Stephen Young
SouthState BankAbout Stephen Young
Stephen D. Young is Chief Strategy Officer of SouthState Corporation and SouthState Bank, appointed June 7, 2020; he is 49 and has 23 years of combined service with SouthState/CenterState . Prior roles include EVP/COO of CenterState (2016–2020) and EVP/CFO of CenterState Bank (2002–2010), following an early career at Deloitte & Touche (1998–2001) . Company performance under the current executive team includes 2024 net income of $535M (adjusted $553M), PPNR $740M, ROATCE ~15%, and stock up 18% with KBW regional bank index outperformance across one-, two-, and three-year lookbacks; 2023 net income was $494M with 11% stock appreciation and 15% index outperformance in 2023 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CenterState Bank | EVP & CFO | 2002–2010 | Built finance function; supported growth; prior CFO experience |
| CenterState Bank / CenterState | EVP & COO | 2016–2020 | Led operations and integration ahead of CenterState merger with SouthState |
| CenterState Bank | Executive roles | 2010–2016 | Senior leadership, operating scale-up |
| Deloitte & Touche LLP | Senior Auditor | 1998–2001 | Foundation in audit/controls |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Salvation Army of East Polk County | Board service | Not disclosed | Community leadership and social impact |
| Parker Street Ministries | Board service | Not disclosed | Community development support |
| SeeJesus | Board service | Not disclosed | Non-profit governance |
| Geneva Classical Academy | Board service | Not disclosed | Education-focused governance |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 626,000 | 644,780 |
| Target Annual Incentive (% of Salary) | 100% | 105% |
| Annual Incentive Earned ($) | 691,532 | 1,015,529 |
| “All Other Compensation” ($) | Not disclosed in 2023 SCT excerpt | 46,727 (401(k) $13,800; LTD premium $876; Other cash $32,050) |
Notes:
- The Compensation Committee approved a 5% base salary increase for NEOs for 2025 following the Independent Merger (specific 2025 dollar amounts not listed) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024 Outcomes
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout (% of target) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted PPNR less Net Charge-Offs (in $M) | 80% | 586 | 651 | 716 | 722 | 150% |
| NPAs / (Loans + OREO) ratio vs peers | 20% | 25th percentile | 50th percentile | 75th percentile | 0.63% (≤ max threshold) | 150% |
Resulting AIP payout for Young: $1,015,529 (at 150% of target) .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – 2024 Structure and Grants
- Mix: 60% PSUs and 40% RSUs; PSUs based equally on 3-year TBV/share growth plus cumulative dividends and 3-year adjusted ROATCE vs peers; RSUs vest ratably over three years (Jan 1 each year post-grant) .
- Young 2024 LTI target: $999,409; RSUs $399,764; PSUs at target $599,645 .
| Instrument | Grant Date | Shares (#) | Grant-date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSU | 1/23/2024 | 4,994 | 408,959 | Ratable over 3 years; Jan 1 each year |
| PSU (target) | 1/23/2024 | 7,491 | 613,438 | Earned 0–150% over 3-year period; equal weighting of TBV + dividends and relative adjusted ROATCE |
Historical PSU payout:
- 2022 PSUs (performance period 1/1/2022–12/31/2024) paid out at 131.2% blended (TBV growth 150.0%; relative adjusted ROATCE 112.3%); Young vested 11,602 shares worth $1,154,167 at 12/31/2024 price .
