112.2 million; 66.0% of target | 0% (overall program canceled) | Short‑term cash incentive; canceled by Compensation Committee |
| Non‑GAAP Operating Loss (2024) | 33.3% | Not disclosed | $30.4 million; 4.9% of target (GAAP op loss $68.9m adjusted per 3/31/2025 8‑K) | 0% | As above; program canceled |
| Revenue Per Head (2024) | 33.3% | Not disclosed | $256.0 million; 79.7% of target | 0% | As above; program canceled |
| Weighted Result | — | — | 50.2% of target | 0% | Committee canceled 2024 NEO bonuses |
Note: The 2024 short‑term incentive program was 100% company metrics for NEOs; despite a 50.2% calculated weighted result, the Compensation Committee canceled payouts to reinforce 2025 profitability priorities .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited for officers/directors; options/derivatives trading and margin accounts also prohibited; pre‑clearance required for transactions .
- Clawback: NYSE‑compliant recovery policy; no recovery applicable for restated periods as no incentive compensation was received .
Beneficial Ownership (as of April 7, 2025)
| Holder | Class A Shares | Class A % | Class B Shares | Class B % | Total Voting Power |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peter Platzer & Theresa Condor (spouses; aggregated) | 2,257,625 | 7.0% | 1,053,583 | 69.9% | 25.7% |
| Peter Platzer (component detail) | 1,162,729 A common | — | 1,035,678 B common | — | — |
| Peter Platzer – near‑term equity | 628,480 A options exercisable ≤60 days | — | — | — | — |
| Peter Platzer – near‑term RSUs | 109,515 A RSUs vesting ≤60 days | — | — | — | — |
2024–2025 Equity Awards and Vesting
| Grant Date | Award Type | Granted | Forfeited | Net RSUs | Vesting Schedule |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3/7/2024 | RSU | 525,000 | 262,500 (voluntary) | 262,500 | 1/8th quarterly starting 5/20/2024 |
| 10/18/2024 | RSU | 262,500 | — | 262,500 | 1/6th quarterly starting 11/20/2024 |
| 12/31/2024 snapshot | RSU (unvested remaining from 10/18 grant) | — | — | 218,750 unvested | Reflects one quarterly tranche vested on 11/20/2024 |
- Outstanding options (historical): Multiple fully vested option tranches (2015–2021) with exercise prices $7.04–$26.32 and expirations 2025–2031 .
- 2022–2023 RSUs (selected): 89,625 RSUs vesting 1/4th quarterly from 5/20/2025; 94,921 and 16,813 RSUs vesting 1/16th and 1/8th quarterly from 5/20/2023 .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Non‑CIC Qualifying Termination | CIC Period (Double Trigger) | Additional CIC Within 90 Days |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash severance | 100% of annualized base salary (lump sum) | 150% of annualized base salary (lump sum) | +50% of base salary (additional lump sum) |
| Bonus severance | 100% of target annual cash bonus (lump sum) | 150% of target annual cash bonus (lump sum) | Difference between CIC bonus and Non‑CIC bonus |
| Benefits continuation | Lump sum equal to 12 months coverage | Lump sum equal to 18 months coverage | Difference between CIC and Non‑CIC benefit amounts |
| Outplacement | Up to $15,000 | Up to $15,000 | N/A |
| Equity acceleration | Immediate full vesting; option exercise period runs to expiration date | Immediate full vesting; option exercise period runs to expiration date | N/A |
| Role‑specific base salary | €300,000 per Restated Platzer Agreement effective Jan 1, 2025 | — | — |
- Qualifying Termination defined (without Cause or for Good Reason) in Employment Agreements; CIC defined in the 2021 Plan .
- Equity grant eligibility: RSUs under 2021 Plan beginning in 2025 per Restated Platzer Agreement .
- Clawback and insider trading: NYSE-compliant clawback policy ; hedging, pledging, and margin accounts prohibited; pre‑clearance required .
Board Governance
- Role: Executive Chairman and chairperson of the Board; not independent .
- Lead Independent Director: William Porteous; presides over independent sessions and acts as liaison; independent committees provide oversight balance .
- Committees: Only independent directors serve on Audit, Compensation, and Nominating & Governance; Platzer is not listed as a committee member .
- Board activity: 10 meetings in 2024; each director attended ≥75% of meetings for served periods .
- Family relationship: Platzer and CEO Theresa Condor are husband and wife; disclosed in proxy .
- Director compensation: Employee directors (Platzer, Condor) received no director pay in 2024 .
- Outside director pay framework: Cash retainers and RSU awards per policy, with change‑in‑control vesting acceleration; annual RSU grants typically $175,000 grant‑date fair value .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance discipline: Despite a 50.2% weighted score on 2024 metrics, the Compensation Committee canceled NEO bonuses—constructive for margin discipline, reducing cash burn, and signaling a profitability focus .
- Alignment via ownership and policies: Platzer/Condor collectively control 25.7% of voting power with significant Class B holdings; combined with hedging/pledging prohibitions and a clawback policy, alignment and governance safeguards are present .
- Equity vesting supply overhang: Time‑based RSUs vest quarterly (1/8th and 1/6th schedules), potentially creating periodic selling pressure absent 10b5‑1 plans or retention commitments; near‑term RSUs and exercisable options are sizable .
- Dual‑role/independence considerations: As Executive Chairman and spouse of the CEO, independence concerns exist; mitigants include a Lead Independent Director and fully independent key committees .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Double‑trigger acceleration with 1.5x salary/bonus/benefits could be value‑neutral to positive for retention but adds cost in a sale; non‑CIC severance is 1x salary/bonus/benefits plus full vesting .
- Restatement backdrop: Recent restatements heighten control risk; clawback policy adoption and no recovery (given no incentive pay) partially addresses investor concerns .