Laurent Sellier
About Laurent Sellier
Laurent Sellier is President & Chief Executive Officer, North America (including Mexico) at Smurfit Westrock plc and serves as the Principal Executive Officer for Smurfit Westrock North America, as evidenced by his S-3 signature capacity on November 12, 2025 . Under his leadership, the North American business delivered Q3 2025 Adjusted EBITDA of $810 million with a 17.2% margin, highlighting improved operational performance and a focus on value over volume within corrugated operations . Company-wide Q3 2025 results included Net Sales of $8,003 million, Net Income of $245 million (3.1% margin), and Adjusted EBITDA of $1,302 million (16.3% margin) . The combination between Smurfit Kappa Group plc and WestRock Company closed on July 5, 2024, with ongoing portfolio optimization (e.g., mill closures) expected to increase profitability excluding restructuring costs .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Smurfit Westrock North America | President & Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer for SW NA) | 2024–present | Led operational/commercial improvement, delivering NA Adjusted EBITDA of $810m (17.2% margin) in Q3 2025 |
External Roles
- No external directorships or roles disclosed for Sellier in available filings. (Skip if not disclosed)
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $598,000 | $760,960 |
| Stock Awards ($) | $1,575,693 | $4,388,320 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Comp ($) | $370,493 | $841,633 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $188,859 | $357,278 |
| Total ($) | $2,733,045 | $6,348,191 |
- Offer Letter terms (effective for the post-combination regime): Base salary $900,000, target annual bonus 75% of base, annual equity awards with a target aggregate grant date fair value of $2,250,000 in respect of 2025; eligibility for Executive Severance Plan; 12-month post-termination non-compete/non-solicit/non-dealing covenants .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Jul–Dec 2024
| Named Executive Officer | Target AIP (% of Base) | Target AIP ($) | Payout (% of Target) | Final AIP Award ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Laurent Sellier | 75% | $337,500 | 128.90% | $435,038 |
- AIP performance metric for Jul–Dec 2024: Adjusted EBITDA (reinforcing strong post-merger earnings focus) .
SKG Plan – Jan–Jun 2024 (Pre-Combination)
| Performance Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Resultant Payout (% of Max) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Group EBIT | 20% | €414m | €549m | €685m | €647m | 17.21% (86%) |
| Group Free Cash Flow | 20% | €(162)m | €(65)m | €32m | €30m | 19.79% (99%) |
| Americas EBIT | 30% | €138m | €196m | €255m | €217m | 20.17% (67%) |
| Americas FCF | 20% | €(128)m | €(79)m | €(31)m | €(13)m | 20.00% (100%) |
| Health, Safety & Wellbeing (Americas TRIR) | 10% | <0.55 | <0.55 | <0.55 | 0.364 | 10.00% (100%) |
| Total Payout | 87.17% |
- Final SKG Plan Award: $406,596 .
- 2024 limited perquisites included a one-time $150,000 discretionary cash award tied to role expansion/relocation and specific allowances with tax equalization, and pension contributions applicable to his region .
