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Jonathan Norling

Chief Legal Officer at SPRUCE POWER HOLDING
Executive

About Jonathan Norling

Jonathan M. Norling (age 56) serves as Chief Legal Officer of Spruce Power Holding Corporation since February 2023; previously General Counsel (January 2019–February 2023), Deputy General Counsel (January 2018–January 2019), and Interim General Counsel (July 2017–January 2018) . He is party to an Amended and Restated At‑Will Employment, Confidential Information, Invention Assignment, and Arbitration Agreement effective March 15, 2019 and amended January 1, 2022 . The company’s incentive framework emphasizes Operating EBITDA/Adjusted Free Cash Flow and operational/reporting objectives; Norling’s 2024 STIC bonus was $100,000, equal to 63% of target, with departmental weighting of Legal 80% and Asset Disposition 20% . Spruce maintains an anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging policy; no named executive officer has engaged in prohibited transactions .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Spruce Power Holding CorporationChief Legal OfficerFeb 2023–present Legal leadership with departmental focus on Legal (80%) and Asset Disposition (20%) under 2024 STIC
Spruce PowerGeneral CounselJan 2019–Feb 2023 Led legal function during transformation to Spruce Power Holding Corporation
Spruce PowerDeputy General CounselJan 2018–Jan 2019 Supported legal operations and corporate matters
Spruce PowerInterim General CounselJul 2017–Jan 2018 Interim stewardship of legal function

External Roles

Not disclosed in the proxy, 10‑K, or 8‑K documents reviewed.

Fixed Compensation

Metric20232024
Salary (paid) ($)297,462 313,269
Target Bonus % of Base50% (base salary used for plan: $315,000; target bonus $157,500) Not disclosed; actual payout $100,000 equals 63% of target
Actual Bonus Paid ($)150,000 100,000

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan Structure and Metrics (2023)

ComponentWeightingMetric-level WeightingPayout Curve (Min/Target/Max)
Organizational Performance60% Revenue 25%; Gross Margin 25%; EBITDA 50% 75% / 100% / 150% of component
Individual Performance40% Discrete objectives per NEO 75% / 100% / 150% of component

Short-Term Incentive (STIC) – Norling (2024)

Metric CategoryWeightingTargetActualPayoutVesting/Timing
Departmental: Legal80% Not disclosedNot disclosedIncluded in bonusPaid in 2025 for 2024 performance
Departmental: Asset Disposition20% Not disclosedNot disclosedIncluded in bonusPaid in 2025 for 2024 performance
Ops & Servicing Excellence (portfolio collections, customer care, tech build-out)Company metric (no % disclosed) Not disclosedNot disclosedCommittee considered in payout Paid in 2025
Reporting Accuracy & TimelinessCompany metric (no % disclosed) Not disclosedNot disclosedCommittee considered in payout Paid in 2025
STIC Bonus – Jonathan Norling$100,000 (63% of target) Approved Feb 2025

Equity Awards Granted (Grant-Date Fair Value)

Metric20232024
Stock Awards (RSUs) – Fair Value ($)429,110 430,852
Option Awards ($)

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Ownership DetailAmountNotes
Beneficial Ownership (Direct/Indirect)22,244 shares; <1% of outstanding As of 2024 proxy record date
Unvested RSUs at 12/31/2024198,739 units Market value $590,255 at $2.97 closing price
Options (Exercisable/Unexercisable)None disclosed for Norling at FY2024 YE
Hedging/PledgingProhibited; no NEO has engaged in prohibited transactions Policy bans short-term trading, short sales, options/hedging, margin accounts, and pledges

Vesting Schedule – RSUs Outstanding at 12/31/2024

Vest DateShares
Apr 1, 202529,755
Apr 1, 202629,755
Apr 1, 202729,755
Apr 1, 202829,755
Apr 3, 202516,156
Apr 3, 202616,156
Apr 3, 202716,156
Sep 9, 202515,625
Sep 9, 202615,625

Employment Terms

  • Agreement: Amended and Restated At‑Will Employment, Confidential Information, Invention Assignment, and Arbitration Agreement effective March 15, 2019; amended January 1, 2022 .
  • Severance (Employment Agreement): If terminated without cause or resigns for good reason, a lump‑sum “Termination Payment” equal to (i) three months of regular base pay and benefits, (ii) any unpaid bonus previously awarded, (iii) pro‑rated bonus for the period through termination, and (iv) a “Notice Differential Payment” if less than 30 days’ notice is provided; death/disability triggers half of these amounts; contingent on signing a separation agreement with a release .
  • “Cause” definition includes fraud/dishonesty/disloyalty, certain criminal pleas/convictions, misconduct harming the company, negligence causing material injury, substance abuse affecting performance, failure to cooperate with investigations, failure to follow directives, violation of company policies, or material breach of duties under the agreement .
  • Company Severance Plan (Exhibit 10.25): Effective August [6], 2024; Eligible Employees include CEO, Sarah Weber Wells, Jonathan M. Norling, and others; “Good Reason” includes material reduction in base/target bonus, material reduction in authority/duties, relocation >50 miles, and (for CEO) failure to re‑nominate to the Board, with cure/notice periods; Normal Severance (not in connection with a change in control) equals Normal Multiplier × (base salary + full target bonus); additional plan mechanics governed by ERISA and administered per the plan .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance linkage appears measured: Norling’s 2024 bonus paid at 63% of target, reflecting committee evaluation of operational, reporting, and departmental objectives (Legal 80%/Asset Disposition 20%) .
  • Vesting cadence implies potential supply overhang: Multiple scheduled RSU vests across April and September 2025–2028 could create periodic selling pressure around vest dates, depending on personal liquidity needs and trading windows .
  • Alignment and risk: Direct ownership is modest (<1% of outstanding), while unvested RSUs are substantial; anti‑hedging/pledging policy reduces misalignment risk from derivatives or collateralization of shares .
  • Separation economics: Employment agreement provides relatively modest cash severance (three months base + benefits plus bonus components and notice differential), complemented by a company severance plan formula tied to base salary and target bonus, indicating balanced retention incentives without outsized guaranteed payouts .