Majdi Abulaban
About Majdi Abulaban
Majdi B. Abulaban is President & CEO of Superior Industries International (SUP) and has served on the Board since 2019; he is 61 years old, holds a B.A.Sc. in Mechanical Engineering (University of Pittsburgh) and an MBA (Case Western Reserve), and previously led major global businesses at Aptiv/Delphi across Asia and electrical architectures . Under his tenure, pay-versus-performance disclosure shows SUP’s three-year TSR trajectory moving from 103.18 in 2022 to 78.24 in 2023 and 49.88 in 2024, alongside net income of $37.0 million in 2022, $(92.9) million in 2023, and $(78.2) million in 2024, informing the calibration of incentive outcomes . 2024 AIPP Adjusted EBITDA was $146.3 million versus a $164.6 million target (88.9% of target), funding the annual bonus pool at 63.2% of target for the CEO and NEOs .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aptiv PLC | Senior Vice President & Group President, Global Signal and Power Solutions | 2017–2019 | Led global product business unit; transformed Aptiv’s electrical architecture businesses; track record implementing systems and structures that drive performance . |
| Delphi Automotive/Delphi Asia Pacific | SVP & Group President, Global Electrical/Electronic Architecture; President, Asia Pacific; prior BU leadership | 1985–2017 | Established Delphi as a leading automotive supplier in China; led large-scale operations (120,000+ employees) with global manufacturing and supply chain execution . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| University of Pittsburgh | Board of Trustees | Since 2021 |
| SPX Flow | Director | 2017–2022 |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 850,000 | 900,000 (6% increase effective 1/1/2024) |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 21,463 | 22,215 |
| Perquisites/Benefits (qualitative) | Auto allowance; executive health screenings; participates in health/welfare and 401(k) with 2024 match up to 6% per plan terms . | Auto allowance; executive health screenings; participates in health/welfare and 401(k); all company 401(k) contributions vest 100% after 2 years . |
Performance Compensation
- Annual Incentive Plan (AIPP) design and outcomes:
- CEO target bonus 125% of base salary; payout range 0–200% of target; tied exclusively to Company financial performance through AIPP Adjusted EBITDA .
- 2024 AIPP calibration and result:
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIPP Adjusted EBITDA ($) | 139,910,000 | 164,600,000 | 189,290,000 | 146,300,000 |
| % of Target | 85.0% | 100.0% | >115% | 88.9% |
| CEO Incentive as % of Target | 50.0% | 100.0% | 200.0% | 63.2% |
| Name | AIPP Target (% of Salary) | Target Award ($) | Performance Multiplier (%) | Total Amount Earned ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Majdi B. Abulaban | 125% | 1,125,000 | 63.2 | 711,000 |
- Long-Term Incentives (LTI):
- 2024 grants: PRSUs based 100% on Relative TSR; time-based RSUs vest ratably over 3 years .
| Name | 2024–2026 PRSUs (Target #) | 2024 Time-Based RSUs (#) |
|---|---|---|
| Majdi B. Abulaban | 604,027 | 302,013 |
| Name | Time-Based RSUs ($) | PRSUs (Target $) | PRSUs (Maximum $) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Majdi B. Abulaban | 900,000 | 2,307,383 | 4,614,766 |
- Recently completed performance cycle (2022–2024): Equal weighting of LTIP Net Debt (50%) and Relative TSR (50%); achievement 96.63% of target .
| Name | PRSUs at Target (#) | Performance (%) | Actual Shares Earned (#) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Majdi B. Abulaban | 397,196 | 96.63 | 383,791 |
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Compensation mix and policies:
- Variable pay comprises ~85% of CEO target total direct compensation; meaningful stock ownership and holding requirements; double-trigger for CIC vesting; anti-hedging/anti-pledging; clawback; no excise tax gross-ups; no option repricing without shareholder approval .
