J. Matthew Scurlock
TEXAS CAPITAL BANCSHARES INC/TXAbout J. Matthew Scurlock
Managing Director and Chief Financial Officer of TCBI since January 2022; age 43. Prior roles at TCBI include Director of Finance (2017–2019) and Executive Vice President, Corporate Treasurer (2019–2021); earlier experience at Deloitte & Touche LLP and Zions Bancorporation in corporate finance and balance sheet management . Firm performance context informing incentive design: 2024 adjusted diluted EPS $4.43, adjusted ROAA 0.74%, adjusted efficiency ratio 66.8%, CET1 11.4%, and fee income areas up 36% YoY; 1-year TSR 21.0% and 3-year TSR 29.8% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Texas Capital Bancshares (TCBI) | Director of Finance | 2017–2019 | Led finance modeling; foundation for later treasury and CFO platform |
| Texas Capital Bancshares (TCBI) | EVP, Corporate Treasurer | 2019–2021 | Managed Corporate Finance, IR, Treasury, Corporate Strategy; stress testing |
| Texas Capital Bancshares (TCBI) | CFO | 2022–present | Resource/capital allocation, expense discipline, investor engagement |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deloitte & Touche LLP | Strategic consulting to financial services | Prior to TCBI | Risk/finance advisory experience |
| Zions Bancorporation | VP, Corporate Finance | Prior to TCBI | Balance sheet management and financial modeling |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 500,000 | 512,500 | 598,334 |
| Target Annual Incentive (% of Base) | — | — | 85% |
| Target Annual Incentive ($) | — | — | 522,750 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Structure and 2024 Outcomes
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Achievement % | Financial Payout Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROAA (Adj. definition) | 35% | 0.45% | 0.65% | 0.80% | 0.76% | 137% | 48.0% |
| Efficiency Ratio (Adj. definition) | 35% | 73% | 68% | 63% | 67% | 110% | 38.5% |
| Financial Measures Aggregate | 70% | — | — | — | — | — | 86.5% (=123.3% of target financial) |
| Management Strategic Objectives (MSOs) | 30% | 50% goals | 85% goals | 100% goals | Varies by NEO | Varies | Varies |
| AIP Result | Value |
|---|---|
| 2024 CFO Aggregate Incentive Earned (% of Target) | 131.3% |
| 2024 CFO AIP Cash Bonus ($) | 686,533 |
Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) Design and Grants
- PRSUs: 3‑year performance; metrics: 3‑year Average ROTCE (60%) and Relative TSR vs KBW Regional Bank Index (40%); TSR component capped at 100% if absolute TSR is negative .
- Time‑based RSUs: Ratable over 3 years; special 2024 award cliff vests at 3 years .
| Grant (2024) | Type | Date | Shares | Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Special retention | Time‑based RSU | 7/29/2024 | 15,200 | 1,000,008 | Cliff vest at 3 years |
| Annual | Time‑based RSU | 2/16/2024 | 5,458 | 325,024 | Ratable over 3 years |
| Annual | PRSU (target) | 2/16/2024 | 5,458 (thr 2,729; max 10,916) | 362,222 (target) | Cliff at end of 3‑yr performance |
Performance realization (prior cycle):
| Cycle | Metric | Weight | Actual | Achievement % | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 PRSUs (earned in 2024) | 3‑yr Avg ROTCE | 60% | 8.7% | 154% | 93% |
| 2022 PRSUs (earned in 2024) | Relative TSR vs peers | 40% | 81st percentile | 200% | 80% |
| Aggregate | — | — | — | — | 172.4% of target |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 17,857 shares (<1%); includes 17,479 shares + 378 RSUs vesting within 60 days |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | 4x base salary for NEOs; as of 12/31/2024 Mr. Scurlock met guideline |
| Outstanding Awards at 12/31/2024 | 15,200 unvested RSUs (7/29/2024); 5,458 time-based RSUs (2/16/2024); 5,458 PRSUs at target (2/16/2024); 2,738 time-based RSUs (2/9/2023); 4,106 PRSUs at target (2/9/2023); 5,802 time-based RSUs (2/8/2022); 378 time-based RSUs (2/26/2021) |
| Market Value of Unvested/Unearned Awards | $1,188,640 (15,200); $426,816 (5,458 time); $426,816 (5,458 PRSU target); $214,112 (2,738); $321,089 (4,106 PRSU target); $453,716 (5,802); $29,560 (378) — valued at $78.20 close on 12/31/2024 |
| Insider Trading Policy | Prohibits hedging, short sales, and pledging by directors/executive officers |
| Clawback Policy | Expanded in 2023; cash and equity awards over prior 4 years subject to recoupment for restatements, misconduct, reputational harm, and policy/covenant violations |