Long-Term Incentive Awards & Vesting
| Award Type | Grant Date | Units/Target | Vesting/Performance | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (SW LTI Plan) | Aug 2, 2024 | Target: 15,106; Earnout 0–200% based on Relative TSR vs S&P 500 | 3-year perf period Jul 8, 2024–Dec 31, 2026; vest on certification; straight-line interpolation between percentiles (25th=50%, 50th=100%, 75th=200%) | Outstanding PSUs reflected at max with dividend equivalents: 30,578 units (MV $1,646,931 using $53.86 close) |
| PSP (Smurfit Kappa, pre-combination) | Mar 14, 2024 | 28,285 units; grant value $1,243,840 | Performance deemed achieved at 100% on Combination; continue service-based vesting through Dec 31, 2026 | Converted to SW awards; continue vesting |
| DBP (Deferred Bonus, for 2023 bonus portion) | Mar 14, 2024 | 8,999 units; DBP cash value presentation $372,019 | 3-year time-based vesting post grant | Converted to SW awards; identical terms |
| Time-based RSUs (legacy SKG time-based awards outstanding) | Mar 14, 2024 | 29,403 unvested; MV $1,583,646 (at $53.86) | Time-based vesting per award agreement | Outstanding at FY’24 year-end |
| 2025 LTI mix | Planned (2025 grants) | 75% PSUs, 25% RSUs | PSUs metrics: Adjusted Cumulative EPS (30%), Average ROCE (30%), Relative TSR (40%); RSUs vest in equal annual installments over 3 years | Detailed disclosure in 2026 proxy |
- No stock options or option-like awards were granted in 2024 under the post-combination compensatory programs .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 83,088 shares (includes 3,188 held by spouse) |
| Ownership as % of Outstanding | Less than 1% (company-wide) |
| Approx. Market Value of Beneficial Holdings | ~$4.48 million (83,088 × $53.86 close on 12/31/2024) |
| Unvested Time-based RSUs | 29,403 shares (MV $1,583,646 at $53.86) |
| Unvested DBP Awards | 8,999 shares (MV $497,087 at $53.86) |
| Unearned PSUs (max scenario incl. dividend equiv.) | 30,578 shares (MV $1,646,931 at $53.86) |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Other Executive Officers: 3× salary; retain 50% of post-tax shares until compliant |
| Compliance Status | As of end-2024, all NEOs either in compliance or subject to holding requirement |
| Hedging/Pledging & Trading Policy | Awards subject to insider trading policy; clawback policies adopted (Dodd-Frank and discretionary) |
Employment Terms
- Offer Letter & Role Expansion: Base salary $900,000; target annual bonus 75%; eligible annual equity ($2,250,000 target for 2025); benefits consistent with peer practices; Executive Severance Plan eligibility; 12-month non-compete/non-solicit/non-dealing; confidentiality/IP obligations .
- Executive Severance Plan: Tiered severance multiples (Non-CIC: 2×/1.5×/1×; CIC: 3×/2×/1.5×) based on participation tier designations, with benefits continuation periods; no single-trigger payments; no excise tax gross-ups (except as required by local law) .
- Retention Bonus (Combination-related): $897,000 (paid within 30 days of January 5, 2025), subject to continued employment/performance through the required date .
- Notice & Garden Leave: Service clauses contemplate 12 months’ notice; Company discretion for payment in lieu of notice; garden leave terms outlined; PILON excludes bonus/benefits accrual .
- Indemnification & Expense Advancement: Company by-laws provide indemnification powers for officers and advancement of expenses, subject to law and board determinations .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-Performance Alignment: AIP and SKG metrics emphasize Adjusted EBITDA/FCF, regional EBIT/FCF, and safety TRIR, with actuals yielding above-target payouts (AIP 128.9%; SKG 87.17%), reflecting tangible operational improvement in North America and reinforcing focus on cash and margin quality .
- Retention vs. Selling Pressure: The $897k retention bonus and substantial unvested equity (RSUs/PSUs/DBP) with 2024–2026 vesting horizons reduce near-term departure risk; PSU design tied to Relative TSR (and 2025 PSUs to EPS/ROCE/TSR) aligns incentives with shareholder outcomes, while ownership guidelines/holding requirements further limit net share sales pre-compliance .
- Severance & Change-of-Control Economics: Participation in a structured Executive Severance Plan (multi-tier, double-trigger CIC; no single-trigger) is standard for U.S.-listed issuers and mitigates abrupt turnover risk while capping parachute optics; lack of excise tax gross-ups is shareholder-friendly .
- Execution Track Record: Segment performance (NA EBITDA $810m; 17.2% margin in Q3 2025) and portfolio optimization (capacity reductions, plant closures) suggest disciplined operational and capital allocation focus under Sellier’s remit, improving profitability and supporting incentive realization .
- Governance Safeguards: Robust clawback policies (Dodd-Frank and discretionary), insider trading policy applicability to awards, and indemnification framework provide governance hygiene; no options awarded in 2024 reduces risk of option repricing optics .
Overall, Sellier’s compensation structure ties near-term incentives to earnings/cash safety outcomes and long-term equity to TSR/EPS/ROCE, while retention bonuses and vesting schedules point to alignment and reduced near-term turnover risk. Segment margin improvement in North America offers supportive evidence of execution against these incentives .