David Vielehr
About David Vielehr
David Vielehr is President of LoadPay, Triumph Financial’s digital banking platform for the trucking industry; he joined Triumph in 2024 to help bring LoadPay to market and was named President on March 25, 2025 . He holds an MBA from Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management and a BA from the University of Colorado, and previously led fintech and product roles at C.H. Robinson, Target, and InComm Payments . During 2024, Triumph’s Payments segment revenue rose 35% year-over-year to $56.7 million and Q4 EBITDA margin improved to 8.6% (from 0.3% in Q4 2023), while the company’s cumulative 5‑year TSR reached 239%—performance context for LoadPay’s launch and scaling under Vielehr’s remit .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Triumph Financial | Senior Vice President, LoadPay | 2024–Mar 2025 | Led launch ramp of the LoadPay product targeting instant payments for carriers |
| C.H. Robinson | Vice President, Product | 2020–2024 | Led financial products, fraud strategy, and carrier marketing for largest U.S. freight broker |
| Target | Vice President, Financial Products & RedCard | 2017–2019 | Revamped cardholder acquisition aligned to digital‑first strategy |
| InComm Payments | Vice President & General Manager | 2013–2017 | Drove product growth in prepaid/transactions across partners |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not disclosed | — | — | No public directorships or external board roles disclosed in SEC filings or company materials . |
Fixed Compensation
- Not disclosed for David Vielehr in the latest proxy or 8‑K filings .
- Company executive compensation framework (context): 2024 NEO base salaries were unchanged; 2025 base salaries for NEOs remained at prior levels (CEO $725k; CFO $400k; COO $500k; TriumphPay President $425k; TBK Bank President $400k) .
Performance Compensation
- Annual Incentive Program (AIP) metrics used for NEOs (company context likely relevant to LoadPay oversight in Payments): five goals at 20% weighting each—Invoice Price Adjusted EPS, Banking Segment Pre‑Tax Net Income, Payments Segment Q4 EBITDA margin, Factoring Segment Invoice Aging, and Individual/Business Unit Objectives; payout ranges 0–150% per metric with ±30% committee discretion .
| Performance Measure | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Stretch | Actual | Earned % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Invoice Price Adjusted EPS (2024) | 20% | $0.94 | $1.38 | $1.82 | $0.61 | 0% |
| Banking Segment Pre‑Tax Net Income ($mm) | 20% | $105.0 | $130.0 | $155.0 | $114.5 | 69% |
| Payments Segment Q4 2024 EBITDA Margin % | 20% | — | 5% | 10% | 9% | 136% |
| Factoring Segment Invoice Aging (≤45 days) | 20% | 96% | 96% | 97% | 96.2% | 120% |
| Individual & Business Unit Objectives | 20% | 50% | 100% | 150% | 100% | 100% |
- Long‑Term Incentive Program (LTIP) structure (NEO framework): 50% performance‑based RSUs tied to relative TSR vs banking and fintech peer groups, with an absolute TSR modifier; 25% time‑vested RSUs; 25% nonqualified stock options .
| LTIP Component | Vesting / Payout Conditions | Key Parameters |
|---|---|---|
| Performance RSUs (50%) | 3‑yr performance; relative TSR vs bank peer group and Russell 3000 Data Processing & Outsourced Services; absolute TSR modifier; cap at 100% of target if negative absolute TSR; 8x value cap | Relative TSR vesting: 25th pct=50%, 50th pct=100%, 75th pct=150%, ≥90th pct=175% ; Absolute TSR modifier scales 30–100%→100–200% |
| RSUs (25%) | Time‑vested | 25% per year over 4 years |
| Stock Options (25%) | Time‑vested; strike at grant‑date close | 25% per year over 4 years; exercise price equals NASDAQ close on grant date |
| Grant Cadence | Annual grants | Generally May 1 for employees/executives; directors Feb 1/Jul 1; no MNPI timing |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial Ownership: David Vielehr is not listed among beneficial owners or executive officers in the February 24, 2025 security ownership table; individual shareholdings for him are not disclosed .
- Stock Ownership Guidelines: CEO 3× base salary; other executive officers 1.5× base salary; directors 5× annual cash retainer; compliance expected within 5 years of appointment .