2023 Reference (design maintained into 2024)
| Metric | Young 2023 |
|---|---|
| AIP Target (% of Salary) | 100% |
| AIP Earned ($) | 691,532 |
| LTI Target ($) | 939,000 |
| LTI Mix | 60% PSUs / 40% RSUs; performance metrics per 2023 plan |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (common shares) | 53,867 (individual) |
| Outstanding RSUs/PSUs (not counted as beneficial ownership) | 30,464 (unvested) |
| Ownership as % of Shares Outstanding | Less than 1% (Company had 101,364,628 shares outstanding) |
| Unvested RSUs (#; multiple grants) | 8,630; 738; 3,091; 4,994 |
| Unvested PSUs (# at target; multiple grants) | 6,955; 7,491 |
| 2022 PSUs achieved (# and value) | 11,602; $1,154,167 |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | CEO 6× salary; other NEOs 2× salary; all NEOs exceeded as of 2024 |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited by Insider Trading Policy |
Note: Insider trading plans (Rule 10b5‑1) permitted under policy; hedging and pledging prohibited; recoupment/clawback policies in place .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Details |
|---|---|
| Agreement Type | “Grandfathered Agreement” dated July 13, 2010; auto-renewing one-year terms |
| Qualifying Termination (without CIC) | Lump-sum cash equal to one times highest W‑2 annual compensation over prior three years; release required |
| Change-in-Control (single trigger) | Lump-sum cash equal to three times highest W‑2 annual compensation over prior three years; excise tax gross-up (Sections 280G/4999) |
| Non-compete / Non-solicit | One-year prohibition on competing and soliciting business relationships or employees following termination (except following CIC) |
| COBRA/Benefits | COBRA medical/dental continuation per agreement; potential payments schedule includes COBRA estimates |
| Potential Payments (illustrative, as of 12/31/2024) | CIC: Cash severance $8,950,595; Tax gross-up $4,097,262; COBRA $95,362; intrinsic values RSUs $905,689 and PSUs $1,481,902 |
| Clawback / Recoupment | SEC/NYSE-compliant compensation recoupment policy (2023) and broader clawback since 2021 |
| Options | No options granted in 2024; outstanding awards are RSUs/PSUs; Company does not reprice options without shareholder approval |
Other benefits and perquisites (2024):
- Split-dollar life insurance death benefit for Young’s beneficiary: $223,299; additional term life BOLI amount: $193,430 .
- “All other compensation” breakdown includes HSA $1,000; auto allowance $9,000; LTD contract premium $12,518; imputed income BOLI $166; club dues $9,366; total $32,050 .
Relationship disclosure:
- Young is the brother-in-law of CEO John C. Corbett; related-person transactions are overseen under the Code of Ethics and Regulation O, with 2024 reports noting only routine non-material HR matters .
Performance Compensation (metric details)
| Component | Weighting | Target Design | Actual/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIP – Adjusted PPNR less NCOs | 80% | Threshold 586; Target 651; Max 716 ($M) | Actual 722 ($M); 150% payout | Annual cash (paid Q1 following year) |
| AIP – NPAs/(Loans+OREO) | 20% | Percentile vs peers (≤0.75% for max) | 0.63% (max); 150% payout | Annual cash |
| PSUs – TBV/share + cumulative dividends (3 yr) | Within 60% PSUs, equally weighted | TBV target band; equal weighting with ROATCE | 2022 cycle achieved 150.0% on TBV | 3-year performance, earned 0–150%, then subject to holding/settlement |
| PSUs – Adjusted ROATCE vs peers (3 yr) | Within 60% PSUs, equally weighted | Percentile ranking vs peers | 2022 cycle 64th percentile (112.3%) | 3-year performance, earned 0–150% |
| RSUs | 40% of LTI | Time-based | N/A | Ratable over three years; Jan 1 each year |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Heavy at-risk mix (AIP and LTI) tied to PPNR, asset quality, TBV growth, and relative ROATCE supports pay-for-performance; 2024 AIP paid at 150% on strong operating metrics and asset quality . PSUs vest over three years, tempering short-termism .
- Ownership/skin-in-the-game: Young beneficially owns 53,867 shares plus unvested RSUs/PSUs; NEO ownership guidelines (2× salary) exceeded; hedging/pledging prohibited—positive alignment signals .
- Retention and risk flags: Grandfathered single-trigger CIC with excise tax gross-up (rare, shareholder-unfriendly) and large potential CIC payouts (cash severance and gross-up) could create event-driven costs; non-compete/non-solicit and COBRA help retention balance .
- No options, repricing limits: Equity is via RSUs/PSUs; absence of options reduces volatility of compensation; no option repricing without shareholder approval mitigates governance risk .
- Shareholder feedback: Say-on-pay support remained high (86.4% in 2024; 98% in 2023), indicating investor acceptance of program design, though CIC terms for legacy agreements merit continued scrutiny and potential future modernization .
- Context: Company delivered strong ROATCE, TBV growth, and TSR outperformance vs KBW peers in recent years, aligning realized pay outcomes with shareholder value creation .