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Taryn Owen

Taryn Owen

President and Chief Executive Officer at TrueBlue
CEO
Executive
Board

About Taryn Owen

Chief Executive Officer and Director of TrueBlue, Inc. since September 12, 2023; age 46; 25+ years of staffing/talent acquisition experience, with 14 years at TrueBlue leading PeopleReady and PeopleScout and the company’s digital transformation and expansion . 2024 was challenging: revenue $1.6B, Adjusted EBITDA $11.2M, with $21.1M of share repurchases; five-year cum. buybacks reduced shares outstanding by 26% . Over the 2019–2024 period, a $100 investment in TBI was worth $33 at 2024 year-end, indicating substantial TSR underperformance versus the peer index at $146 . Governance mitigants to CEO dual-role: independent Chair (separate from CEO) and 8 of 9 independent directors; Owen is non‑independent due to her executive role .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
TrueBlue (Company)President & CEO; DirectorSep 2023–presentDrove cost reductions, liquidity, investor engagement; oversaw JobStack relaunch and tech initiatives .
TrueBluePresident & COO; President of PeopleReady & PeopleScoutSep 2022–Sep 2023Led operations across brands; continued digital and growth initiatives .
TrueBlueEVP; President PeopleReady and PeopleScout2021–2023Managed multi-brand leadership during recovery period .
TrueBlueEVP; President PeopleReady2019–2021Led largest unit; operational execution .
TrueBlueEVP; President PeopleScout2014–2019International expansion; acquisitions; digital transformation .
PeopleScout (prior)SVP Global Operations; VP Client DeliveryPre‑2014Delivery leadership .
Randstad SourcerightOperations DirectorPre‑2014Led global RPO engagements .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
HRO TodayBoard of Advisors (former)n/aIndustry engagement .
Wharton Center for Human ResourcesHuman Capital Industry Advisory Board (former)n/aAdvisory role .
SIA recognitionStaffing 100; Global Power 150multiple yearsIndustry awards .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base salary ($)$660,000 $766,751 $860,000
All other compensation ($)$9,969 $11,250 $5,750

Notes:

  • Salary held flat in 2024 ($860k); highlights cost discipline and pay positioning at market median per peer review .

Performance Compensation

Short-Term Incentive (STI) – 2024 design and outcome

ComponentWeightThresholdTargetMaximum2024 actual resultCEO payout impact
Adjusted EBITDA25%$21M $30M $39M $11.2M (below threshold) 0%
Relative revenue growth vs peers25%-5% 0% +5% Below threshold 0%
Individual strategic goals50%n/a100% 120% cap CEO at 100% (leadership, cost reduction, tech launches, investor outreach) 100% of this portion
CEO STI Target ($)$1,290,000
CEO STI Paid ($)$645,000 (50% of target)

Design notes:

  • CEO target bonus equals 150% of salary (derived from $1.29M target on $860k base) .
  • Company metrics paid zero; only individual component paid, signaling pay-for-performance alignment in a down year .

Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – 2024 structure and grants

  • Mix: 50% RSUs (time-vest, 3 years), 50% PSUs (3-year performance) .
  • 2024 PSU metrics replaced prior ROE with: 3-year Aggregate Adjusted EBITDA (70% of PSU) and Relative TSR (30%) vs defined peer set; 50–150% payout range; PSUs fully at risk .
CEO LTI targets (as % of salary)RSU (3-yr)PSU – 3-yr EBITDAPSU – rTSRTotal
% of base salary150.00%105.00%45.00%300%
2024 CEO equity grantsGrant dateShares/UnitsGrant-date fair value ($)
RSU2/23/202490,978 $1,023,503
PSU – 3y EBITDA (thr/target/max)3/7/202440,987 / 81,973 / 122,960 $955,805 (target)
PSU – 3y rTSR (thr/target/max)3/7/202417,566 / 35,132 / 52,698 $351,320 (target)
PSU performance curvesThresholdTargetMaximum
3-year Aggregate Adjusted EBITDA$116M (50%)$166M (100%)$216M (150%)
3-year Relative TSR (percentile vs peers)25th (50%)Median (100%)75th (150%)

Other LTI notes:

  • No options outstanding; plan prohibits repricing; 2024 equity plans rely on full-value shares (RSUs/PSUs) .

Multi‑Year CEO Compensation (Summary Compensation Table)

Component ($)202220232024
Salary$660,000 $766,751 $860,000
Stock awards (grant-date fair value)$1,557,377 $1,660,749 $2,330,628
Non‑equity incentive (STI)$825,000 $689,931 $645,000
All other comp$9,969 $11,250 $5,750
Total$3,052,346 $3,128,681 $3,841,378

Compensation program context:

  • Pay mix is majority at‑risk; no pension; no CIC excise tax gross‑ups; clawback policy in place (Dodd-Frank compliant) .
  • Compensation Committee uses Mercer as independent consultant; targets median of peer market; 2024 changes emphasized EBITDA and rTSR for PSUs .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership414,932 shares; ~1% of class (as of Mar 14, 2025) .
Stock ownership guideline4x annual RSU grant; effective multiple: 6.00x 2024 salary; on track to meet by Sep 12, 2028 .
Hedging/pledgingHedging prohibited; pledging discouraged by policy .
OptionsNone outstanding under plans; company reports zero options outstanding .
2024 shares vested53,852 shares; value $669,485 (pre‑tax) .
Deferred compensationExecutive contributions $14,550; company match $5,750; 2024 earnings $46,968; balance $425,614 .

