Jeffrey M. Sullivan
About Jeffrey M. Sullivan
Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary of STAG Industrial since 2015; age 55; BA, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; JD, Vanderbilt University Law School. Prior to STAG, Sullivan was a partner at Hunton & Williams (2012–2014), DLA Piper (2005–2012), and associate/partner at Alston & Bird (1998–2005), focusing on securities law, M&A, corporate governance and REITs . STAG’s long-term incentive plan pays based on TSR; the 2021–2023 PSU cycle paid 191.6% of target with absolute TSR of +39.3%, while the 2022–2024 PSU cycle paid 106% of target despite absolute TSR of -12.9%, reflecting above-peer relative performance thresholds and 25% absolute TSR gate for >100% payout on the MSCI benchmark .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hunton & Williams LLP | Partner, Corporate Group | 2012–2014 | Advised REITs and real estate companies on securities/M&A; governance |
| DLA Piper LLP (US) | Partner, Finance Group | 2005–2012 | Structured financings; REIT-focused transactions |
| Alston & Bird LLP | Associate/Partner, Corporate Transactions & Securities | 1998–2005 | Led securities/M&A work; governance and corporate law for REITs |
External Roles
No public company board roles disclosed; Sullivan is an executive officer (not a director) .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $332,188 | $375,000 | $375,000 |
| Target Bonus Opportunity ($) | $332,188 (100% of salary) | $375,000 (100% of salary) | $375,000 (100% of salary) |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | $408,951 | $522,416 | $528,750 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $42,609 | $40,514 | $43,093 |
| Notes | Other NEO bonus bandwidth: Threshold 50%, Target 100%, Max 150% of salary | Program per 2023 proxy | Program per 2025 proxy |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive – 2024 Detail (Other NEO calibration including Sullivan)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Points Earned (Other NEOs) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core FFO per Share | 50% | $2.36 | $2.38 | $2.40 | $2.40 | 75.0 |
| Acquisition Volume | 10% | $400M | $600M | $800M | $821.1M | 15.0 |
| Net Debt to Run Rate Adjusted EBITDAre | 10% | 5.50x | 5.25x | 5.00x | 5.20x | 11.0 |
| Same Store Cash NOI Growth | 10% | 4.75% | 5.00% | 5.25% | 5.80% | 15.0 |
| Individual Performance | 20% | 10.0–30.0 pts band | — | — | Assessed | Sullivan earned 25.0 |
| Total Points / Bonus | — | — | — | — | Company 116.0; Total 141.0 | Bonus $528,750 |
Individual goals for Sullivan included scalability of legal/IT/HR, SEC/NYSE compliance, governance/sustainability, Board support, and departmental initiatives .
Annual Cash Incentive – 2023 Detail (Other NEO calibration including Sullivan)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Points Earned (Other NEOs) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core FFO per Share | 50% | Company-set | Company-set | Company-set | $2.29 (above max) | 75.0 |
| Acquisition Volume | 10% | Company-set | Company-set | Company-set | $312.4M (+4.1% > threshold) | 5.3 |
| Net Debt to Run Rate Adjusted EBITDAre | 10% | Company-set | Company-set | Company-set | 4.9x (> max) | 15.0 |
| Same Store Cash NOI Growth | 10% | Company-set | Company-set | Company-set | 5.6% (> max) | 15.0 |
| Individual Performance | 20% | 10.0–30.0 pts band | — | — | Assessed | Sullivan earned 29.0 |
| Total / Bonus | — | — | — | — | Company 110.3; Total 139.3 | Bonus $522,416 |
Long-Term Equity – LTIP Units (Service-Vesting RSU analogue)
| Grant Date | Units | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 11, 2023 | 9,842 | $328,132 | Quarterly pro rata over 4 years beginning Mar 31, 2023, service-based |
| Jan 8, 2024 | 8,868 | $328,116 | Quarterly pro rata over 4 years beginning Mar 31, 2024, service-based |
2023 and 2024 policy: annual equity split ~35% LTIP and ~65% PSUs (2023; committee-discretion) .