- Hedging/Pledging: Company prohibits hedging and short sales; pledging restricted and excluded from guideline compliance unless pre‑approved with demonstrable repayment capacity .
| Alignment Policy | Requirement / Status |
|---|---|
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | CEO 3× salary; executives 1.5× salary; directors 5× retainer; compliance tracked |
| Hedging/Short Sales | Prohibited for directors/executives |
| Pledging | Restricted; not counted toward guidelines; pre‑approval required |
Employment Terms
- Executive Employment Agreements (NEO framework; David’s specific agreement not disclosed): one‑year terms auto‑renew; non‑compete and non‑solicit covenants for 1 year post‑termination; clawback policy compliant with SEC/Nasdaq rules .
- Severance Economics (NEO framework): Qualifying termination—CEO 1.5× base salary; other NEOs 1.0× base; healthcare continuation 18 months (CEO) / 12 months (others). With double‑trigger change‑in‑control within 24 months—CEO 3.0× (base + trailing 3‑yr average bonus), others 2.0×; healthcare continuation 36 months (CEO) / 24 months (others); 280G “better net” cutback applies .
| Provision | NEO Standard Terms |
|---|---|
| Term / Renewal | 1‑year; auto‑renew; extended to ≥2 years if CIC occurs |
| Severance (no CIC) | CEO 1.5× base; others 1.0× base; healthcare 18/12 months |
| Severance (double‑trigger CIC) | CEO 3.0× (base + 3‑yr avg bonus); others 2.0×; healthcare 36/24 months |
| Restrictive Covenants | Confidentiality (perpetual); non‑compete/non‑solicit 1 year |
| Clawback | Section 10D/Nasdaq‑compliant compensation recovery policy |
Performance & Company Context
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Triumph Annual TSR (%) | 27.70 | 145.27 | (58.96) | 64.07 | 13.34 |
| Payments Segment | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($mm) | 42.3 | 56.7 |
| Total Payment Volume ($bn) | 21.5 | 27.8 |
| Total Invoice Volume (mm) | 19.5 | 24.8 |
| Network Transactions Volume ($bn) | 1.8 | 4.2 |
| Payments Profitability | Q4 2023 | Q4 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 0.3 | 8.6 |
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Governance/Trading Policies: Strict insider trading windows and pre‑approval; anti‑hedging/pledging—reduces misalignment/pressure to sell .
- Ownership Disclosures: No personal beneficial ownership reported for Vielehr as of Feb 24, 2025—limits visibility into direct equity alignment; company guidelines still apply .
- Compensation Structure: Performance‑weighted AIP includes Payments EBITDA margin and LoadPay launch qualifier—signals alignment of cash bonuses with segment execution milestones .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Education: MBA (Kellogg School of Management); BA (University of Colorado) .
- Industry Experience: Fintech/product leadership in freight brokerage (C.H. Robinson), retail payments (Target, InComm); growth/marketing in carrier platforms (Xpress Technologies) .
- Current Leadership: Listed as President, LoadPay on Triumph’s leadership page .
Compensation Committee & Peer Benchmarking (Company Context)
- Committee: Independent Compensation Committee with Meridian Compensation Partners as advisor; NEO pay targeted to market median with heavier equity emphasis given fintech peer dynamics .
- Peer Groups: Banking (19 institutions with assets $3.7–$13.0bn) and fintech peers with revenues $38–$664mm; relative/absolute TSR used in LTIP .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Cash incentives tied to Payments EBITDA margin and LoadPay launch milestones align Vielehr’s operational execution with near‑term value drivers; 2024 achieved Q4 margin improvement and successful LoadPay launch qualifier suggests continuity in incentive design for payments leadership .
- Retention & Upside: Company LTIP focuses on TSR‑based PSUs, time‑vested RSUs, and options; although Vielehr’s individual awards are not disclosed, the framework promotes retention and ties upside to stock performance .
- Ownership Visibility: Absence of disclosed personal share ownership limits direct “skin‑in‑the‑game” analysis; monitor future proxies/Forms 4 for grants and holdings, and any pledging exceptions (company policies restrict pledging/hedging) .
- Execution Signals: Watch for LoadPay adoption, Payments margin trajectory, and network density metrics (payment volume, network transactions) as leading indicators under Vielehr’s leadership; the segment delivered 35% revenue growth and margin expansion in 2024—continued momentum would support pay‑for‑performance alignment .