-
Total compensation summary (for completeness):
| Year | Salary ($) | Bonus ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Non-Equity Incentive ($) | All Other ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 850,000 | 1,500,000 | 2,769,356 | 691,688 | 21,463 | 5,832,506 |
| 2024 | 900,000 | — | 3,207,383 | 711,000 | 22,215 | 4,840,598 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership (as of March 27, 2025):
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned | RSUs Vesting ≤60 Days | Total | % of Common Stock | % of Voting Power |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Majdi B. Abulaban | 2,006,990 | 100,671 | 2,107,661 | 7.1% | 5.9% |
- Outstanding equity awards at FY2024 year-end:
| Grant Year | Unvested RSUs (#) | Market Value ($) | Unearned PRSUs (Target #) | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 66,199 | 135,046 (at $2.04) | — | — |
| 2023 | 134,409 | 274,194 (at $2.04) | 403,226 | 822,581 (at $2.04) |
| 2024 | 302,013 | 616,107 (at $2.04) | 604,027 | 1,232,215 (at $2.04) |
- Alignment mechanisms:
- CEO stock ownership guideline: 5x base salary; executives must hold 100% of acquired/net shares until compliant; all NEOs at/above requirement as of the 2024 measurement date .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging policies applicable to employees and directors .
Employment Terms
- Employment agreement and term: CEO employment agreement entered May 15, 2019 (amended Oct 12, 2021); initial term 2 years with automatic one-year renewals; initial base salary $800,000; target and max bonus opportunities of 125% and 250% of salary (with a 2019 minimum) .
- Severance (non-CIC): If terminated without Cause or he resigns for Good Reason, severance equals 18 months base salary; prorated current-year bonus (actual performance); pro-rata vesting for RSUs outstanding ≥6 months; PRSUs continue based on actual performance; 18 months health care continuation .
- Change-in-Control (CIC), double trigger: Within 2 years post-CIC and terminated without Cause or resigns for Good Reason, lump sum equals 3x base salary + target annual bonus; health care continuation up to 18 months; time-based awards vest in full; performance awards deemed earned at target .
- Incentive plan structure: Equity vesting accelerated only on double trigger; no excise tax gross-ups; clawback policy covers incentive-based cash/equity for current/former executive officers .
Board Governance
- Board service: Director since 2019; SUP’s Board had 9 meetings in 2024; committees met frequently (Audit 9; Human Capital & Compensation 6; Nominating & Corporate Governance 7) .
- Governance structure: Non-executive Board Chair; fully independent Board committees; 7 of 8 director nominees are independent; annual election of directors .
- Director compensation: Abulaban receives no director compensation for board service (as an employee); non-employee directors receive cash retainers, committee fees, and annual RSUs; ownership guideline for non-employee directors equals 5x cash retainer with a 5-year compliance window .
- Dual-role implications: CEO serving as a director is mitigated by non-executive chair and fully independent committees; compensation oversight by Human Capital & Compensation Committee and use of independent consultant (Meridian) across compensation reviews .
Performance Compensation Details
| Incentive Type | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Range | Actual Payout | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIPP (2024) | AIPP Adjusted EBITDA | 100% (CEO) | $164.6M | $146.3M | 0–200% of target | 63.2% of target | Annual cash FY2024 |
| PRSUs (2022–2024) | LTIP Net Debt | 50% | Not disclosed (competitively sensitive) | Not disclosed | 0–200% target | Included in 96.63% total | Earned at period end |
| PRSUs (2022–2024) | Relative TSR | 50% | Peer-based TSR | Peer-relative outcome | 0–200% target | Included in 96.63% total | Earned at period end |
| PRSUs (2024–2026) | Relative TSR | 100% | Peer-based TSR | N/A (in flight) | 0–200% target | N/A | Earn at end of 3-year period |
| RSUs (2024 grants) | Stock price alignment | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 3-year ratable vesting |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment appears intact: 2024 annual incentive funded at 63.2% of target on miss to AIPP EBITDA; PRSU outcomes for 2022–2024 paid at 96.63% of target, reflecting balanced Net Debt and Relative TSR measurement .
- Retention and transaction incentives strengthened: CIC cash multiple for CEO raised to 3x salary+target bonus with double-trigger vesting, increasing retention and aligning interests in potential strategic alternatives; COO received a $1.0 million retention bonus in 2025, signaling emphasis on management continuity during operational improvements .
- Ownership alignment is strong: CEO beneficial ownership of 2.11 million shares (7.1% of common) with strict holding and 5x-salary ownership guideline; anti-pledging/anti-hedging policies mitigate misalignment risk .
- Vesting and potential selling pressure: Large outstanding PRSU/RSU balances (e.g., 604k PRSUs target and 302k RSUs) may create episodic supply at vest dates; mitigated by holding requirements until guidelines are met .
- Governance quality: Non-executive chair and fully independent committees help offset dual-role concerns (CEO + director); regular shareholder engagement and say-on-pay proposal recommended “FOR” underpin governance practices .