
Mark Walsh
About Mark Walsh
Mark T. Walsh, age 63, has served as Chief Executive Officer since October 2019 and as a director since December 2020; he holds a B.A. from Brown University and an M.B.A. from The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania . Under his tenure as public-company CEO, 2024 Adjusted EBITDA was $296.2 million, while net income was $29.0 million; cumulative TSR translated an initial $100 to $45 for 2024 (down from $76 in 2023), indicating equity underperformance versus operational resilience; Q3 FY25 net sales rose 8.1% YoY to $426.9 million with Adjusted EBITDA of $70.0 million (16.4% margin) and comps +5.8% . The Board maintains a split Chair/CEO structure (Walsh is CEO/Director; Aaron Rosen serves as non-executive Chair), and SVV is a “controlled company,” affecting board independence context .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bob’s Stores & Eastern Mountain Sports (Vestis Retail Group) | CEO (two tenures) | 2008–2013; 2015–May 2017 | Led operational turnaround, preserved ~400 jobs, and managed Section 363 sale to Versa Capital; subsequent sale to Sports Direct through DIP process . |
| Polartec | Operating Chairman | 2012–2014 | Oversight role during operational transition period . |
| Independent consultant (special situations) | Interim/turnaround CEO services | May 2017–Oct 2019 | Focused on special situations and interim leadership mandates . |
| Early career: Deloitte Consulting; PepsiCo; apparel brands (J.Crew, Juicy Couture, Prana, Ellen Tracy, Laundry) | Various leadership roles | — | ~20 years across apparel retailing and operations, building turnaround and brand optimization expertise . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Savers Australia Pty Ltd | Director | Current | Oversight of international affiliate operations . |
Board Service at SVV
- Board tenure and class: Director since 2020; Class II director up for election at 2025 meeting; not independent due to management role .
- Committee roles: None; Board committees (Audit; Compensation; Nominating, Governance & Sustainability) are fully independent as required for Audit; SVV utilizes controlled-company exemptions for committee composition .
- Leadership structure and independence: Separate Chair (Aaron Rosen) and CEO; SVV is a “controlled company,” so majority independence isn’t required; Audit independence maintained per NYSE/SEC rules .
- Meeting cadence/attendance: Board met 5x in fiscal 2024; each standard committee met 4x; all directors attended ≥75% of applicable meetings; independent directors meet in executive sessions .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | 921,807 | 956,949 | 1,000,000 (year-end rate) |
| Target bonus (% of salary) | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Actual bonus / AIP paid ($) | 1,149,480 (AIP) | 8,184,000 (Bonus) | 100,000 (10% of $1,000,000 target) |
Notes: FY24 AIP payout was 10% of target after achieving ~86% of Adjusted EBITDA goal; no discretionary bonuses in FY24 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – FY 2024
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP) | 100% | 86% of goal → 10% payout | 100% of goal → 100% payout | 120% of goal → 200% payout | ~86% of target | 10% of target |
- Definition and rationale: Adjusted EBITDA selected as sole metric for FY24 to emphasize growth and expense discipline; aligns with broad-based incentive design .
- CEO target and result: Target = 100% of salary ($1,000,000); paid $100,000 (10%) .
Long-Term Equity Incentives
| Award | Grant date | Quantity/terms | Vesting | Key economics |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock options | 3/12/2024 | 208,768 options @ $19.70 strike | 1/3 on each of 2nd, 3rd, 4th anniversaries | Time-based vesting; full acceleration upon death/disability per 2024 award terms . |
| RSUs | 3/12/2024 | 101,522 RSUs | 1/3 on each of 2nd, 3rd, 4th anniversaries | Full acceleration upon death/disability for 2024 awards . |
| Pre-IPO performance options | Various (e.g., 2019, 2020) | MOIC and VWAP performance tranches; IPO vesting 25%; VWAP tranches at $6.88, $11.76, $15.42 with an additional 25% vesting achieved during 2024 | Performance-contingent | Time-based options vest pro-rata upon termination without cause; CIC fully accelerates time-based options and performance options to extent MOIC met . |
- FY24 realized equity activity: Walsh exercised 118,305 options, realizing $1,512,159 in value (monetization signal) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 2,806,239 shares (1.75% of shares outstanding); comprised of options exercisable within 60 days as of 3/31/2025 . |
| Vested vs. unvested (select positions) | Exercisable options within 60 days: 2,806,239 . Unvested RSUs outstanding from 3/12/2024 grant: 101,522 (fair value $1,046,692 at $10.31 on 12/27/2024) . |
| Recent selling pressure indicators | Participated as a “Selling Stockholder” in the 5/16/2025 secondary offering alongside Ares (aggregate 17.3M shares sold by selling holders; company received no proceeds) . Exercised options for $1.51M value in 2024 . |
| Ownership guidelines | CEO required to hold shares equal to 5x base salary; measurement includes owned shares and unvested RSUs (excludes options); 5-year compliance window . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for executives and directors (mitigates alignment risk); 10b5-1 plans encouraged with cooling-off periods . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Summary (Walsh-specific where noted) |
|---|---|
| Employment term | Amended & restated agreement dated 3/8/2023; initial term through 12/31/2025 with automatic 12-month renewals . |
| Target bonus | 100% of base salary (CEO) . |
| Severance (without cause or good reason resignation) | 12 months base salary; pro-rated bonus at actual (for CEO, target bonus amount); COBRA premiums for 18 months (CEO); continued post-2022 perf-option treatment through specified dates; release and covenants required . |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | Non-compete 12 months for CEO; confidentiality and non-disparagement apply . |
| Change-in-control (equity) | Post-IPO equity under Omnibus Plan uses double-trigger vesting; pre-IPO time-based options fully vest; perf-options vest to MOIC attainment on CIC . |
| Estimated CIC equity value (12/27/2024) | $12,959,178 (equity acceleration value, methodology at $10.31 close; options net of strike) . |
| Clawback | 3-year recoupment on material restatement for incentive comp . |
| Tax gross-ups | No 280G/4999 tax gross-up provisions; “better-of” reduction applies for other NEOs (no gross-ups disclosed) . |
Performance & Track Record
- Operating growth: Q3 FY25 net sales +8.1% YoY to $426.9M; comps +5.8%; Adjusted EBITDA $70.0M (16.4% margin); 10 new stores opened (364 total) .