| Nonqualified Deferred Compensation | 2024 earnings $20,618; balance $172,746; no 2024 contributions noted |
Employment Terms
| Provision | CFO Terms |
|---|---|
| Executive Severance Plan | If terminated without cause or for good reason: 12 months base + 1.0x average prior two years’ bonus; COBRA premiums for 12 months; outplacement discretionary; standard release/non‑compete/non‑solicit/confidentiality required |
| Executive Change‑in‑Control Plan | Double‑trigger within two years: 18 months base + 1.5x average prior two years’ bonus; up to 18 months health coverage; outplacement up to 6 months; no tax gross‑ups |
| “Cause” / “Good Reason” | Definitions include misconduct, fraud, policy violations (cause) and material demotion, major relocation (>50 miles), compensatory reductions, adverse changes post‑CIC (good reason) |
Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024 assumptions)
| Scenario | Severance Cash ($) | Benefits ($) | Equity Acceleration ($) | Total Notional Exposure ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination Without Cause/For Good Reason | 1,112,767 | 30,363 | — | 1,143,130 |
| Change in Control + Qualifying Termination | 1,669,151 | 45,545 | 3,060,749 | 4,775,445 |
| Death | — | — | 3,060,749 | 3,060,749 |
| Disability | — | — | 3,060,749 | 3,060,749 |
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 CFO performance highlights: drove expense savings; implemented consumption-based tech cost allocation; repurchased $81M of shares; executed $1.2B bond portfolio repositioning improving annual pre-tax earnings by ~$40M; supported ~$400M healthcare portfolio acquisition; enhanced liquidity risk framework; centralized vendor spend reductions; initiated CFO “Culture Tiger Team” .
- 2024 AIP payout reflects above-target company performance on ROAA and efficiency; CFO earned 131.3% of target .
Compensation Tables (Multi‑Year)
Summary Compensation (Reported)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 500,000 | 512,500 | 598,334 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 427,937 | 584,636 | 1,687,254 |
| AIP Cash Bonus ($) | 406,000 | 309,000 | 686,533 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 15,250 | 22,017 | 21,358 |
| Total ($) | 1,362,803 | 1,428,153 | 2,993,479 |
2024 Grants Detail
| Award | Date | Threshold | Target | Max | Grant Date FV ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Special RSU | 7/29/2024 | — | 15,200 | — | 1,000,008 |
| Time RSU | 2/16/2024 | — | 5,458 | — | 325,024 |
| PRSU | 2/16/2024 | 2,729 | 5,458 | 10,916 | 362,222 (target) |
Vesting Schedules and Insider Selling Pressure
- 2/16/2024 RSUs: time‑based vest ratably in 2025–2027; PRSUs cliff vest after performance period ending 12/31/2026 (settlement in early 2027) .
- 7/29/2024 special RSUs: cliff vest on 7/29/2027; concentrated vesting may create event‑date supply pressure absent 10b5‑1 programs .
- 2023 grants vest through 2025–2026; 2022 grants largely concluding 2025 (PRSU earned at 172.4%) .
- Anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging reduces leverage/selling pressure risk; trading pre‑clearance and blackout periods apply .
Governance and Alignment
- Pay‑for‑performance design: 70% AIP tied to ROAA and efficiency; LTI split PRSU/RSU; broad clawback and ownership requirements (CFO compliant at 4x salary) .
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval 82.6%; active investor outreach to refine disclosure and retention rationale for one‑time equity awards .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: CFO holds meaningful equity and meets 4x salary ownership; anti‑hedging/pledging and recoupment policies strengthen alignment and downside accountability .
- Near‑term vesting over 2025–2027 (including a 15.2k share cliff in 2027) could create episodic supply; monitor 10b5‑1 plan filings/Form 4 cadence around vest dates .
- Incentives emphasize profitability and efficiency (ROAA, efficiency ratio) with LTI tied to ROTCE and relative TSR—favorable for value creation but exposes payouts to rate/credit cycle; 2024 PRSU design maintains upside capped on TSR if absolute negative, reducing windfall risk .
- Retention risk appears mitigated by July 2024 one‑time RSUs and competitive severance/CIC protections; double‑trigger CIC terms avoid single‑trigger windfalls and lack tax gross‑ups, consistent with investor‑friendly norms .