Long-Term Equity – Performance Units (PSUs, TSR-based)
| Grant Date | Target Units | Target Value ($) | Payout Range | Benchmarks / Weighting | Vesting/Settlement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 11, 2023 | 14,241 | $609,372 | 0–250% of target plus deemed dividends | 2023 design: Industry 50%, MSCI US REIT 50%; 25% absolute TSR gate for >100% on MSCI | 3-year performance period; immediate vesting upon settlement |
| Jan 8, 2024 | 13,722 | $609,394; Max $1,523,485 | 0–250% of target plus deemed dividends | 2024 design: Industry 50%, MSCI US REIT 50%; 25% absolute TSR gate for >100% on MSCI | 3-year performance period; immediate vesting upon settlement |
Historical PSU outcomes: 2021–2023 paid 191.6% (Size 68th→166.1% of slice; Industry 81st→200%; MSCI 75th→200.1%; total 191.6%) . 2022–2024 paid 106% (Size 49th→88.1%; Industry 79th→200%; MSCI 39th→67.9%; total 106%; absolute TSR -12.9%) .
2023 Stock Vested – Realized Values (Sullivan)
| Vesting Date | Closing Price ($) | Shares/LTIP Units Vested | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 11, 2023 | 34.73 | 19,150 | 665,080 |
| Mar 31, 2023 | 33.82 | 2,307 | 78,023 |
| Jun 30, 2023 | 35.88 | 2,309 | 82,847 |
| Sep 30, 2023 | 34.51 | 2,307 | 79,615 |
| Dec 31, 2023 | 39.26 | 2,309 | 90,651 |
2022 realized vesting for Sullivan (illustrative): Jan 10, 2022—36,987 units at $44.19 ($1,634,456) plus quarterly installments thereafter .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| As-of Record Date | Beneficial Ownership (Shares & Units) | % of Shares Outstanding | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 10, 2022 | 210,389 | * (<1%) | Includes LTIP units; none pledged |
| Feb 27, 2023 | 239,381 | * (<1%) | Includes 239,381 LTIP units; not all vested; none pledged |
| Mar 4, 2024 | 259,492 | * (<1%) | None of NEOs/directors pledged shares |
| Mar 3, 2025 | 284,058 | * (<1%) | Policy prohibits hedging/pledging |
- Stock ownership guidelines: 3x base salary for other executive officers; 6x for CEO; executives have 5 years to comply; all executive officers are in compliance .
- Prohibition on hedging and pledging applies to officers/directors; no pledges by NEOs/directors noted in ownership tables .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Role/Tenure | EVP, General Counsel & Secretary since 2015 |
| Agreement Term | Current term expires Dec 31, 2025 (auto-renews for successive one-year periods unless notice ≥60 days before term end) ; prior proxy listed Dec 31, 2024 |
| Severance (without cause / good reason) | Lump-sum 2x (salary + most recent bonus), pro rata bonus, 18 months health premiums, immediate vesting of non-performance equity |
| Change-of-Control | Cash after a change of control generally only if also terminated within 1 year (double-trigger), consistent with policy |
| Performance Units on Termination | Generally pro rata vesting rather than full vesting in most terminations |
| Non-Compete | 12 months post-termination, except if terminated without cause, non-renewal by Company, or for good reason |
| Clawback Policy | Clawback for incentive-based executive compensation |
| Tax Gross-ups | No excise tax gross-ups for change-of-control payments; no pension plans |
| Perquisites | Insurance premiums, 401(k) match, commuting/parking allowances; 2024 total $43,093 for Sullivan |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Cash bonus tied 80% to objective REIT metrics (Core FFO/share, Same Store Cash NOI growth, Net Debt/Run-Rate Adj. EBITDAre, Acquisition/Development volume) and 20% to individual goals; Sullivan’s 2024 bonus equaled 141% of salary ($528,750) on strong FFO, NOI growth and development commitments .
- Equity-heavy incentives with retention: Quarterly vesting LTIP units over four years create steady vesting supply; 2023 alone saw ~28,000 units vest for Sullivan with ~$996k pre-tax value realized, indicating potential periodic selling pressure but balanced by policy prohibiting hedging/pledging and ownership guidelines .
- Relative TSR PSU design moderates cyclicality: 2022–2024 PSU payout at 106% despite negative absolute TSR (-12.9%) reflects outperformance vs peers and MSCI REIT index; gate limits >100% payouts on MSCI unless absolute TSR ≥25%, reducing windfalls in weak markets .
- Retention risk: Auto-renewing employment term, double-trigger change-of-control cash, immediate vesting of service-based equity on qualifying terminations, and pro rata PSU vesting lower exit friction; severance at 2x salary+bonus is competitive but not excessive .
- Governance risk checks: No pledged shares; hedging prohibited; independent compensation consultant; clawback policy in place; modest perquisites; no option repricing .