Peter Wall
SEMPRAAbout Peter Wall
Peter R. Wall is Senior Vice President, Controller and Chief Accounting Officer at Sempra, serving as Controller & CAO since May 2018 and as Senior Vice President since April 2020; he previously served as Vice President (May 2018–April 2020) and as Vice President & CFO of Sempra Infrastructure (January 2017–April 2018). He is 53 years old as of February 25, 2025 . Company performance relevant to his incentive metrics: Sempra delivered 21% total shareholder return in 2024, and 2024 ABP Earnings achieved $3,158 million vs a $3,051 million target, driving a 143% bonus payout for named executives; the 2022–2024 LTIP paid out at 190% based on relative TSR and EPS growth .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sempra | Senior Vice President; Controller & Chief Accounting Officer | SVP since Apr 2020; Controller & CAO since May 2018 | Companywide controllership and accounting leadership; signer on SEC filings |
| Sempra | Vice President | May 2018–Apr 2020 | Finance leadership; transition into corporate controller role |
| Sempra Infrastructure | Vice President & CFO | Jan 2017–Apr 2018 | Platform CFO prior to reorganization into Sempra Infrastructure |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year summary for Peter Wall (reported compensation):
| Metric | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 390,000 | 410,000 | 435,000 |
| Actual Annual Bonus ($) | 380,600 | 393,200 | 383,800 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 1,140,578 | 740,097 | 683,312 |
2023 bonus target and structure:
| Item | 2023 Value |
|---|---|
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 50% |
| Target Bonus ($) | 217,500 |
| Payout % | 176% (rounded) |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | 383,800 |
Performance Compensation
Annual bonus (ABP) metrics and outcomes:
| Metric | Weight | Target (FY 2024) | Actual (FY 2024) | Payout (FY 2024) | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ABP Earnings | 80% | $3,051mm | $3,158mm | 143% (composite score) | Cash, paid after year-end |
| Safety Measures | 12% | Company-defined score | Formulaic 200% reduced via negative discretion | Included in 143% total | Cash |
| Sustainability Measures | 8% | Company-defined goals | Not separately disclosed | Included in 143% total | Cash |
Long-term incentives (LTIP) design and payout:
| LTIP Component | Weight | Performance Measure | Period | Payout Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PBRSU – Relative TSR vs S&P 500 Utilities | One-third of LTIP; 70% of TSR sleeve | TSR percentile vs S&P 500 Utilities peers (ex-water) | 3 years | 2022–2024 awards paid 190% of target |
| PBRSU – Relative TSR vs S&P 500 | One-third of LTIP; 30% of TSR sleeve | TSR percentile vs S&P 500 | 3 years | 2022–2024 awards paid 190% of target |
| PBRSU – EPS CAGR vs Utilities Peers | One-third of LTIP | 3-year adjusted EPS CAGR relative to peers | 3 years | 2022–2024 awards paid 190% of target |
| Options/Service-based RSUs | One-third of LTIP | Time-based; 3-year ratable vest | 3 years | Value realized depends on stock price/appreciation |
Peter Wall’s 2023 equity grants (share counts):
| Award | Threshold (#) | Target (#) | Maximum (#) |
|---|---|---|---|
| PBRSU – TSR vs S&P 500 Utilities | 353 | 1,410 | 2,820 |
| PBRSU – TSR vs S&P 500 | 353 | 1,410 | 2,820 |
| PBRSU – EPS Growth | 705 | 2,820 | 5,640 |
| Service-based RSUs | — | 2,820 | — |
Vesting schedules:
- PBRSUs vest after the 3-year performance period, with payout range 0%–200% of target based on certified TSR and EPS results . Service-based RSUs vest ratably over three years; multiple tranches from 2021–2023 grants are outstanding .
- Special RSU award granted January 4, 2021 vests over four annual installments; tranches vested in 2023 per table footnotes .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Ownership (as of March 20, 2025):
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Shares of Sempra common stock owned | 26,887 |
| Shares subject to exercisable options | 12,971 |
| Total beneficially owned shares | 39,858 (less than 1% of outstanding) |
| Phantom shares (deferred comp tracking stock) | 20,974 |
| Beneficial + phantom (for guideline assessment) | 60,832 |
Policies and guidelines:
- Officers must meet share ownership guidelines: SVPs at 2× base salary; includes direct shares, phantom shares, unvested service-based RSUs, and in-the-money value of service-based options; expected compliance within 5 years; retain at least 50% of net after-tax shares acquired until guideline met .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: officers and directors are prohibited from hedging or pledging company securities .
Insider selling pressure indicators:
- Rule 10b5-1 plan adopted March 19, 2024: scheduled sales from June 18, 2024 until completion of (i) 6,100 owned shares; and (ii) all shares vesting from 7,480 PBRSUs in Jan/Feb 2025 and 5,876 PBRSUs in Jan/Feb 2026 (net of tax withholding) .
Employment Terms
Severance Pay Agreement:
- Agreement effective January 1, 2023; automatic annual extensions beginning year 2 unless notice given; special extension protection around change-in-control; contains asset-sale termination conditions if comparable employment is offered by buyer .
Severance and change-in-control economics (illustrative values disclosed):
| Component | FY 2021 Value | FY 2022 Value |
|---|---|---|
| Lump-sum cash (no CIC) | $956,050 | $1,135,300 |
| Lump-sum cash (with CIC) | $1,274,733 | $1,513,733 |
| Equity acceleration (with CIC termination) | $965,754 | $3,009,519 |
| Health & welfare continuation (no CIC / with CIC) | $37,199 / $52,584 (2021) | $41,054 / $58,098 (2022) |
| Financial planning allowance (no CIC / with CIC) | $37,500 / $50,000 (2021) | $37,500 / $50,000 (2022) |
| Outplacement | $50,000 (each scenario) |
Trigger terms:
- “Change in Control Only (without termination)” table discloses equity acceleration values, indicating single-trigger acceleration of certain outstanding awards upon CIC per plan terms; severance cash requires termination without cause or for good reason (double-trigger) .
Clawbacks and risk controls:
- Mandatory clawback of erroneously paid performance-based incentive compensation per SEC/NYSE rules; Sarbanes-Oxley CEO clawback; committee discretion to recover compensation from LTIPs upon fraudulent or intentional misconduct materially affecting results .
- Independent compensation risk assessment concluded programs do not create material adverse risk .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: High variable weighting with ABP Earnings (80%), safety (12%), sustainability (8%); strong LTIP linkage to relative TSR and EPS CAGR, with 2022–2024 payout at 190% of target supported by company TSR performance in 2024; structurally supportive of long-term value creation .
- Retention risk appears moderated: Modest severance cash multiples for SVPs (½× salary+bonus without CIC; 1× with CIC) and robust share ownership guidelines (2× salary) that include phantom shares and unvested RSUs; strong anti-hedging/pledging policies further align interests .
- Selling pressure: The March 2024 Rule 10b5-1 plan schedules sales of 6,100 owned shares plus net shares from 2025/2026 PBRSU vesting, indicating predictable, programmatic supply around vesting dates rather than discretionary insider selling; monitor net shares delivered after withholding around January/February vest dates .
- Ownership alignment: While beneficial ownership is <1%, inclusion of phantom shares and unvested RSUs in guidelines plus time-based vesting and performance-based RSU exposure provide meaningful “skin in the game” and sensitivity to TSR and EPS outcomes .
Note: All metrics and amounts cited reflect disclosures in Sempra’s 2025, 2024, 2023, and 2021 proxy statements, 2025/2024/2022 10-Ks, and 2024 10-Q.