- Capital structure and capital returns: Refinanced into a $750M term loan and $180M revolver (9/18/2025), expected to reduce interest expense by ~$17M annually; Board authorized new $50M share repurchase (effective 11/9/2025–11/8/2027) .
- FY2024 profitability: Adjusted EBITDA $296.2M; net income $29.0M .
- TSR context: Compensation-Actually-Paid vs. TSR shows pressure; $100 initial investment → $45 in 2024 (peer group TSR noted via S&P 500 Retail Select Industry Index) .
- Executive transitions: New CFO Michael Maher joined 5/13/2024; former CFO Jay Stasz departed 8/12/2024 with separation benefits; FY24 “executive transition costs” recorded .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay-for-performance alignment: FY24 AIP paid 10% of target after ~86% of Adjusted EBITDA target achieved; no discretionary bonuses in FY24 .
- Mix shift: Transitioned to public-company LTI mix with 50% options/50% RSUs in FY24, vesting over years 2–4 to support retention; pre-IPO performance options partly vested at IPO and via VWAP hurdles in 2024 .
- At-risk pay: CEO total comp in 2024 was $5.09M, heavily equity-based ($4.0M grant-date value) vs. modest cash incentive outcome; CEO pay ratio 191.1:1 .
- Governance mitigants: Clawback, anti-hedging/pledging, and ownership guidelines (5x salary for CEO) reduce agency risk .
Compensation Peer Group (used for benchmarking)
- FY2024 peer set includes consumer and off-price comparables such as Five Below, Ollie’s Bargain Outlet, Sprouts Farmers Market, Floor & Decor, Academy Sports, Shoe Carnival, Leslie’s, National Vision, Grocery Outlet, among others; Committee uses market data without strict formulaic benchmarking .
Related Party / Governance Context
- Controlled company: Ares Funds own ~85.29% (as of 3/31/2025) and hold consent rights on key corporate actions (e.g., M&A over thresholds, indebtedness, equity issuance, CEO employment changes) via Stockholders Agreement; also hold registration rights .
- Insider trading policy: Board notes management and directors subject to insider trading policy; 10b5-1 plans encouraged .
Director Compensation (context; not paid to CEO as director)
- Non-employee director retainers: $80,000 cash; $130,000 equity in RSUs; additional committee chair fees; Walsh receives no additional director pay as CEO .
Performance Compensation – Detailed Tables
CEO FY2024 AIP Outcome
| Component | Target ($) | Actual ($) | Payout (% of Target) |
|---|---|---|---|
| AIP (Adjusted EBITDA) | 1,000,000 | 100,000 | 10% |
CEO FY2024 Equity Grants
| Award | Grant date | Shares/Options | Strike/Price | Vesting cadence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Options | 3/12/2024 | 208,768 | $19.70 | 1/3 on 2nd/3rd/4th anniversaries |
| RSUs | 3/12/2024 | 101,522 | n/a | 1/3 on 2nd/3rd/4th anniversaries |
Employment & CIC Economics – Summary (as of 12/27/2024)
| Scenario | Cash benefits ($) | Equity acceleration ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Involuntary termination (without cause) / Good reason resignation | 2,039,000 (salary, target bonus, COBRA) | 64,046 |
| Death or disability | — | 1,110,738 |
| Change in control (equity) | — | 12,959,178 |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: AIP paid down to 10% on under-target EBITDA, while multi-year option/RSU vesting supports retention; ownership guidelines (5x salary) and anti-hedging/pledging strengthen alignment .
- Selling pressure signals: CEO participated as a selling stockholder in the May 2025 secondary and realized $1.51M from option exercises in 2024, signaling some liquidity-taking; monitor future Form 4 activity and 10b5-1 plans for timing patterns .
- CIC and control risk: Significant equity acceleration in CIC ($13.0M estimate) plus Ares’ consent rights on CEO changes and major corporate actions concentrate control—beneficial for stability but a governance overhang; potential for private-equity-driven decisions impacting minority holders .
- Execution vs. equity performance: Operations show growth (Q3 FY25 comps +5.8% and EBITDAs), debt refinancing should lower interest ~$17M annually, and a $50M buyback adds capital return flexibility; however, FY2024 TSR was weak, and CFO turnover in 2024 adds some execution risk .