Edward J. Schreyer
About Edward J. Schreyer
Edward J. Schreyer (age 58) is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Triumph Financial, Inc. (TFIN) and TBK Bank, SSB; he became COO in 2022 after joining TFIN in 2021 as President and COO of TriumphPay. He previously spent ~30 years at CBRE Group, Inc., most recently as COO for the Americas Advisory business, leading Industrial & Logistics and overseeing the Security and Crisis Management Team. Schreyer holds a B.S. in Urban Studies/Affairs from Indiana University Bloomington . During 2019–2024, TFIN’s cumulative TSR reached ~239% and outperformed the Nasdaq Bank Index; 2024 EPS was $0.54 amid freight downturn, while Payments revenue rose 35% to $56.7M and Q4 2024 Payments EBITDA margin improved to 8.6% from 0.3% YoY .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Triumph Financial, Inc. | Executive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer (Company and TBK Bank, SSB) | 2022–present | Enterprise COO; drove network platform initiatives across payments, factoring, banking . |
| TriumphPay (TFIN) | President & Chief Operating Officer | 2021–2022 | Led onboarding growth; payments network and product build-up pre-COO promotion . |
| CBRE Group, Inc. | COO, Americas Advisory; leadership of Industrial & Logistics; oversight of Security & Crisis Management | ~30 years (ending 2021) | Led large-scale operations across logistics client base; crisis/security oversight . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $500,000 | $500,000 | $500,000 (effective Mar 1, 2025; unchanged) |
| Target Bonus (%) | 60% of base | 60% of base | 60% of base (program continuity) |
| Actual Annual Incentive ($) | $315,000 | $255,000 | N/A |
2024 “All Other Compensation”: $17,178 (401(k) $13,800; executive health $3,378) .
Multi-year compensation trend (total): $1,603,972 (2022), $1,733,111 (2023), $1,906,650 (2024) .
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Program (AIP) – Company Metrics and Payout
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Stretch | Actual | Earned % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Invoice Price Adjusted EPS | 20% | $0.94 | $1.38 | $1.82 | $0.61 (after invoice price adj.) | 0% |
| Banking Segment Pre-Tax Net Income (in $mm) | 20% | $105.0 | $130.0 | $155.0 | $114.5; credit-quality qualifier met | 69% |
| Payments Segment Q4 EBITDA Margin % (with qualifiers) | 20% | — | 5% | 10% | 9%; LoadPay launch & data solution delivered | 136% |
| Factoring Segment Invoice Aging (≤45 days) | 20% | 96% | 96% | 97% | 96.2% | 120% |
| Individual & Business Unit Objectives | 20% | 50% | 100% | 150% | 100% | 100% |
| Weighted % of Target Bonus Earned | — | — | — | — | — | 85% |
Schreyer’s 2024 AIP target bonus was 60% of base ($300,000) and actual payout was $255,000 (85% of target) .
Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP) Design and 2024 Targets
| Component | Design | 2024 Target Grant Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Performance RSUs (50%) | 3-year TSR vs (i) banking peer group and (ii) Russell 3000 Data Processing/Outsourced Services; 50–175% vest based on relative TSR; absolute TSR modifier (≤30% no uplift, ≥100% doubles vested shares); negative absolute TSR cap at 100%; 8x value cap . | $437,500 |
| Time-Vested RSUs (25%) | Four annual tranches (25% per year) . | $218,750 |
| Nonqualified Stock Options (25%) | 4-year ratable vesting; strike = grant-date close . | $218,750 |
| Total 2024 LTIP Target | — | $875,000 |
2024 Grants of Plan-Based Awards (Schreyer)
| Type | Grant Date | Target Shares (#) | Max Shares (#) | Exercise Price ($) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance RSUs (TSR) | 5/1/2024 | 6,076 | 21,266 | — | $697,009 |
| Time-Vested RSUs | 5/1/2024 | 3,038 | — | — | $218,736 |
| Stock Options | 5/1/2024 | 5,864 | — | $72.00 | $218,727 |
2024 Stock awards vested (realized value): 21,677 shares; $1,560,744 (no options exercised) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Category | Amount |
|---|---|
| Shares directly/indirectly owned | 1,275 |
| Shares subject to future vesting | 32,294 |
| Options exercisable within 60 days | 992 |
| Total beneficial ownership | 34,561 (less than 1% of common) |
Stock ownership guidelines: Other Executive Officers must hold stock equal to 1.5x base salary; all executives are compliant or expected to be by the measurement date; hedging prohibited; pledging restricted and not counted toward guidelines . No pledging is disclosed for Schreyer; company notes CEO pledging (60,000 shares) separately .