Outstanding unvested and performance awards (12/29/2024):

  • Unvested RSUs: 7,066 (2/4/22; $55,609), 6,472 (10/3/22; $50,935), 21,146 (2/3/23; $166,419), 16,718 (10/2/23; $131,571), 90,978 (2/23/24; $715,997) .
  • Unearned PSUs (shown at target unless noted): 41,420 (3/10/23; $325,975), 81,973 (3/7/24 EBITDA; $645,128), 35,132 (3/7/24 rTSR; $276,489) .
  • RSUs generally vest 33.33% annually over three years; certain promotional/pre‑NEO awards vest 25% over four years .

Insider selling pressure signals:

  • Significant scheduled RSU/PSU vesting over 2025–2027 (per grant schedules above) can create periodic supply; 2024 vestings total 53,852 shares realized for CEO .

Employment Terms

ProvisionCEO – pre‑CIC separationCEO – after Change‑in‑Control (double trigger)
Cash severance18 months base salary; pro‑rated STI subject to performance 2x (base + target STI), paid 50% lump sum then 24 monthly installments
Equity vestingTime‑based equity scheduled to vest within 18 months vests at termination; performance awards vest pro‑rata based on actual results (deemed 18 months of service) All equity fully vests; performance awards at least target (per plan/change-in-control treatment)
Benefits continuationn/a18 months health/welfare benefits
Restrictive covenantsNon‑compete 18 months; non‑solicit 24 months; confidentiality/duty of loyalty
280G treatmentBest‑net cutback to avoid excise tax if needed; no gross‑up

Illustrative potential payouts (assuming 12/29/2024 termination):

  • After CIC: Cash $4,300,000; equity vesting value $2,368,122; benefits $51,406 .
  • Before CIC: Cash $1,935,000; accelerated equity $1,863,947 .

Board Service & Governance

AttributeDetail
Board roleDirector since September 2023; not independent (CEO) .
CommitteesInnovation & Technology Committee member (all directors serve on I&T); remit includes technology strategy, cybersecurity, AI oversight .
Leadership structureIndependent Board Chair separate from CEO for 20+ years; Lead Independent Director used when needed .
Board composition8 of 9 independent directors; all key committees (Audit, Compensation, Governance) fully independent .
AttendanceBoard met 7 times in 2024; all directors attended ≥75% of Board/committee meetings .
Say‑on‑pay91% approval in 2024 .
Related party transactionsNone in 2024 .
Insider trading policyProhibits hedging/short sales; policy filed with 10-K .

Note: As an employee director, Owen does not receive non‑employee director retainers/equity (director compensation tables apply to non‑employee directors) -.

Compensation Design, Benchmarks, and Trends

  • Peer benchmarking: 2024 peer group includes Robert Half; United Rentals and Volt removed (size/transaction changes). Company targets total direct compensation near median; base salaries ~median; STI targets between median–75th; LTI grant values between 25th–50th percentile; overall TDC between 25th–median .
  • 2024 program pivot: PSU metrics shifted from ROE to 3‑yr EBITDA (70%) and rTSR (30%); 2022 PSU cycle paid 0% on ROE; 2024 STI company metrics paid 0% amid downturn—tight pay-for-performance linkage .
  • Governance safeguards: No option repricing; double‑trigger CIC; clawback policy adopted 2023; no CIC excise tax gross‑ups; hedging prohibited .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • TSR underperformance: TBI TSR value fell to $33 on 2019=100 basis vs S&P 1500 HR/Employment Services peer index at $146 (through 2024) .
  • Zero payouts on company STI metrics; 2022 PSUs forfeited—signals challenging fundamentals .
  • Impairment and net loss: 2024 GAAP net loss $(125.7)M; Adjusted EBITDA $11.2M (contrast to 2022) .
  • Mitigants: Strong governance (independent chair; majority independent committees), clawback, anti-hedging; no related party transactions disclosed in 2024 .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

YearSay‑on‑pay result
202491% FOR

Compensation Committee uses Mercer; conducts investor outreach; program set near median and balances cash/equity with minimum vesting and clawbacks .

Compensation Committee Composition

  • Members: William C. Goings (Chair), Colleen B. Brown, Paul G. Reitz, Kristi A. Savacool; entirely independent; 5 meetings in 2024; approves metrics, targets, and oversees HCM .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: CEO’s target bonus (150% of salary) and 50%+ of LTI in performance shares tied to multi‑year EBITDA and rTSR create clear leverage to fundamentals and stock performance; 2024 zero company STI payout and 2022 PSU forfeiture reinforce pay-for-performance credibility .
  • Supply overhang: Large unvested RSU/PSU over 2025–2027 and demonstrated vesting cadence (53.9K shares vested in 2024) suggest periodic insider selling pressure on vest dates, notwithstanding anti‑hedging policies .
  • Retention/Change risk: Robust severance and double‑trigger CIC protections (2x cash; full equity vesting) reduce flight risk and can influence strategic optionality in corporate actions; pre‑CIC severance (18 months) and long non‑compete (18 months) further stabilize leadership continuity .
  • Governance comfort: Independent chair, strong committee independence, clawback, and no gross‑ups are investor‑friendly; however, TSR underperformance and low Adjusted EBITDA highlight execution risk—the new PSU framework (EBITDA+rTSR) raises stakes on multi‑year value creation .