James McKinney
About James McKinney
James J. McKinney is Chief Financial Officer of SiriusPoint Ltd. (SPNT), appointed effective June 3, 2024; he is 45 and holds a Master’s in Accounting (Northern Illinois University) and a BA in Economics & Computer Science (DePauw University) . The company’s 2024 operating performance under the current leadership delivered a Core combined ratio of 91% and underlying ROE of 14.6%, with diluted book value per share up 10% year-over-year, providing context for pay-for-performance alignment . Company TSR for 2024 (SEC “pay vs performance” presentation) shows a $155.80 value of a $100 investment versus $219.19 for the Dow Jones U.S. P&C comparator, highlighting room for relative improvement .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kemper Corporation | EVP & CFO | 2016–2023 | Architected a strategic reset; led finance for a publicly-traded P&C insurer |
| Banc of California | CFO; previously EVP & Chief Accounting Officer | 2015–2016 | Built infrastructure enabling asset growth from $3.5B to $11B |
| International Lease Finance Corporation (AIG subsidiary) | VP & Controller | 2012–2014 | Managed stub-period audit post AerCap acquisition; led finance transformation |
| RBS Citizens Asset Finance | Various roles culminating in VP, Head of Balance Sheet Mgmt/Operations/Strategy | 2004–2012 | Led balance sheet management and operations for asset finance platform |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sage Capital Group LLC | Co‑founder, Managing Director, Investment Committee member | 2004–present | Private investment activities alongside corporate finance leadership |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Terms | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $625,000 | Set in CFO offer letter dated May 21, 2024 |
| Retirement/Benefits | Eligible for standard U.S. executive plans; 2024 employer retirement contributions $15,865 | Per DEF 14A “All Other Compensation” table |
| 2024 Salary Paid | $362,981 | Pro‑rated for partial year service |
Performance Compensation
Annual Short-Term Incentive (STI) – 2024 framework and outcomes
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout vs Target | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core Combined Ratio | 70% | 93.9% → 50% pay (0% if >93.9%) | 92.9% → 100% pay | ≤89.9% → 200% pay | 91.0% | 173.0% | Company-wide pool driven by underwriting-first |
| Strategic Objectives (6 pillars) | 30% | 0–50% cliff if not met | 100% if fully achieved | 100% | Achieved | 100.0% | Governance, growth, ROE/ROTE, MGA strategy, sustainability |
- STI bonus pool funding for 2024 was 151.3% of aggregate target, based on the formula above; individual NEO payouts vary by performance modifiers .
- McKinney’s 2024 non‑equity incentive (paid in 2025) was $549,240, pro‑rated for service .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) design and McKinney’s grants
| Element | Weight | Metric/Targeting | Vesting | McKinney 2024 Grant |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 75% | Tangible NBVPS CAGR over 3 years (2024–2026) | 3‑year cliff (performance + service) | 74,111 PSUs granted June 3, 2024 |
| RSUs | 25% | Time-based retention | Equal annual installments over 3 years | 24,704 RSUs granted June 3, 2024 |
PSU performance curve (2024 awards): Threshold 7% CAGR → 50% vesting; Target 9% → 100%; Maximum 11% → 200% (linear interpolation between points) .
2024 LTI award sizing: 200% of base salary (mix 75% PSUs / 25% RSUs); 2024 grant not pro‑rated despite mid‑year start . McKinney’s 2024 “Share Awards” (grant‑date fair value) totaled $1,278,666 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail | Status/Policy |
|---|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 24,704 common shares | As of March 14, 2025 (Executive & Director table) |
| Vested within 60 days | None for McKinney | Table of shares vesting within 60 days shows “—” |
| Ownership Guidelines | 3x base salary for other executive officers; 50% net shares retained until guideline met; 5 years to achieve | Company policy |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for executives/directors (incl. margin accounts) | Governance policy |
| Initial Section 16 Filing | Form 3 filed June 5, 2024 indicating no securities beneficially owned at start | Baseline ownership on appointment |
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Appointment & Role | Appointed CFO effective June 3, 2024; U.S.-based executive |
| Base/Bonus/LTI | $625,000 base; 100% target bonus; LTI target 200% of base (75% PSUs / 25% RSUs), full‑year grant in 2024 despite mid‑year start |
| Severance | Offer letter does not provide severance benefits |
| Change-in-Control | Plan documents generally use double‑trigger vesting assumptions for equity (substitution/assumption) in change-in-control scenarios |
| Restrictive Covenants | Perpetual confidentiality; non‑compete and non‑solicit during employment and for 6 months thereafter |
| Clawback | Policy covers financial restatements and, expanded in Jan 2024, gross/serious misconduct |
Company Performance Context (for pay-for-performance assessment)
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues (USD) | $2,431,400,000* | $2,709,900,000* | $2,647,100,000* |
| EBITDA (USD) | -$469,400,000* | $513,700,000* | $357,200,000* |
| Net Income (USD) | -$386,800,000 | $354,800,000 | $199,900,000 |
Values retrieved from S&P Global.
Additional 2024 highlights: Core combined ratio 91%; underlying ROE 14.6%; employee engagement improved; capital structure simplified via CM Bermuda repurchase; business mix shifted to reduce property exposure and volatility .
Performance Compensation – Detailed STI Table (Company)
| Component | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Funding |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core Combined Ratio (70% weight) | 93.9% → 50% | 92.9% → 100% | ≤89.9% → 200% | 91.0% | 151.3% total pool (with strategic goals at 100%) |
Governance, Peer Benchmarking, and Shareholder Feedback
- Peer group for 2024 compensation benchmarking included AXIS, RenaissanceRe, Hiscox, W.R. Berkley, Markel, Enstar, RLI, Selective, The Hanover, Employers Holdings, Global Indemnity, ProAssurance, James River, White Mountains .
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval: approximately 82% in favor; Committee strengthened 2025 STI Core combined ratio target to 91.3% (threshold 96.0%, max 88.3%) .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is reinforced by an underwriting-first STI (COR gate) and PSU metrics tied to tangible NBVPS CAGR; equity mix (75% PSUs) increases at‑risk compensation linked to book value accretion .
- Retention risk is mitigated by 3-year LTI structures and ownership guidelines with retention requirements; hedging/pledging prohibitions reduce misalignment/forced selling risk, but absence of contractual severance for the CFO implies less guaranteed protection on termination, potentially increasing external mobility sensitivity .
- Execution confidence: 2024 saw improved underwriting profitability and ROE, but relative TSR underperformed the P&C comparator (company $155.80 vs peer $219.19), indicating continued need to sustain multi‑year book value growth to maximize PSU outcomes and investor returns .
- Capital actions (CM Bermuda share/warrant repurchase) are accretive to EPS/ROE and reduce governance complexity, supporting compensation outcomes tied to ROE/NBVPS and potentially enhancing future TSR .