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Fernando Madeira

President, BetterHelp at Teladoc HealthTeladoc Health
Executive

About Fernando Madeira

Fernando Madeira (55) is President of BetterHelp at Teladoc Health, appointed in November 2023. He holds a Bachelor of Computer Science from Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, and previously led major consumer internet and e‑commerce businesses (IPSY President; Walmart.com President/CEO; Walmart Latin America eCommerce President/CEO; Terra co‑founder/CEO) . During his tenure, Teladoc reported 2024 revenue of $2.6B and adjusted EBITDA of $311M (12.1% margin), with BetterHelp unique users of 1.3M; in 2025, BetterHelp segment revenue declined year over year, and Teladoc recorded a 2024 non‑cash goodwill impairment charge of $790M attributable to BetterHelp .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
TERRACo‑founder and CEO1989–2012Built and scaled a consumer internet platform across Latin America .
Walmart Latin America eCommercePresident & CEO2012–2014Led regional e‑commerce operations and market expansion .
Walmart.comPresident & CEO2014–2017Ran the U.S. online retail platform, driving digital commerce initiatives .
IPSYPresident2018–2022Grew a large DTC beauty subscription platform and creator commerce .
Teladoc Health (BetterHelp)President2023–presentLeads strategy, growth, operations, partnerships and product for DTC mental health .

External Roles

Not disclosed in company filings for Madeira .

Fixed Compensation

Not individually disclosed for Madeira. Company framework for executives comprises annual base salary and target cash bonuses set via peer benchmarking (Aon) and internal leveling; 2024 base salary and bonus structures for named executive officers (NEOs) are detailed but do not include Madeira .

Performance Compensation

Company-wide executive incentives (RSUs and PSUs) emphasize pay for performance using near-term profitability/cash flow and forward revenue growth metrics. While Madeira’s specific awards are not disclosed, the 2024 PSU constructs and outcomes for NEOs illustrate rigor and alignment:

MetricWeightingTarget periodThresholdTargetActualPayoutVesting details
Adjusted EBITDA (2024)40%FY2024$328mm$395mm$311mm0%Would have vested 1/3 on 3/19/2025; remainder quarterly over 2 years .
Free Cash Flow (2024)10%FY2024$193mm$255mm$170mm0%Would have vested 1/3 on 3/19/2025; remainder quarterly over 2 years .
Revenue (2025)50%FY2025Not disclosedNot disclosedPendingPendingTwo‑thirds vests 3/1/2026; remainder quarterly over 1 year (target capped at 200%) .
2023 Revenue PSUs (ending 2024)n/aFY2024$2,725mm$2,868mm$2,570mm0%Would have vested 2/3 on 3/1/2025; remainder quarterly over 1 year .
2022 AEBITDA Margin PSUs (ending 2024)n/aFY202414.75%15.75%12.09%0%Would have vested on 3/1/2025 .

Design features:

  • Annual bonus pools based on corporate revenue, adjusted EBITDA (ex‑bonus), and operational OKRs; segment leaders’ bonuses can blend corporate and segment metrics (e.g., 50/50 for certain commercial segments) .
  • RSUs typically vest 1/3 at first anniversary and then in eight equal quarterly installments over the next two years .
  • PSUs feature single‑year profit/cash metrics for near‑term alignment and forward revenue metrics for longer‑term growth; unearned PSUs in 2024 demonstrate rigor .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 5x base salary; all other executive officers 3x base salary; non‑employee directors 3x annual Board cash retainer .
  • Hedging/pledging prohibited by Insider Trading Compliance Policy; clawback policy compliant with SEC/NYSE rules applies to current/former executive officers .
  • Insider activity: Madeira adopted a Rule 10b5‑1 trading plan (amended 11/27/2024) to sell up to 36,540 shares through December 2025; subsequent sales align with plan and RSU vesting events .
  • Reported proposed/actual sales around vesting dates (Form 144/Yahoo/MarketWatch):
DateEventSharesConsiderationSource
06/03/2025Sale4,174$28,842 at $6.91/sh
09/01/2025RSU vesting (acquisition)4,149Compensation (vested RSUs)
09/02/2025Sale2,383$18,075.77
09/03/2025Proposed sale filing4,149$31,490.91
09/10/2025SaleNoted as $7.58–$7.59/sh

Stock ownership amounts for Madeira and % of shares outstanding are not individually disclosed in the proxy’s beneficial ownership table (only NEOs/directors and the aggregate executive group are listed) .

Employment Terms

  • Role start date and tenure: President, BetterHelp since November 2023 .
  • Executive contracts: Severance/change‑in‑control terms are disclosed for the CEO, CFO, CLO, U.S. Group Health President, and International President; Madeira’s specific employment agreement terms are not disclosed .
  • Company policies: No hedging or pledging; minimum vesting conditions in equity plans; no repricing of options/SARs without stockholder approval .

Performance & Track Record (BetterHelp context under Madeira’s leadership)

MetricQ2 2024Q2 2025
BetterHelp Revenue ($USD Thousands)$265,023 $240,390
BetterHelp Adjusted EBITDA ($USD Thousands)$25,453 $11,861
BetterHelp Adjusted EBITDA Margin (%)9.6% 4.9%
BetterHelp Paying Users (Millions)0.407 0.388
Non‑cash goodwill impairment (2024, BetterHelp)$790.0M

Additional context:

  • 1H25 BetterHelp revenue decreased 10% to $480.3M; adjusted EBITDA decreased 52% to $19.6M .
  • Teladoc acquired UpLift on April 30, 2025 to support coverage‑based access and potential topline benefits; Madeira commented on advancing access and growth via UpLift .

Compensation Committee & Governance Context

  • Independent Compensation Committee with Aon as advisor; peer group recalibrated in 2024 and migrated toward health care for 2025 benchmarking; strong say‑on‑pay support (91.6% in 2022; 81.9% in 2023; 95.9% in 2024) .
  • Stock ownership guidelines, clawback, no hedging/pledging, minimum vesting, and no option repricing without stockholder approval reflect alignment and governance discipline .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Segment headwinds: BetterHelp revenue and margin declines in 2025 and the 2024 non‑cash goodwill impairment signal execution complexity and potential pressure on DTC mental health economics under Madeira’s purview .
  • Insider selling: Pre‑planned 10b5‑1 sales around RSU vesting dates (relatively modest volumes) may create short‑term supply but are consistent with policy; no pledging/hedging permitted .
  • No disclosed tax gross‑ups or related‑party transactions involving Madeira; Cedar Gate contract involves the Board Chair, not Madeira .

Investment Implications

  • Pay‑for‑performance alignment at Teladoc is rigorous (multiple PSUs earned 0% for 2024), which likely constrains realized equity for executives when company/segment underperform—this supports shareholder alignment but can elevate retention risk if BetterHelp remains pressured .
  • Madeira’s 10b5‑1 plan‑driven sales are modest and timed to vesting, reducing signal risk; more meaningful signals would be plan changes or large discretionary sales. Governance policies (no hedging/pledging; clawbacks; ownership guidelines) mitigate alignment concerns .
  • Strategic response under Madeira includes expanding coverage‑based access via UpLift, potentially improving unit economics and demand mix for BetterHelp over time; monitor segment revenue/margin trends and paying user trajectory as leading indicators of value creation and execution quality .