Outstanding Equity Awards at 12/31/2024 (Key items)
| Award | Status | Quantity | Terms/Value Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Options (2023 Grant) | Exercisable/Unexercisable | 992 / 2,976 | Strike $51.25; exp. 5/1/2033 |
| Stock Options (2024 Grant) | Unexercisable | 5,864 | Strike $72.00; exp. 5/1/2034 |
| Performance RSUs (2023 TSR grant) | Unvested (max basis) | 13,656 | Market value: $1,241,057 as of $90.88 close |
| Performance RSUs (2024 TSR grant) | Unvested (max basis) | 21,266 | Market value: $1,932,654 as of $90.88 close |
| Time-Vested RSUs (various) | Unvested | 16,539; 5,400; 7,317; 3,038 | Market values: $1,503,064; $490,752; $664,969; $276,093 as of $90.88 close |
Insider trading policy requires pre-clearance and open-window trading; hedging/short sales prohibited .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Term |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement term | 1-year, auto-renews; extended to ≥2 years from a change in control (CIC) |
| Severance (non-CIC, qualifying termination) | 1.0x base salary + 12 months health continuation |
| Severance (CIC + qualifying termination; double-trigger) | 2.0x base + trailing 3-year average bonus; 24 months health continuation |
| Restrictive covenants | Confidentiality (perpetual); 1-year non-compete, non-solicit, business non-interference |
| Clawback | Mandatory recovery upon material restatement; covers performance incentive/equity pursuant to SEC/Nasdaq Rule 5608 |
| Tax gross-ups | None; 280G “better net after-tax” cutback applies |
Potential Payments (12/31/2024 termination assumptions)
| Scenario | Severance ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Stock Options ($) | Welfare Benefits ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualifying Termination (no CIC) | 500,000 | 690,734 | — | 29,462 | 1,220,196 |
| Qualifying Termination (CIC; double-trigger) | 1,303,940 | 4,605,526 | 267,964 | 58,925 | 6,236,355 |
| Death / Disability | — | 2,553,204 | 267,964 | — | 2,821,168 |
Performance & Track Record
| Area | 2024 Performance Highlights |
|---|---|
| Payments | Revenue $56.7M (+35% YoY); processed $27.8B payment volume (+29% YoY); Q4 EBITDA margin 8.6% (vs. 0.3% prior year); successful LoadPay launch and inaugural data product; strategic onboarding of C.H. Robinson . |
| Factoring | Improved invoice aging to 96.2% ≤45 days; ML-based instant purchase decisioning; fuel program savings of ~$3.5M for carriers; rollout of Factoring‑as‑a‑Service (FaaS) . |
| Banking | Pre‑tax net income $114.5M (vs. $136.2M in 2023) with cost of funds 1.51%; managed expenses (-1% YoY) and maintained deposit strength under rate and credit pressure . |
| Shareholder Returns | 5‑year cumulative TSR ~239%; annualized 19% (Dec 2019–Dec 2024), outperforming bank indices . |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and trends: Schreyer’s total pay increased from $1.60M (2022) to $1.91M (2024), driven primarily by equity awards; base salary remained flat at $500k during 2023–2025 .
- At‑risk emphasis: 2024 LTIP target at 175% of salary with 50% performance RSUs tied to TSR vs banking/fintech peers, aligning long‑term pay with shareholder returns; options have value only with price appreciation .
- Annual incentive rigor: 5 equally weighted AIP metrics spanning enterprise EPS, segment goals (Banking pre‑tax, Payments Q4 EBITDA margin with product qualifiers, Factoring aging), plus individual objectives; payout at 85% reflected mixed macro headwinds and strong segment execution .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Skin‑in‑the‑game: 34,561 total beneficially owned shares; 32,294 subject to future vesting; options exercisable within 60 days: 992 .
- Guidelines: Required ownership at 1.5x salary; company states executives are compliant or on track; hedging banned; pledging restricted (no Schreyer pledge disclosed) .
- Vesting schedules: Time‑vested RSUs/options vest 25% per year over 4 years; performance RSUs vest after 3‑year TSR tests with absolute TSR modifier and caps; prorated vesting for certain terminations; CIC double‑trigger acceleration applies per plan terms .
Employment Terms
- Contract: 1‑year auto‑renew; extended to at least the second anniversary post‑CIC; 1‑year non‑compete/non‑solicit post‑termination .
- Severance economics: 1.0x base (non‑CIC); 2.0x base + 3‑year avg bonus (CIC double‑trigger), plus 12–24 months health continuation; “better net after‑tax” 280G cutback (no gross‑ups) .
- Clawback: Mandatory recovery for restatements per SEC/Nasdaq Rule 5608 .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: High equity and TSR‑based performance RSUs tie Schreyer’s upside to sustained shareholder returns; options reinforce sensitivity to share price appreciation .
- Retention risk: Multi‑year vesting, TSR hurdles, and CIC double‑trigger severance reduce near‑term churn risk; termination scenarios indicate meaningful CIC‑linked equity value and cash protections that stabilize leadership through strategic cycles .
- Insider selling pressure: Significant 2024 vesting ($1.56M realized) without option exercises suggests limited immediate selling pressure; trading constrained by pre‑clearance/windows; hedging banned .
- Alignment and governance: Ownership guidelines, anti‑hedging/limited pledging, robust clawback, and no CIC gross‑ups indicate shareholder‑friendly design; CEO share pledge is disclosed separately, with restrictions on counting pledged shares toward guidelines—no pledge disclosed for Schreyer .
- Execution track record: Under Schreyer’s operating leadership, Payments and Factoring advanced monetization and operational KPIs despite freight downturn; cumulative TSR outperformance underscores long‑term value creation against bank indices .